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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY, AND A DESCRIPTION 
OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERAL 
ENERGY ADMINISTRATION
THE FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION:
A CASE STUDY OF ENERGY POLICY-MAKING
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Scope of the Study 
Until the 1973 oil embargo imposed by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the 
United States had no "energy policy" as such. Decisions 
were made more or less independently at each level of govern­
ment by a myriad of agencies for each of the separate energy 
resources. Within twelve months of the implementation of 
the boycott, however, the national policy-making apparatus 
had been significantly altered by the introduction of new 
federal organizations designed to bring order to events by 
coordinating and controlling decisions ranging from the 
research and development of energy technologies to the imple­
mentation of "life style" changing conservation strategies. 
Foremost among these new organizations was the Federal Energy 
Administration (FEA), which was charged with the task of 
regulating the production, distribution, and pricing of a 
wide range of energy fuels. This study is an attempt to
2
evaluate the performance of the FEA as a more coherent 
energy authority within the federal government. As such, 
the study is designed to follow in the established research 
tradition, termed "institutional" policy analysis, which 
has sought to apply principles of public administration and 
public policy theory to the evaluation of formal, govern­
mental mechanisms for making decisions.^ Perhaps no more 
fertile field exists for the policy analyst than the energy 
arena. Energy politics is more easily subjected to policy 
analysis than, for example, the more complex arena of inter­
national relations and foreign policy; the boundaries of the 
energy policy system are more clearly defined and the list 
of decision-making participants, while growing, remains 
limited. Moreover, the newly created energy institutions 
offer attractive advantages for the policy analyst. These 
new organizations have been established with wide-ranging, 
but generally well-defined powers, goals, and objectives.
And bodies such as the FEA deal with substantive problem 
areas which have high national visibility and can be expected 
to generate political controversy and debate. That this area 
has remained underdeveloped by political scientists can be
See, for example, Samuel Krislov and Lloyd D. Musolf, 
eds., The Politics of Regulation (New York: Houghton-Mifflin,
1964); and Louis M. Kohlmeier, Jr., The Regulators (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1969).
^See David H. Davis, Energy Politics (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 1-16.
attributed to a number of factors, but two seem especially 
relevant. First, and more generally, there has been no 
consensus within the discipline as to the theoretical frame­
work which best matches analytical concepts to institutional 
energy problem-solving; models have been developed from such 
disparate sources as social choice theory to more traditional 
interest group theory.^ And second, the understanding of 
substantive energy issues by policy analysts has usually been 
very shallow.^ One cannot help but be struck by how little 
social science in general and political science in particu­
lar contributed to the resolution of institutional problems 
during the 1973 energy crisis.
Purpose of the Research 
The dual research purposes of this study flow 
directly from the problems outlined above. On the one hand, 
a case study of the FEA has as a research purpose contribut­
ing to the substantive knowledge of energy policy-making 
through the building of a descriptive base which outlines
See Gerald Garvey, "Research on Energy Policy: 
Processes and Institutions," in Hans H. Landsberg, et al., 
eds.. Energy and the Social Sciences: An Examination of
Research Needs (Washington, P.O.: Resources for the Future,
1974), pp. 539-580.
^See Robert M. Lawrence, "Research Possibilities in 
the Area of the Formulation and Implementation of Energy 
Policy: Institutions," in Landsberg, et al., pp. 596-636;
and William 0. Doub, Federal Energy Regulation: An Organiza­
tional Study (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1974) .
the characteristics of the overall energy policy system, 
the FEA itself, and the agency's major programs. A second 
research purpose is to evaluate FEA performance. Hopefully, 
this study can contribute to the expansion of knowledge of 
both policy analysis theory and energy policy-making through 
the development and implementation of an evaluation frame­
work which is rooted in the "bureaucratic behavior" litera­
ture of political science. But it must be emphasized that 
the primary goal of this analysis is to aid in the under­
standing of the workings of energy institutions. Any con­
tribution to analytical theory-building is of secondary con­
cern.
In summary, then, the research purposes of this 
study are as follows :
-To describe the legislative-executive policy-making 
processes which led to the establishment of the 
FEA, the focus to be placed on energy policy struc­
tures .
-To evaluate the bureaucratic policy-making pro­
cesses which the FEA has undertaken, the focus 
to be placed upon energy policy functions.
Statement of the Research Problem
The establishment of the FEA is typical of the incre­
mental, piecemeal, ad hoc responses of the energy policy 
system to perceived problems. Responding to the perception 
of an energy shortage in the early 1970s, both the legisla­
ture and the executive came forth with a series of disjointed 
efforts to reorganize energy policy machinery. The primaury
motive behind the creation of the FEA was the need to bring 
a greater degree of coordination and consolidation to the 
energy policy system. Thus, at the broadest level, the 
research problem for a case study of the FEA must be stated 
in terms of an investigation of "institutional incoherence." 
More specifically, however, the research problem must be 
stated in terms of the application of specific evaluative 
criteria to specific institutional policies.
Although the choice of both criteria and policies is 
of necessity somewhat arbitrary, justification can and must 
be made in both instances. In the case of FEA policies, 
the choice is a fairly straightforward one. The major activ­
ities of the FEA are the regulatory programs controlling the 
pricing and allocation of crude oil and petroleum products.^ 
Determining the most appropriate performance evaluation cri­
teria is a more difficult task, since the list of possible 
standards is long and the issue-area of energy policy-making 
has not itself been developed enough to provide many hints.® 
The frame of reference adopted in this study is that no 
single evaluative criterion adequately assesses institutional 
behavior. Instead, a "systems analysis" approach, considering
®See Federal Energy Administration, Annual Report,
1974-1975 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975), p. 1.
®See Charles 0. Jones, An Introduction to the Study 
of Public Policy (Belmont: Duxbury Press, 1970), pp. 107-
109, for a discussion of the problems involved in determining 
acceptable evaluation criteria.
energy policy organizations as social systems, has been 
adopted.^  This approach relies heavily upon that part of 
public administration theory which focuses on bureaucratic
O
behavior. This literature has, over the last three or four 
decades, introduced a whole range of criteria which have 
influenced the design of American bureaucracy and the man­
ner in which public policies are made in these organizations. 
Six policy evaluation criteria from this body of theory 
appear to have relevance to this study: representativeness,
efficiency, equity, effectiveness, responsiveness, and 
responsibility. They form the basic elements from which a 
framework for the analysis of the FEA's performance can be 
constructed. In the review of the literature which follows, 
the reasons for the utility of each of these criteria are 
outlined in some detail. Then, in the next chapter.
^See David Easton, The Political System (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1953) .
Q
Examples of this extensive literature include 
Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown,
1967); Harold Seidman, Politics, Position and Power (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Peter M. Blau and 
Marshall W. Meyer, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: 
Random House, 1971).
9
It should be noted that these concepts, while not 
central elements in most works on energy policy, are con­
sidered in some studies. This is especially the case with 
the standards of efficiency and effectiveness. See Stephen 
G. Breyer and Paul W. MacAvoy, Energy Regulation by the 
Federal Power Commission (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1974); and Edward Berlin, Charles J. Cicchetti, 
and William J. Gillen, Perspective on Power (Cambridge: 
Ballinger Publishers, 1974).
8theoretical and methodological problems with these standards
are discussed, the analytical framework is made explicit,
a methodology incorporating these standards is developed,
and the concepts are operationalized.
In summary form, then, the research problem for this
study can be stated as follows:
-Within an energy policy-making system which is 
characterized by "institutional incoherence,” frag­
mentation, and incremental modes of making decis­
ions, how representative, efficient, equitable, 
effective, responsive, and responsible have Federal 
Energy Administration policies regarding the pric­
ing and allocation of petroleum and its products 
been?
Review of the Literature 
Each of the six evaluative criteria to be used in 
this study has an extensive history in the literature of 
political science. The following discussion attempts to 
briefly place the criteria in an historical context and out­
line the most important aspects of the evolution, defini­
tions, and uses of each of these concepts.
Representativeness 
The concept of a "representative" policial institu­
tion is as old as political theory itself, but the concept 
of a "representative bureaucracy" was developed in the 1940s 
in an attendit to cope with the growing problems of analyzing 
bureaucratic responsibility. As long as political analysts 
had accepted the premise of a policy-administration dichotomy
which distinguished between the policy-making functions of 
the executive and the legislature and the administrative 
(or policy-implamentation) activities of the bureaucracy, 
responsible control of public agencies had seemed a rela­
tively simple task. In this paradigm bureaucracies were 
controlled by external mechanisms utilizing strategies empha­
sizing governmental sanctions.^® However, with the growth 
of the view that policy-making and policy-implementation 
were interwoven, problems of analyzing political control 
became more complex. Once bureaucrats were seen as having 
substantial policy roles, then a portion of political re­
sponsibility had to be internalized and based upon such fac­
tors as the values, attitudes, beliefs, and interests of the 
bureaucrat himself, as well as his expertise and administra­
tive skills. As Donald Kingsley, one of the first advocates 
of the concept, summarized the general idea of representa­
tiveness:
. . . the essence of responsibility is psychological 
rather than mechanical. It is to be sought in an 
identity of aim and point of view, a common back­
ground of social prejudice, which leads the agent to 
act as though he were the principal . . .  if the 
essence of responsibility is psychological, the 
degree to which all democratic institutions are 
representative is a matter of prime significance.
See Frank J. Goodnow, Politics and Administration 
(New York: Macmillan, 1900); and Carl J. Friedrich, "Public
Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," in 
Carl J. Friedrich and E. S. Mason, eds.. Public Policy 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 3-24.
10
No group can safely be entrusted with power who do 
not themselves mirror the dominant forces in 
society; for they will then act in an irresponsible 
manner or will be liable to corruption at the hands 
of dominant groups.H
Thus, the theory of all representative democratic institu­
tions is derived from the concept of political responsi­
bility. It is also closely related to the concept of polit­
ical responsiveness, since:
The representative system must look after the public 
interest and be responsive to public opinion, except 
insofar as non-responsiveness can be justified in 
terms of the public interest.12
Two basic elements are therefore included in the theory of
any representative political structure— acting in the
responsible interest of, and in a manner responsive to, the
represented.
Kingsley's British view of a representative bureau­
cracy as one which "mirrors" the population in terms of eco­
nomic class was modified by American political scientists to 
include a broader range of representative characteristics.
Donald J. Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy:
An Interpretation of the British Civil Service (Yellow 
Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1944), pp. 282-283. See also 
David E. Levitan, "The Responsibility of Administrative 
Officials in a Democratic Society," Political Science 
Quarterly 61 (December 1946): 582-583.
12Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 224.
^^Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix 
and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Depar­
ture from an Old Problem," American Political Science Review 
63 (June 1969): 429.
11
Thus, Norton Long proposed that the U.S. Federal Civil
Service was "a better sample of the mass of the people than
Congress" because of its "more effective and more respon­
sible" representation stemming from "its origins, income 
level, and associations."^^ An even more sophisticated set 
of requisites was proposed by Paul Van Riper, who said that 
a representative bureaucracy must:
. . . (1) consist of a reasonable cross section of 
the body politic in terms of occupation, class, 
geography and the like, and (2) must be in general
tune with the ethos and attitudes of the society of
which it is part.15
While Long and Van Riper enlarged the range of appli­
cable characteristics of a representative bureaucracy, 
others, like Lloyd Warner,sought to redefine the term in 
a manner more compatible with traditional American princi­
ples of merit. Thus, as V. Subramaniam points out, rather 
than defining representative bureaucracy in its most literal 
sense (every class represented in exact proportion to its 
numbers), Warner interpreted it to mean "a bureaucracy drawn 
'from all social, racial, and religious groups on the basis
^^Norton Long, "Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism," 
American Political Science Review 46 (September 1952): 808-
818.
^^Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States 
Civil Service (Evanston: Row Peterson, 1958), pp. 549-559.
^^See Lloyd W. Warner, et al., The American Federal 
Executive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). Also
see Dwight Waldo, "Development of Theory of Democratic 
Administration," American Political Science Review 46 
(March 1952): 81-103.
12
of ability*— but not necessarily in exact numerical 
proportion to produce 'a copy of society
Samuel Krislov found, in reviewing this literature, 
four "intertwined" meanings for the concept of a representa­
tive bureaucracy:
The most obvious is the simple representational 
notion that all social groups have a right to 
political participation and to influence. The second 
can be labeled the functional aspect; the wider the 
range of talents, types, and regional and family 
contacts found in a bureaucracy, the more likely it 
is able to fulfill its functions, with respect to 
both internal efficiency and social setting. 
Bureaucracies also symbolize values and power reali­
ties and are thus representational in both a politi­
cal and analytic sense. Therefore, finally, social 
conduct and future behavior in a society may be 
channelized and encouraged through the mere consti­
tution of the bureaucracy.18
Frederick Mosher has further refined the concept by 
observing that there are two types of representativeness—  
active and passive. Active (or responsible) representative­
ness is defined in terms of the bureaucrat advocating the 
interests of constituencies. As Mosher puts it, in active 
representation the individual administrator "is expected to 
press for the interests and desires of those whom he is pre­
sumed to represent, whether they be the whole people or some
V. Subramaniam, "Representative Bureaucracy: A
Reassessment," American Political Science Review 61 (Decem­
ber 1967): 1010 (emphasis mine).
18Samuel Krislov, The Negro in Federal Employment 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967), p. 64
(emphasis mine).
13
19segment of the people." Passive (or sociological)
representativeness, on the other hand:
. . . concerns the source of origin of individuals 
and the degree to which, collectively, they mirror 
the total society. It may be statistically measured 
in terms, for example, of locality or origin and its 
nature (rural, urban, suburban, etc.), previous 
occupation, father's occupation, education, family 
income, family social class, race, and religion.20
For Mosher, as with most theorists, a strong linkage between
active and passive representativeness is assumed.
Efficiency and Equity 
Perhaps the most common evaluative standard, the 
concept of efficiency has a long history in policy analysis. 
It has, in fact, been the justification for most administra­
tive reform efforts in the public service and has often
21acquired the status of an "unquestioned moral imperative." 
The essence of the classical argument for administrative 
efficiency was the "imperative" that any rational (Weberian) 
bureaucracy required the constant minimization of resources 
(inputs) and the maximization of products (outputs). In 
the words of Herbert Simon, it was a generally accepted
19Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public 
Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 12.
See also Arthur D. Larson, "Representative Bureaucracy and 
Administrative Responsibility: A Reassessment," Midwest
Review of Public Administration 7 (April 1973): 87.
^^Mosher, p. 12.
^^Robert C. Fried, Performance in American Bureau­
cracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), pp. 67-68.
14
tenet of the theory of public policy-making that almost
all bureaucratic decisions were in some sense determined by
the rational requirement to "take the shortest path, the
cheapest means, toward the attainment of the desired 
22goals." Thus, in Weberian terms, bureaus were defined by
their "technical superiority" over other organizational
forms. In order to justify this stance, a number of factors
such as task specialization, hierarchical authority, and
span of control became associated with administrative effic-
23iency through elaborate "principles of administration."
More recent research has demonstrated the weaknesses 
of these hard and fast principles of bureaucratic efficiency. 
But the basic nature of the concept has not been altered.
For example, one analysis, moving beyond the traditional 
economic framework to a consideration of the conversion pro­
cesses of organizations, defines efficiency in terms of the 
consumption of "energy" inputs. That is, while all organi­
zations maintain themselves only as long as they achieve 
"negentropy" (importing more "energy" than they produce) the 
"efficient" organizaton consumes less of its inputs in the 
policy conversion process than does the "inefficient"
22Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New 
York: Free Press, 1957), p. 14.
^^See Simon, pp. 20-21.
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24structure. Thus, while the definitions of bureaucratic
efficiency now range from the traditional standard of
25"doing the job at the lowest cost," to a focus on the
ability of the bureaucracy to "perform without waste in the
approved technical m a n n e r , t h e  basic idea remains the
same— the achievement of a ratio of inputs to outputs which
increases the latter while decreasing the former.
As useful as the concept of efficiency has been to
the study of bureaucratic performance, the criterion does
little to answer the output concern of: "Who gets what,
when, how?" As Johnson and Pierce note:
To the extern: that both costs and benefits can be 
measured in dollar terns, cost-benefit analysis may 
be used to aid in the efficient allocation of 
resources among alternative substantive programs. 
However, because most programs carry with them a 
decision rule dealing with distribution, the tradi­
tional economic efficiency criterion is not suffic­
ient for decision m a k i n g . ^7
Thus, the evaluation of agency outputs must include consider­
ation for both the production and the distribution of policy
Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology 
of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966),
pp. 150-151.
^ ^ F r i e d ,  p .  6 7 .
^^Louis C. Mainzer, Political Bureaucracy (Glenview,
111.: Scott, Foresman, 1973), p. 8.
27Ronald W. Johnson and John M. Pierce, "The Economic 
Evaluation of Policy Impacts: Cost-Benefit and Cost- 
Effectiveness Analysis," in Frank P. Scioli, Jr. and Thomas 
J. Cook, eds., Methodologies for Analyzing Public Policies 
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975), p. 135.
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costs, benefits, and sanctions. This need has led to the
widespread usage of the concept of equity in conjunction
with the standard of efficiency, particularly in studies of
regulatory agency performance. According to James Wilson:
In evaluating these and other kinds of government 
regulations, there are two standards one may 
employ— efficiency and equity. By "efficiency" I 
mean that a given regulatory policy achieves a desir­
able objective at minimal cost; by "equity" I mean 
that the regulatory policy, whether efficient or 
not, treats those subject to it fairly— that is, 
treats like cases alike on the basis of rules known 
in advance and applicable to all.28
The use of equity as an evaluative criterion has 
traditionally emphasized the necessi ty for broadening the 
scope of administrative law and principles of "democratic 
administration" through the development of procedures for 
notice, hearing, and review for parties subject to the 
actions of government. It is only recently, however, that 
policy analysts have moved beyond consideration of equity as 
synonymous with equal (or identical) outputs to more sophis­
ticated distinctions between different standards of equity. 
The most important distinctions for policy analysis appear 
to be those between potential and actual equity and those 
between input and output equity.
The "fairness" definition of equity outlined above 
by Wilson closely corresponds to what Pauly and Willett have 
termed "ex ante," or "before-the-fact" equity. In this
28James Q. Wilson, "The Dead Hand of Regulation," 
Public Interest 25 (Fall 1971) : 40.
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definitional scheme, equity is achieved through the 
equalization of potential risks or opportunities. In con­
trast, "ex post," or "after-the-fact" equity denotes situa­
tions in which actual outputs are equalized.
The difference between input equity and output equity 
is a distinction between the equalization of the distribution 
of resources, and the responsiveness of any system of allo­
cating such resources to the perceived needs and the social 
values of the consumers. Lineberry and Welch discuss this 
issue as follows:
The distinction between input and output 
equity is usually credited to James Coleman, who 
made a strong case for the latter as a criterion for 
school evaluation. For a long time the measurement 
of public policy output, especially in the field of 
education, was dominated by an input equality stan­
dard. Schools were presumed equal when they were 
assigned equal resources for each child . . . This 
standard, however, collides abruptly with the cri­
teria of output equality and efficiency. From an 
output equality perspective, neither wants nor needs 
are considered in the use of input equality stan­
dards. 30
Essentially, the concern of most recent policy anal- 
sts with the criterion of output equity has been that public
29Mark V. Pauly and Thomas D. Willett, "Two Concepts 
of Equity and Their Implications for Public Policy," Social 
Science Quarterly 53 (June 1972): 8-10. See also Richard C.
Rich, "Institutional Arrangements and Equity in Urban Service 
Delivery," a paper prepared for delivery at the 1976 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Chicago, September 2-5, 1976.
^^Robert L. Lineberry and Robert E. Welch, Jr.,"Who 
Gets What: Measuring the Distribution of Urban Public Ser­
vices," Social Science Quarterly 54 (March 1974): 709-
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programs should not only produce the desired "products" 
but should also "work for the advantage of the community. 
Thus, the concept has evolved away from a focus upon pure 
"market equity" to usages which emphasize "social equity" 
considerations designed to achieve "the greatest social good 
from available resources."
Effectiveness
Along with efficiency, the concept of effectiveness
has always been a primary administrative virtue pursued by
political analysts. Not only were many early reforms and
reorganizations of the U.S. federal system based upon the
perceived desirability of improved bureaucratic performance
(usually defined in terms of effectiveness, economy, and
efficiency), but:
Effectiveness has also been the goal in recent 
efforts to improve decision-making by cost-benefit 
analysis and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting 
(PPB) system. The stress here on effectiveness 
grows out of a long tradition and also reflects 
strong feelings in government today.33
Moreover, the use of effectiveness as a "touchstone" by
which the utility of a bureaucratic policy system is measured
has been a major factor in the movement toward developing
^^Gordon P. ïfhitaker, "Who Puts the Value in Evalua­
tion?" Social Science Quarterly 54 (March 1974) : 759.
32Fried, p. 68. See also Rich, pp. 3-6.
^^Fried, p. 16.
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"open" policy systems in which evaluation information is 
more freely available.
Robert Fried has identified six different, but 
related meanings for the concept of effectiveness as a cri­
terion for the evaluation of bureaucratic performance.^^ 
First, and most significantly, effectiveness is defined in 
terms of goal attainment. This is the definition most often 
attached to the criterion,since, at least in theory, 
organizations are established in order to accomplish spe­
cific objectives. Second, effectiveness is often treated as 
being synonymous with a broader view of efficiency or pro­
ductivity than has been utilized in most studies. An exam­
ple of this approach is Katz and Kahn's notion of effective­
ness as the maximization of return to the organization by 
all means (economic, technical, and political). This defi­
nition assumes two components of effectiveness: efficiency
and p r o f i t . A  third meaning associates effectiveness with 
policy inputs such as the expenditure of money or manpower. 
This definition equates effective bureaucratic behavior with
^^Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and 
Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 55-78.
^^This discussion of policy effectiveness draws 
heavily upon Fried, pp. 55-78.
^^See Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 8-10; and Rourke, 
pp. 3-7.
^^Katz and Kahn, pp. 150-153.
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effort rather than with achievement and argues that
effectiveness is indicated by such things as larger staffs,
38higher salaries, and greater workloads. The fourth way 
in which effectiveness is tested is through a determination 
of whether "beneficial influence" results from bureaucratic 
outcomes. The entire "social indicators" movement is a 
response to the attempt to evaluate program effectiveness 
based upon criteria of social well-being.Fifth, effec­
tiveness may be seen as sufficiency or adequacy of goals or 
outcomes. Implicit in this scheme is the requirement that 
policies must meet certain "need thresholds" independent of 
goal attainment, efficiency, or benefit to particular com­
munities.^® Finally, an effective bureaucracy is the one 
which survives. Effectiveness defined as survival, whether 
through the achievement of a balanced equilibrium between 
external conflicting forces or the internal maintenance of a 
self-regulated "dynamic homeostasis," emphasizes the requi­
sites for continued organizational existence.
One result of the confusion regarding the meaning of 
the concept of effectiveness has been that public
^®Fried, p. 70.
39Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation Research: Methods of
Assessing Program Effectiveness (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 4.
40
"Fried, pp. 75-76.
41See Etzioni, pp. 18-19.
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administration and public policy theory have not resolved 
the question of the causes of ineffective policy applica­
tion. That is, if effectiveness is defined in terms of 
goal attainment, factors such as the practice of creating 
agencies with unrealizable or utopian goals or ambiguous 
legislation can be cited as reasons for policies failing to 
meet stated objectives.Similarly, the tendency for 
bureaucrats to behave conservatively, emphasize accommoda­
tion, and seek to limit risk while searching for personal 
security is often given as a negative influence by those who 
define effectiveness as efficiency or productivity.^^ More­
over, the effectiveness of bureaucracies is intimately 
related to the other evaluative criteria used in this study. 
This is especially so in the case of the standard of respon­
sibility. According to Michael Cohen:
. . . ineffective policy application often stems 
from the fact that an agency is caught up in a con­
tinuing political struggle among conflicting inter­
ests in society. In these cases the legislation 
which the agency must administer has often been 
passed only after several attempts, and then by a 
small majority. It is usually in danger of emascula­
tion or repeal by later Congresses or legislatures. 
The difficulties in passing the legislation and in 
making its provisions strong enough to be enforced 
are reflections of the extreme opposition to its
Michael Cohen, "Sources of Ineffectiveness in Policy 
Application," Midwest Review of Public Administration 2 
(August 1968): 83-85.
43Cohen, pp. 81-82; and Louis V. Imundo, Jr., "Inef­
fectiveness and Inefficiency in Government Management,"
Public Personnel Management 4 (March/April 1975): 92-93.
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presence in society. It is not surprising when 
delaying tactics, non-compliance and other efforts 
succeed in preventing the agency from effectively 
administering the p o l i c y . 4 4
Responsiveness 
Over the years, the movement to "debureaucratize" 
political activities has been a manifestation of the belief 
that public agencies are unresponsive to "the public inter­
est." On the other hand, America's administrative history 
has emphasized the perception that these bodies, particu­
larly regulatory commissions and "clientele agencies" are 
unfairly responsive to "special interests." Thus:
At one time, enhanced responsiveness was sought 
through the spoils system, rotation in office, and 
(at the state and local levels) direct election of 
administrative officials. A successive wave of 
reformers found that the spoils system encouraged 
responsiveness to corruptionists and political 
machines, instead of the public. A neutral public 
service, they argued, could be trained to be 
"responsive through channels," that is responsive 
only to orders from politically accountable super­
iors; it would, moreover, be better able than party 
hacks to be responsive because of its skills in 
achieving what the community wished to be d o n e . 45
Policy responsiveness, therefore, has come to mean
both "reflecting and giving expression to the will of the
people" through general public opinion, and "responding
44Cohen, p. 86.
^^Fried, p. 399. See also Virginia B. Ermer, 
"Strategies for Increasing Bureaucratic Responsiveness," 
Midwest Review of Public Administration 9 (April/July 1975) 
121-132.
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easily to any and all demands" of specific parties at 
i n t e r e s t . I n  practice, these two factors are often mixed; 
public administration in a democracy usually requires an 
agency to be responsive to a combination of congressional 
committees, other agencies, and the mass media in addition 
to interest groups and private individuals. Also, respon­
siveness is maintained not only by these external control 
mechanisms (pressure groups, media, etc.) but by the imple­
mentation of internal controls such as subordination to a 
politically appointed executive or ethnically balanced re­
cruitment p r a c t i c e s . I n  this sense, responsiveness is 
closely related to the criteria of representativeness and 
responsibility— the "prompt acquiescence by government in 
popular demands for policy change" is often one of the com­
plex of values included in the general definition of bureau-
4 8cratic responsibility. Similarly, a representative public 
service is assumed to "increase bureaucratic understanding 
of and responsiveness to minority views, feelings, desires,
4Q
problems and needs."
J. Roland Pennock, "Responsiveness, Responsibility, 
and Majority Rule," American Political Science Review 46 
(September 1952): 790-791.
^’see Fried, pp. 50-52.
^®See Charles E. Gilbert, "The Framework of Administra­
tive Responsibility," Journal of Politics 21 (August 1959): 374.
49Harry Kranz, "Government By All the People: The Why
and How of a More Representative Public Service," Good Govern­
ment 89 (Fall 1972): 3. See also Ermer, pp. 121-122.
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Regardless of the source of demands and supports 
to which an agency must respond, bureaucratic responsive­
ness is a two-way flow of information and influence.
Ifhile democratic theory holds that the legislature should 
set standards of responsiveness, leaving only the execution 
of a mandate to the bureaucracy,in fact agencies them­
selves may create demands which they can then supply. More­
over:
As a defensive reaction, trying to survive 
in a world of competing organizations, agencies 
seldom feel that they can afford to let their good 
works speak for themselves or practice a policy of 
complete and frank reporting to the public on their 
successes and failures. They are constantly trying 
for a favorable, or at least neutral public image, 
directly by propaganda and indirectly by cultivating 
friendly legislators, interest groups, and journal­
ists. 51
Research has demonstrated that certain types of organ­
izational arrangements and certain modes of decision-making 
facilitate bureaucratic responsiveness. Among these are:
(1) systematic efforts to obtain community needs and prefer­
ences; (2) attempting to give the public information as to 
policy alternatives and consequences; (3) open communica­
tions networks; (4) emphasis on developing feedback mechan­
isms; (5) training personnel to be receptive to client groups 
and public opinion; and (6) participation by outsiders in 
agency decision-making.
^°Whitaker, pp. 759-760. 
^^Fried, p. 53.
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Responsibility 
In part, the concept of bureaucratic responsibility 
is rooted in the idea of a policy-administration dichotomy 
discussed earlier. In addition, however:
The theory as to the responsibility of admin­
istrative officials has been based on the notion of 
neutrality of the public service; the existence of 
a rigid line separating administration and execution 
from policy formulation; the idea that the technical 
character of governmental administration and the 
scientific nature of public administration which gave 
the trained public servant an opportunity to act on 
the basis of objectively established principles; the 
influence of the "fellowship of science"— the respon­
sibility arising out of concern for the opinion of 
fellow technicians, who are capable of judging the 
actions of their colleagues in terms of scientific 
knowledge bearing on the decisions; the resort to 
the courts; and the influence of the power to hire 
and fire.52
Once it became clear that all these factors had been 
complicated by the exercise of policy-making power by admin­
istrators, then the control of this authority became a com­
plex issue. To a great extent, the responses to this dilemma 
depended upon how the acquisition of bureaucratic authority 
was described and defined. Arch Dotson has identified five 
major "approaches" to the problem of administrative responsi­
bility, including: (1) the "conservative" reaction, which
saw the problem as resulting from a bureaucratic conspiracy 
to seize power; (2) the "rule of law" interpretation, which 
emphasized a breakdown of "due process" as the root cause;
(3) the "executive supremacy" position, focusing on the lack
L e v ita n ,  p .  570.
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of adequate management authority in the Presidency; (4) the 
"corporate objectivity" stance, which saw bureaucratic power 
as a necessary political response to complex socio-economic 
needs which the traditional institutions had not acknowl­
edged; and (5) the "legislative supremacy" argument, defin­
ing the problem in terms of the loss of power by the people. 
For all but the corporate objectivity approach, the solution 
to the problem of administrative responsibility was to be 
found in the reassertion of traditional American democratic 
principles of external control. The conservatives would, 
as far as was possible, eliminate bureaucratic activities, 
especially in the areas of regulatory and welfare programs. 
The rule of law, executive supremacy, and legislative suprem­
acy advocates would adopt less extreme, but equally time- 
honored solutions— the strengthening of judicial review, 
executive management, and legislative sanctions, respect­
ively.^^ The divergence of the corporate objectivity 
approach from these arguments has been captured best in the 
classic exchange between Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer. 
Advancing the legislative supremacy position. Finer asked 
the question:
Arch Dotson, "Fundamental Approaches to Administra­
tive Responsibility," Western Political Quarterly 10 (Sep­
tember 1957): 701-715.
54 D otson, p . 7 1 6 .
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Are the servants of the public to decide
their own course, or is their course to be decided
by a body outside themselves? My answer is that 
the servants of the public are not to decide their 
own course, they are to be responsible to the 
elected representatives of the public, and these 
are to determine the course of action of the public 
servants to the most minute degree that is techni­
cally feasible.55
Only through the implementation of external controls could 
"the new despotism" of the administrative state be avoided, 
according to Finer. Friedrich's position, on the other 
hand, was that external controls on bureaucratic behavior 
could only be partially successful at best, given the com­
plexity of governmental tasks and the range of skills and
expertise brought to bear on issues by administrators.^®
At a time when the legislature had proven unequal to the 
task of responding to highly technical issues and the execu­
tive had been unable to limit bureaucratic discretionary 
authority, the only recourse, for Friedrich, was to imple­
ment a system of administrative self-restraint based upon 
responsiveness to technical knowledge and popular sentiment.
From this debate emerged the two dominant concep­
tualizations of administrative responsibility. First, grow­
ing out of the emphasis on external controls, administrative 
responsibility has come to mean "accountability" or
Herman Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in 
Democratic Government," Public Administration Review 1 
(Summer 1941): 336.
®®Friedrich, pp. 3-4.
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"answerability." This definition focuses upon the
capability of political institutions to enforce sanctions
on the bureaucracy. As noted by Roland Pennock:
A person is responsible to another for his actions 
when he can be held to account for them by another.
A government is responsible when its tenure of 
office is subject to control, within limits, by the 
electorate. Similarly, a ministry that holds power 
at the pleasure of the legislature is said to be 
responsible to the legislature.57
Mosher has termed this type of answerability or accountabil­
ity "objective responsibility." According to this meaning, 
administrative policy-making control relies upon the "respon­
sibility of a person or an organization ^  someone else, 
outside of self, for some thing or some kind of perfor­
mance . " ^ ®
In contrast, the second major connotation focused 
"not upon to whom and for what one ^  responsible (according 
to the law and the organization chart) but to whom and for 
what one feels responsible and behaves responsibly." This 
meaning was termed "subjective" or "psychological" responsi­
bility by Mosher, and was assumed to be associated with such
factors as professional identity, loyalty, and personal con- 
59science.
^^Pennock, p. 797.
58Mosher, p. 7. It should be noted that Friedrich, 
who also used the term "objective responsibility" had the 
exact opposite connotation in mind. For Friedrich, the 
reliance of bureaucrats upon "scientific standards" was 
"objective."
59Mosher, p. 8.
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Thus, the location of bureaucratic control can be 
either from punitive restraints (or t.ie threat of such 
restraints) imposed from external sources, or internal self- 
restraint imposed by the bureaucrats themselves. In most 
instances, of course, both types of controls are in evidence.
Regardless of the location of bureaucratic responsi­
bility, two forms of administrative control have been of 
significance. First, there has been "formal" reliance upon 
established regulations, standards, and rules. And, second, 
administrative control has been achieved through the "infor­
mal" manipulation of bureaucratic values or n o r m s . W h e n  
these control forms are combined with the location of con­
trol mechanisms, a framework for the study of bureaucratic 
responsibility is created which includes four categories: 
internal formal, internal informal, external formal, and 
external informal.
Each of these categories focuses upon two questions: 
What are the roles of administrators in policy-making? And, 
what are the roles of policy-makers in administration? The 
major bureaucratic avenues for influencing policy-making are 
the mobilization of political support and the development 
of bureaucratic skills and expertise. Political support can
See Theodore M. Mills, "Equilibrium and the Pro­
cesses of Deviance and Control," American Sociological Review 
24 (October 1959): 671-679.
^^Gilbert, p. 382.
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be mobilized in a number of ways: public opinion can be
influenced, attentive publics can be created and maintained, 
congressional committees can be cultivated, or identifica­
tion with the President can be sought. Expertise can be 
developed through specialized recruitment patterns or the 
concentrated use of training programs. Such expertise can 
then be channeled into the policy-making arena either through 
the giving of advice to decision-makers or the use of discre­
tionary authority to issue orders and make r u l e s . L i m i t ­
ing both constituency support and expertise are the politi­
cal controls discussed above— congressional oversight, exec­
utive leadership, and judicial review, as well as the bureau­
crat's own professionalism and morality.
The role of policy-makers in administration is 
closely related to these control mechanisms; a President, 
for example, can not only regulate the bureaucracy through 
his leadership authority, but he can actively manipulate 
administrative decisions through his political appointments 
and his use of public opinion levers. Similarly, congres­
sional budgetary control and the courts' review of adminis­
trative law serve not only to limit the policy-making roles 
of the bureaucracy, but also to further the roles of these 
competing branches of government. In opposition to this
^^Rourke, pp. 45-55.
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influence, however, the bureaucracy has the powerful 
built-in safeguard of the merit system.
Outline of the Study 
Implicit in the preceding review of the literature 
are a number of conceptual and operational problems. In 
Chapter II, these difficulties are made explicit through an 
outline of the methodology to be used in this study. Then, 
the next three chapters attempt to provide a description of 
the energy policy system (Chapter III), the creation of the 
FEA (Chapter IV), and the fuel allocation and pricing regula­
tions (Chapter V). Part Two, the evaluation of the FEA's 
regulatory performance, is composed of analyses of the 
representativeness of the agency's decision-makers (Chapter
VI), the efficiency and equity of its policy outputs (Chapter
VII), the effectiveness of its policy outcomes (Chapter VIII), 
the responsiveness of its feedback mechanisms (Chapter IX), 
the responsibility of its policy inputs (Chapter X), and an 
overall evaluation of agency policy-making (Chapter XI).
Rourke, pp. 11-61; and Norman J. Powell, Responsible 
Public Bureaucracy in the United States (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, 1967), pp.*46-117. See also Emmette S. Redford, 
Democracy in the Administrative State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969), pp. 38-69.
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
Although the study of institutional regulation of 
such processes as energy production, distribution, and pric­
ing has traditionally been the province of the political 
scientist, there has been little or no systematic develop­
ment of analytical concepts within the discipline to aid in 
this task. Theory-building in the area of institutional 
policy analysis has proceeded at an uneven pace as various 
analysts have been concerned with "market choice" mechanisms, 
agency "capture" by client interests, or "power elite" influ­
ences on policy-making. Very few research efforts have been 
directed toward assembling the disparate approaches in any 
comprehensive manner. The review of the literature in the 
previous chapter gave some indication of the resulting con­
ceptual confusion by pointing out, in some detail, the 
breadth, depth, and range of the evaluative criteria of 
representativeness, efficiency, equity, effectiveness, 
responsiveness, and responsibility. It is the purpose of 
this chapter to develop a model for policy evaluation which
32
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combines these six criteria in a systematic fashion. Prior 
to describing the methodology to be used in this model, 
however, it is necessary to state explicitly the underlying 
theoretical and methodological problems involved in apply­
ing the evaluative standards to the analysis of energy 
policy-making in the FEA. Such an enumeration is necessary 
because in each case the operationalization of a criterion 
is heavily dependent upon the limitations imposed by these 
theoretical and methodological difficulties. Following the 
clarification of these problems, attention is devoted to an 
outline of a general framework and the operationalization 
of each criterion. Finally, these measures are combined in 
an operational model for policy evaluation.
Theoretical and Methodological Problems 
Important questions have been raised regarding both 
the underlying theory and the applicable measurement tech­
niques for each of the evaluative criteria. The following 
discussion briefly outlines the most relevant of these 
analytical problems for each standard.
Representativeness 
The problems associated with the theory of repre­
sentative bureaucracy can be grouped into three general cate­
gories: (1) conceptual confusion regarding the definition
of the concept; (2) reliance upon unsubstantiated assumptions;
34
and (3) lack of clarity regarding the relationship between 
representativeness and responsibility.
The most basic criticism of the concept has been the 
ambiguity surrounding its definition. Not only have theor­
ists disagreed about whether the "precise" definition of 
representativeness as a "reproduction of the composition of 
the general propulation" is preferable to the "reasonable" 
idea of the bureaucracy represented by a "cross-section of 
the body p o li t ic , b u t there have been conceptual diffi­
culties regarding the categories to be represented (economic
2
classes versus region, for example). By far the greatest 
definitional problem, however, has been the variety of uses 
of the concepts of active and passive representation. David 
Rosenbloom notes that at least four definitional schemes 
have been utilized: (1) defining representative bureaucracy
in terms of passive factors alone; (2) defining it in active 
terms alone; (3) using both active and passive factors, but 
assuming a separation between these categories; and (4) assum­
ing a strong linkage between passive and active representa­
tion. ^ The most common approach has been the latter— relying
Arthur D. Larson, "Representative Bureaucracy and 
Administrative Responsibility: A Reassessment, Midwest Review
of Public Administration 7 (April 1973): 87.
^V. Subramaniam, "Representative Bureaucracy: A Reas­
sessment," American Political Science Review 61 (December 1967) 
1010.
^David H. Rosenbloom, "Forms of Bureaucratic Repre­
sentation in the Federal Service," Midwest Review of Public 
Administration 8 (July 1974): 161.
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upon the fairly straightforward meaning of sociological 
representation and to imply a strong link between such 
characteristics as background and pre-employment socializa­
tion and subsequent bureaucratic orientation and behavior.
In addition to creating a number of problems associated 
with unsubstantiated assumptions (as discussed below), the 
use of this scheme raises additional definitional problems, 
since there is simply no general agreement upon what consti­
tutes active representation. Rosenbloom identifies at least 
four possible patterns of active bureaucratic representa­
tion: (1) the formal-legal view of the bureaucrat as repre­
sentative of the government or state; (2) the extra-normal 
view of the bureaucrat representing political groups through 
non-agency channels and structures (representing interests 
because of their official positions, but not through these 
positions); (3) the normal, or traditional view of the 
bureaucrat representing groups in their official capacities 
or within the regular agency frameworks; and (4) the captive 
view of the bureaucrat controlled by private interests to 
whom actual policy-making authority is delegated.^ The moti­
vations for and forms of these representation patterns vary 
from case to case, but Rosenbloom identifies three basic 
motivating factors— employment opportunities, political
^Rosenbloom, pp. 162-172.
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ideology, and social background— and two basic forms of 
representation, sociological and symbolic.5
The theoretical assumption which has drawn the most 
criticism is the contention that socio-economic characteris­
tics and pre-occupational socialization determine the later 
attitudes, values, and behavior of bureaucrats. Arthur 
Larson correctly asserts that very little research exists to 
support this contention.® Moreover, as both Larson and 
Kenneth Meier have argued, socialization is an ongoing learn­
ing process that does not stop for the individual upon his 
entering the bureaucracy. Thus, "organizational socializa­
tion will tend to dilute the influence of outside groups" 
and the role the agency creates for the bureaucrat may be as 
significant as any pre-occupational experience.^ In addi­
tion, research has demonstrated that responsible and respon­
sive bureaucratic behavior results from a number of other 
factors, including mobility and accessibility, as well as
^Rosenbloom, pp. 173-174.
^Larson, p. 84. See Lloyd G. Nigro and Kenneth J. 
Meier, "Bureaucracy and the People: Is the Higher Federal
Service Representative?" Bureaucrat 4 (October 1975): 300-
308, for research which indicates that demographic factors 
are not adequate predictors of representative political atti­
tudes of bureaucratic elites.
^Larson, p. 84; and Kenneth J. Meier, "Representative 
Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis," American Political
Science Review 69 (June 1975): 529. See Peta E. Sheriff,
"Unrepresentative Bureaucracy," Sociology 8 (September 1974): 
449, for the same criticism.
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Q
representativeness. Therefore, there is some question as 
to whether:
. . . those concerned with the representativeness 
of public bureaucracies, who view the modification 
of social background as a means to responsiveness, 
besides being embarked on a difficult and perhaps 
futile exercise, might not achieve the desired 
result even if the means prove possible.9
Another assumption which has been controversial is 
the contention that traditional controls of administrative 
abuse (hierarchy, legislative budgeting, etc.) have proven 
ineffective. Meier, for example, notes that this argument 
contradicts evidence of bureaucratic responsiveness and 
cites the lack of systematic research on the question of 
external control failure.
The relationship between representativeness and 
responsibility has raised questions regarding: (1) the role
of bureaucratic leadership rather than a broadly representa­
tive civil service in insuring responsibility;^^ (2) the 
ethics of incorporating minorities into a bureaucracy in 
order to control them by binding them to the s y s t e m ; a n d
p
Subramaniam, p. 1019.
^Sheriff, p. 459.
^°Meier, p. 528.
^Hleier, pp. 529-530.
12Earl J. Reeves, "Equal Employment and the Concept 
of the Bureaucracy as a Representative Institution," Midwest 
Review of Public Administration 6 (February 1972): 5.
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(3) the problem of achieving aggregate responsibility 
through individual "irresponsibility" by encouraging 
bureaucrats to represent interests.
The primary methodological difficulty in analyzing 
passive representativeness is that it is based on secondary 
variables (background variables) which may not be related 
to the primary ones (values.) Further, in the absence of 
empirical indicators of the primary variables of active 
representation (such as bureaucratic attitudes and behavior 
patterns) the reliance upon secondary personnel characteris­
tics usually limits the analysis to nominal data. Finally, 
attempts to compare bureaucracies with the general popula­
tion according to secondary variables require consideration 
of such complex factors as the society's geographical distri­
bution of social groups and public offices, and the distribu­
tion of social groups in the working age population.
Efficiency and Equity 
The primary difficulty associated with the theory of 
efficient bureaucracy lies in the wide range of attributes 
emphasized in the criterion of efficiency. According to Katz 
and Kahn, efficiency may be either "potential" or "actual"
^^Larson, p. 85.
^Sleier, p. 530.
^^David Nachnias and David H. Rosenbloom, "Measuring 
Bureaucratic Representation and Integration," Public Adminis­
tration Review 33 (November 1973): 591.
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depending upon whether an organizational design has been 
realized in practice.Lineberry and Welch, on the other 
hand, distinguish "theoretical" efficiency (such as Pareto's 
criterion) from the "administrative" efficiency involved in 
obtaining the most output from the least i n p u t . A t  the 
same level, Aaron Wildavsky terms the classical notion of 
bureaucratic maximization of objectives at the lowest cost 
"pure" efficiency, and the modification of organizational 
goals in a situation of scarce resources as "mixed" effic­
iency. Moreover, Wildavsky notes that both pure and mixed 
efficiency may be either "limited" (forced to work within
systemic constraints) or "total" (modifying political goals
18and means to meet efficiency standards) .
Much the same dilemma characterizes the definition 
of the concept of equity in bureaucratic outputs. As was 
implied in Chapter I, the range of meanings attached to the 
concept of policy equity is broad. Included are emphases
^^Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psy­
chology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1966) , p. 155.
^^Robert L. Lineberry and Robert E. Welch, Jr., "Who 
Gets What: Measuring the Distribution of Urban Public Ser­
vices," Social Science Quarterly 54 (March 1974): 708.
18Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Effic­
iency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program
Budgeting," in Austin Ranney, ed., Political Science and 
Public Policy (Chicago: I4arkham Publishing, 1968), p. 56.
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on; identical inputs, outputs in proportion to payment,
IQ
equal results, and "fairness."
As important as this lack of clarity in the dual 
theories of efficiency and equity is the relationship 
between the definitions of the two terms. That is, "effic­
iency cannot be defined without specifying the definition
2 0of equity or justice." Unless both concepts are used in
conjunction, the policy analyst runs the risk of allowing
21efficiency measures to become ends in themselves.
For both the criteria of efficiency and equity of
policy outputs, the primary methodological constraint is the
paucity of agreed-upon standards of measurement. In the
case of efficiency measures, Louis Imundo has concluded that:
Progress in establishing performance standards and 
measuring productivity in work environments where 
the product is service has been limited in the pri­
vate sector, while no progress has been made in gov­
ernment. Where standards and measurement techniques.. 
do not exist, it is difficult to measure efficiency.
19Richard C. Rich, "Institutional Arrangements and 
Equity in Urban Service Delivery," a paper prepared for 
delivery at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Chicago, September 2-5, 1976, pp. 3-6.
^^Lester C. Thurow, "Equity Versus Efficiency in Law 
Enforcement," Public Policy 18 (Summer 1970): 451. See also
Harold Bierman, Jr. and Jerome E. Hass, "Inflation, Equity, 
Efficiency, and the Regulatory Pricing of Electricity," Public 
Policy 23 (Summer 1975): 299-315.
21See Robert C. Fried, Performance in American Bureau­
cracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), pp. 69-70.
22Louis V. Imundo, Jr., "Ineffectiveness and Ineffic­
iency in Government Management," Public Personnel Management 
4 (March/April 1975): 90.
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If the absence of comparable measures of bureaucratic
efficiency is a significant methodological limitation, the
problem is more crucial in the case of equity measures, where
the need for formulation of operational indicators has been
2 3labelled a "paramount" research issue.
Effectiveness 
Thomas Dye has outlined the major problems confront­
ing policy evaluation studies as: (1) determining what the
goals of a program are; (2) evaluating programs and policies 
with primarily symbolic values or impact; and (3) overcoming 
agency bias in proving impacts of crucial p r o g r a m s . T o  
this list of theoretical problems with the concept of policy 
effectiveness should be added the difficulties of determin­
ing causality in policy outcome relationships and the dif-
25fuse nature of policy impacts and effects.
The determination of organizational goals is crucial 
to the evaluation of goal attainment by policy outcomes. 
However, goals and objectives of bureaucracies may be ambigu- 
uos, hazy, or "merely a long list of pious and partly
23Astrid E. Merget, "Equalizing Municipal Services: 
Issues for Policy Analysis," Policy Studies Journal 4 (Spring 
1976): 298.
Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 2nd ed. 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), pp. 332-333.
25James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Making (New York: 
Praeger, 1975), p. 102.
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26incompatible platitudes." This incompatibility may be 
the result of the need to maintain different sets of goals 
for the diverse groups which may form an agency’s constitu­
ency or it may simply be an intentional attempt by the agency 
to camouflage its real goals under a veil of unclear promises. 
In addition, agencies are often given tasks which require 
them to pursue "unofficial" goals.
Closely related to the problem of goal definition is 
the fact that a primary function of many government actions 
is to provide symbolic impacts. As Dye notes:
The impact of a policy includes both its 
symbolic and tangible effects. Its symbolic impact 
deals with the perceptions that individuals have of 
government action and their attitudes toward it.
. . . Individuals, groups, and v;hole societies fre­
quently judge public policy in terms of its good 
intentions rather than its tangible accomplishments.
Thus, the impact of public policies must include considera­
tion not only of the material benefits, both direct and indir­
ect, which flow from a particular decision, but the feelings 
and perceptions of those affected by government's symbolic 
actions.
The determination of agency bias and resistance to 
policy evaluation is both a theoretical and methodological 
problem. The fact that any organization has a strong vested
Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation Research: Methods of
Assessing Program Effectiveness (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-ilall, 1972) , p. 25.
^^Dye, p. 331.
43
interest in seeing that its programs are presented in the
most favorable manner leads to methodological problems of
data availability, for example. However, the theoretical
difficulties of agency bias are even more troublesome,
because, ultimately, policy impact evaluation involves people 
2 8evaluation.
Analysis of the effects of policy actions naturally 
raises issues regarding causality. Stated briefly, the pri­
mary problem is that "the mere fact that action A is taken
and condition B develops does not necessarily mean that a
29cause-and-effeet relationship exists." In too many policy 
evaluations, causality is implied without the proper develop­
ment of causal theory or the employment of causal methodol­
ogies. In most cases, public policies are so complex, the 
data so inadequate, and the underlying theory sc underdev­
eloped as to make causal analysis extremely difficult. Never­
theless, thinking causally about policy effectiveness may 
have heuristic value.
Finally, the effectiveness of policy outcomes is dif­
ficult to conceptualize because impacts are usually diffuse.
^^See Weiss, p. 25.
29Anderson, p. 139.
^^Donald S. Van Meter and Herbert B. Asher, "Causal 
Perspectives on Policy Analysis," in Frank P. Scioli, Jr. and 
Thomas J. Cook, eds., Methodologies for Analyzing Public 
Policies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975), pp. 61-62.
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Not only are effects felt by different political communities
(both intended and unintended), but the results of public
policies may vary over time. In addition, second and third
order consequences of public policies may vary widely from
the more immediate, first order outcomes.
According to Johnson and Pierce, there are two very
critical methodological problems involved in the evaluation
of policy effectiveness (or, as they term it, "results
measurement"): explicitly relating any measure to program
objectives (the relevancy problem) and making the standard
32replicable (the measurement problem). The relevancy issue, 
or what E. S. Quade has termed the "conceptual" problem, is 
closely related to the theoretical constraints outlined 
above :
It is by no means obvious how the benefits of most 
social programs should be defined. For example, the 
federal government supplies money to the states and 
cities for lai; enforcement. How can we measure the 
effectiveness of their program.s to fight crime? The 
first impulse is to use the number of crimes as a 
measure of effectiveness. This has important dif­
ficulties, however. Crime is a very heterogeneous 
phenomenon— murder, shoplifting, drunkenness, and
^^Anderson, p. 140.
32Ronald W. Johnson and John M. Pierce, "The Economic 
Evaluation of Policy Impacts: Cost-Eonefit and Cost-
Effectivcness Analysis," in Frank P. Scioli, Jr. and Thomas 
J. Cook, eds., Méthodologies for Analyzing Public Policies 
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975), p. 144. See also
Tom R. Houston, Jr., "The Behavioral Sciences Impact- 
Effectivcness Model," in Peter H. Rossi and Walter Williams, 
eds. , Evaluating Social Pi'ogramis: Theory, Practice, and
Politics (New York: Seminar Press, 1972), pp. 51-65.
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joy riding may all be crimes, but all are not 
equally serious.33
Measurement problems, on the other hand, are derived 
from the poor data which may be available, the fact that 
effects (or benefits) are distributed unevenly, and the non- 
market character of many inputs. Data problems are perhaps 
the most frustrating for the policy analyst— even if measures 
are developed, the information required may not be available 
or may be inadequate. If this difficulty can be overcome, 
distributional constraints remain— different people get dif­
ferent benefits— and those impacts may not parallel the mar­
ket characteristics from which many of the cost-benefit 
models are derived. As a result, analysts have often turned 
to methodological approaches which are less than adequate, 
such as using work load measures, program costs, or dollar 
expenditures as the only indicators of effectiveness.^^
Responsiveness 
While the term "responsiveness" has long been central 
to the study of politics, serious definitional problems 
remain to be resolved. This is primarily because legisla­
tive, rather than bureaucratic, representation and responsive­
ness has been the focus of much of the policy research in the
33E. S. Quade, Analysis for Public Decisions (New 
York: American Elsevier, 1975), p. 105.
^^Quade, pp. 107-108.
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past; there is not an extensive theoretical base from which 
to develop concepts to evaluate agency performance.^^ Cru­
cial analytical terms such as "the public interest" and 
"public opinion," for example, remain elusive at best. As 
Roland Pennock has noted:
The uncertainty as to the meaning and the 
application of the term "responsiveness" makes it 
impossible to say much, in general terms, about its 
desirability. From the broad philosophical orienta­
tion that we have assumed, it is clear that govern­
ments should be responsive to any clear and settled 
popular demand. Some would say that they should 
respond quickly to any clear expression of public 
opinion, whether or not "settled," while others 
would hold that the opinion should persist long 
enough to give some assurance that it represented 
more than a passing whim.36
Implicit in this critique of the conceptual confusion sur­
rounding feedback responsiveness are the problems.involved 
in defining public opinion and the fragmented nature of 
public opinion, however defined. That is, even when there 
is widespread articulation and aggregation of public respon­
ses to agency actions (and this may be seldom, if ever, for
many organizations), there may be little unanimity in the
37preferences expressed by the community. Moreover, there
See Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Con­
stituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science 
Review 57 (March 1963): 45-56.
Roland Pennock, "Responsiveness, Responsibility, 
and Majority Rule," American Political Science Review 46 
(September 1952): 791.
^^See Fried, pp. 106-110.
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are serious theoretical difficulties in distinguishing
between general public opinion and narrower interest group
demands as proper indicators of community preferences.
This is because;
. . . populist democratic theory holds that the pri­
mary goal of democracy is to maximize popular sover­
eignty and political equality. The resulting scheme 
of representation places greatest emphasis on respon­
siveness to majority preferences. On the other hand, 
pluraliste contend that democratic systems respond 
to the opinions of select portions of the constitu­
encies, not necessarily the majority. In their view 
democracy becomes a process wherein the minorities, 
through representation, rule within guidelines 
established in a majority concensus.38
The major methodological problem related to the eval­
uation of feedback is that although the concept is widely 
employed in the literature of public policy analysis, there
have been few attempts to operationalize bureaucratic respon- 
3 9siveness. This shortcoming is in part a consequence of the 
theoretical difficulties discussed above, but it is also a 
result of the fact that measuring congruence between agency 
policy and public opinion, for example, may involve questions 
of causality which are hot easily resolved. Because respon­
siveness is a two-way flow of influence between an agency and
38William R. Shaffer and Lowell A. Wright, "The Respon­
siveness of U.S. Senators to Their Constituents' Policy Pre­
ferences," a paper prepared for delivery at the 1976 Annual 
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 
April 26-May 1, 1976, p. 1.
39Delbert A. Taebel, "Bureaucratization and Responsive­
ness: A Research Note," Midwest Review of Public Administra­
tion 7 (July 1973): 199-200.
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its publics and because there are always time lags in both 
the public's response to policies and the agency's reception 
of this response, it becomes extremely difficult to determine 
whether a given policy is in fact a reaction to a particular 
demand or whether the policy created the opinion.
Even where responsiveness has been operationalized, 
it has usually been in terms of agency distribution of 
easily measurable outputs (usually dollars) or legislative 
roll call v o t e s . N e i t h e r  of these approaches has a great 
deal of utility for more comprehensive analysis.
Responsibility 
The significance of the problems involved in defin­
ing responsibility is apparent in the following observation 
by Frederick Mosher:
Responsibility may well be the most important 
word in all the vocabulary of administration, public 
and private. But it has a confusing wealth of dif­
ferent meanings and shades of meanings . . . .41
Among the most common values implied in the use of the term
are: responsiveness, flexibility, consistency, stability,
leadership, probity, candor, competence, efficacy, prudence,
40See Russell W. Getter and Paul D. Schumaker, 
"Political Structure and Policy Responsiveness in the Distri­
bution of Revenue Sharing Funds in 51 American Cities," a 
paper prepared for the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Southwest­
ern Political Science Association, Dallas, April 7-10, 1976.
^^Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public 
Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 7.
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due process, and accountability.^^ As Norman Powell has 
noted:
Some of these meanings of responsibility 
overlap, some contradict others, some are cunbiguous 
indeed; all raise questions of how they are to be 
assessed and used with what emphases in what cir­
cumstances. 43
These theoretical overlaps and contradictions have 
led to some serious difficulties in the operationalization 
of the concept of responsibility. Perhaps the overriding 
problem is the fact that the concept is related to the entire 
political system and not just to the administrative system.
In addition, responsibility as an evaluative criterion is in 
conflict with other standards, particularly that of respon­
siveness. Moreover, informal and internal aspects of admin­
istrative behavior which are central to the assessment of 
responsibility are extremely difficult to determine and mea­
sure. Finally, most of the research upon which the theory 
of administrative responsibility rests is based in the pre- 
World War II experience of U.S. public policy and may there­
fore have only limited relevance to modern bureaucracy.
^^Charles E. Gilbert, "The Framework of Administra­
tive Responsibility," Journal of Politics 21 (August 1959) : 
375-378.
43Norman J. Powell, Responsible Public Bureaucracy 
in the United States (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), p. 6.
^ ^ G ilb e r t ,  p . 4 0 6 .
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A Framework for Analysis 
Within the limitations imposed by these theoretical 
and methodological constraints, it is possible to develop 
general definitions for the evaluative criteria which corres­
pond to the five major components of the policy process. The 
following discussion delineates the general framework for 
analysis to be used in this study.
Most policy analyses limit their scope to a single 
evaluative criterion— usually either the examination of policy 
outputs (efficiency) or outcomes (effectiveness). The frame­
work developed for this study departs from this mainstream by 
instead opting for a systems approach which goes beyond the 
usual "goal model" of research to emphasize that:
. . . organizations pursue other functions besides 
the achievement of official goals. They have to 
acquire resources, coordinate subunits, and adapt 
to the environment.
Thus, although "outcome goal attainment" is included as a 
significant element in this study, the entire policy-making 
system is considered in the framework illustrated in Figure 
1. This scheme couples the policy process components and the 
evaluative criteria as follows: the decision-makers are
evaluated by the criterion of representativeness, outputs by 
both efficiency and equity, outcomes by effectiveness, feed­
back by responsiveness, and inputs by responsibility. This
Weiss, p. 29. See also Amitai Etzioni, "Two 
Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and a Sug­
gestion," Administrative Science Quarterly 5 (1960): 257-278.
FIGURE 1
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING PUBLIC POLICY
Policy Process 
Component
Evaluative
Criterion
Cr iterion 
Detinition
Decision-Makers Representativeness
Outputs Efficiency
Actual representation of clientele 
or passive sociological correspon­
dence to the origins of the broader 
society.1
The amount of resources used to 
produce a unit of output.2
Equity A situation in which actual outputs 
are equalized.3
Outcomes Effectiveness The degree to which the bureaucratic 
policy system leads to decisions 
which are more likely than alterna­
tive choices to bring about desired 
outcomes.4
FIGURE 1, continued
Policy Process 
Component
Evaluative
Criterion
Criterion
Definition
Feedback Responsiveness The extent to which the bureaucratic 
policy system promotes a correspon­
dence between the decisions of 
bureaucrats and the preferences of 
the community.^
Inputs Responsibility The degree to which bureaucratic 
performance is limited by internal 
and external controls.^
VI
ro
Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1968), pp. 10-14.
2
Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1964), pp. 8-10.
^Mark V. Pauly and Thomas D. Willett, "Two Concepts of Equity and Their 
Implications for Public Policy," Social Science Quarterly 53 (June 1972): 8-11.
^Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 3-6.
^Rourke, pp. 3-6.
^Norman J. Powell, Responsible Public Bureaucracy in the United States 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 46-49.
53
emphasis on the process of public policy-making is another
departure from the norm, but it seems easily justifiable in
light of previous research. In fact, previous efforts have
convinced some analysts that process must be considered:
We see that in principle, and not only because 
doing so is more practical, the tests of policy­
making must be applied to the policymaking process 
itself, and not to its results alone. The main cri­
terion of policy-making quality then becomes; "How 
much does the policymaking process lead toward 
adoption of the policy that has the highest probable 
net payoff." Note that this probability cannot, in 
most cases, be deduced directly from any observed 
real output.46
Another crucial aspect of this framework is its 
reliance upon a more broadly defined notion of organizational 
performance than is usually the case. For the purposes of 
this study, performance is defined as the efficient, equit­
able, and effective attainment of systemic goals through 
responsive, responsible, and representative processes.
Finally, this framework is focused upon the "regula­
tory" aspects of bureaucracy and, as such, has little in 
common with much of the policy evaluation methodology which
focuses upon the "distributive" or "redistributive" impacts
4 8of social action programs.
^^Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined 
(Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing, 1968), p. 41.
^^See Fried, p. 15.
^®See Rossi and Williams; Walter Williams, Social 
Policy Research and Analysis: The Experience in the Federal
Social Agencies (New York: Elsevier, 1971); and Elmer L.
Struening and Martha Guttentag, eds., Handbook of Evaluation 
Research (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975)•
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Operationalizing Concepts 
Moving from the general definitions of the six 
evaluative criteria in Figure 1 to their specific applica­
bility to an analysis of the performance of the PEA is the 
purpose of the following discussion. With each criterion, 
an effort is made to specify those variables (and their 
dimensions) which are to be applied in the evaluation in 
order to build a model which relates the criterion to the 
policy-making process as a whole.
Representativeness 
For the purposes of this study, representativeness 
is defined as botzh active representation of clientele inter­
ests and passive sociological correspondence to the origins 
of the broader society. A strong linkage between passive 
and active representation is assumed, based in part upon a 
limited empirical research base and in part upon normative 
principles of democratic theory. Although, as was noted 
above, there is only limited data to support a contention 
of passive-active linkage, research has demonstrated, for
example, that the racial characteristics of bureaucrats may
49influence proclivity for political activity. Moreover, 
minority representation has been found to have a mixed, but
49See Jeffrey C. Rinehart and E. Lee Bernick, 
"Political Attitudes and Behavior Patterns of Federal Civil 
Servants," Public Administration Review 35 (November/ 
December 1975): 603-611.
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significant, impact on certain government policies (at the 
state level). Even more basic to the assumption, how­
ever, is the following argument by Harry Kranz:
But the case for a more representative public 
service must rest largely, not on hard data, but on 
democratic theory and logical inference. Democratic 
theory holds that decisions reached by a large, 
diverse group are "better" than decisions arrived at 
by a single person or small group of elite conform­
ists; the decision will be "better" because we sub­
jectively believe democracy is "better" than autoc­
racy. Exclusion is morally and ethically wrong; 
equal opportunity to participate is the law of the 
land. Similarly, logical inference leads us to 
believe that increasing minority representation in 
bureaucracy should increase minority opportunities 
to exercise power, reduce their feelings of aliena­
tion, and dilute the power currently exercised by 
elites and specialists.51
Because empirically demonstrable (and quantifiable) 
data regarding either the pre- or post-agency socialization 
or behavior of FEA personnel is lacking, the assumption of a 
passive-active representation linkage must remain grounded 
in this theoretical precept and in the limited supporting 
research base. Figure 2 illustrates the model of representa­
tive bureaucracy upon which these assumptions are based.
Kenneth J. Meier, "The Policy Impact of Affirmative 
Action: Racial Representation in the States," a paper
prepared for delivery at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the 
Southwestern Political Science Association, Dallas, April 7- 
10, 1976.
^^Harry Kranz, "Government By All the People: The
Why and How of a More Representative Public Service," Good 
Government 89 (Fall 1972): 4.
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FIGURE 2
A MODEL OF REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY*
Group
Group
2
Group
3
Administration
A
V
-Person
A
V
-Person - Outputs
A
V
-Person
A=Attitudes; V=Values
*Mary L. Miller, "Representative Bureaucracy and 
Affirmative Action: Basic Issues and Concepts," a paper 
prepared for the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern 
Political Science Association, Dallas, April 7-10, 1976, 
p. 4.
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Passive bureaucratie representativeness is defined
as a public service "in which the ratio of each minority
group in a particular government agency comes closest to
equalling that group's percentage in the population in the
52area served by that office." This definition focuses
upon the sociological categories of sex and race, since,
as Kranz has noted:
. . .  a representative public service must include 
appropriate participation by blacks, Indians, 
Spanish-origin persons, women, youth (17-24 years 
of age inclusive) and poor people (those from a "low- 
income" family), all as defined in the 1970 census.53
Three dimensions of the variable "sociological cor­
respondence" (passive representation) will be analyzed by 
this study. The first, level of representativeness, is 
operationalized as the ratio of the percentage of FEA per­
sonnel in the indicator categories of sex and race to the 
percentage of the national population for the same categories. 
This simple "index of representation" provides a summary figure 
where 1.0 equals a "perfect" level of representation, more 
than 1.0 signifies "over-representation," and less than 1.0
52Kranz, p. 3.
^^Harry Kranz, "How Representative Is the Public 
Service?" Public Personnel Management 2 (July/August 1973): 
243- As was the case with Kranz's research, however, since 
no comprehensive data are available for age levels or pre­
employment income for FEA employees, sex and race have to 
suffice as the data base.
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designates "under-representation."^^ A second dimension, 
integration of representatives, focuses upon "the degree to 
which the work force of an organization is socially mixed" 
and is measured by an "index of integration" which counts 
and sums the total number of differences in specified social 
characteristics (sex and race, for this study). This index 
ranges from 0 (total absence of integration) to 1.0 (maximum 
integration).^^ Finally, the third dimension is distribution 
of representativeness. This dimension taps such factors as 
the income and occupational distribution of minority groups 
through the Gini Index of Inequality. The Gini Index ranges 
from 0 to 1.0— from perfectly equal distribution to perfectly 
unequal distribution.^^ The analysis of the distribution of 
FEA representativeness also includes measurement of the 
degree of "differential incorporation" of the agency. This 
structural factor combines measures of organizational "strat­
ification" (the degree to which minority personnel are
This index was developed by Subramaniam and has 
been utilized by almost every analyst of passive representa­
tion, although Meier is responsible for conceptualizing the 
dimension "level of representativeness" as it is used here. 
See Nachmias and Rosenbloom, p. 591, for a discussion of the 
methodology of this index and Peter N. Grabosky and David H. 
Rosenbloom, "Racial and Ethnic Integration in the Federal 
Service," Social Science Quarterly 56 (June 1975): 71-84.
for an example of its use.
55See Nachmias and Rosenbloom, pp. 592-593.
^^See Oliver E. Benson, Political Science Laboratory 
(Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1969), pp. 8-12, for a dis­
cussion of the use of the Gini Index.
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clustered into jobs of lower grade, lower classifications for 
pay, and positions of lower responsibility) and organizational 
segmentation" (the degree to which minorities are isolated 
in various offices, programs, and geographical areas). An 
attempt will be made to correlate indices of integration of 
representativeness to FEA personnel income levels as an indi­
cator of bureaucratic stratification, and to measures of 
office/program importance (size and funding) as an indicator 
of organizational segmentation. Finally, the FEA will be 
placed in a typology of bureaucratic representation and an 
effort will be made to draw the political implications of 
these findings.
Efficiency and Equity
Bryan Jones has identified two "complementary models"
which dominate the policy analysis literature— the systems
58model of process and the economic model of product. Termed
59"policy output analysis" by Cook and Scioli, the systems
Charles H . Levine, "Unrepresentative Bureaucracy," 
Bureaucrat 4 (April 1975): 91-92. According to Levine,
"differential incorporation" is the "disparity in benefits 
and opportunities between privileged and underprivileged 
groups as a direct expression of discriminatory practices."
5SBryan D. Jones, "Distributional Considerations in 
Models of Government Service Provision," a paper prepared for 
delivery at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Polit­
ical Science Association, Dallas, April 7-10, 1976, pp. 1-10.
59Thomas J. Cook and Frank P. Scioli, Jr., "Impact 
Analysis in Public Policy Research," in Kenneth M. Dolbeare, 
ed., Public Policy Evaluation (Beverly Hills: Sage Publi­
cations, 1975), p. 95.
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model of process focuses upon the explanation of public 
policy (output) formation in terms of the influence of 
inputs from the political environment. Inputs, in this 
model, are usually conceptualized as demands or supports on 
the policy-makers. Outputs are then the "authoritative allo­
cations of values" which result from the conversion of these 
inputs into specific governmental acts. Usually, these out­
puts have been measured by allocations of dollar expendi­
tures, although manpower, physical facilities, political sym­
bols, and other factors of production are also commonly 
utilized.
The economic model of product begins where the sys­
tems model of process ends. The outputs of the systems 
model, most often measured by public expenditures, become 
the inputs of the economic model. In the economic model, 
government funds, personnel, and facilities are converted 
into services such as street maintenance, fire control, or 
law enforcement.®^ A similar approach, termed "policy impact 
research" by Cook and Scioli and "evaluation research" by 
Carol W e i s s , g o e s  one step beyond the economic model by
See Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the 
Public (Chicago: Rand-McNaily, 1966), for an example of
research which relates political system characteristics to 
policy outputs (Dye terms them "outcomes").
®^See Donald M. Fisk and Richard E. Winnie, "Output 
Measurement in Urban Government: Current Status and Likely
Prospects," Social Science Quarterly 54 (March 1974): 725-
728.
®^Cook and Scioli, p. 95; and Weiss, pp. 1-2.
61
defining outputs in terms of the impacts or effects of 
government services on organizational goals. Figure 3 
outlines the sequential nature of these models and empha­
sizes their interlocking and overlapping conceptualization.
The criterion of efficiency is applicable to each of the 
three output types (process, product, and impact) identified 
in Figure 3 since the "efficiency imperative" of any rational 
bureaucracy requires the constant minimization of system in­
puts and the maximization of system outputs, regardless of 
the system level under consideration.®^ Efficiency, for the 
purposes of this study, is defined as the ratio between pub­
lic expenditures and effort, as outlined in Figure 4. This 
approach focuses upon the economic model of product in a 
slightly modified form. As Figure 4 shows, inputs continue 
to be defined in "allocative" terms and measured by expendi­
ture patterns. Outputs, or public service levels, are mea­
sured, however, not as effects on the environment, but as 
"efforts" by the policy-implementing structure at the point 
where the government and the "community" (the environment for 
a particular agency) interface.Approaching outputs as 
"the transformation which occurs when dollars, manpower, and 
other factors of production are combined in an effort 'to
William G. Scott and Terence R. Mitchell, Organization 
Theory; A Structural and Behavioral Analysis (Homewood: 
Dorsey Press, 1972), p. 5.
‘Jones, pp. 5-6.
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*This is an adaptation of Bryan D. Jones' illustration of the Systems- 
Process-Economic Product (SPEP) Model of public Policy in his "Distributional Con­
siderations in Models of Government Service Provision," a paper prepared for 
delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Southwest Political Science Association, 
Dallas, April 7-10, 1976, p. 9.
FIGURE 4
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*This is an adaptation of Bryan D. Jones' illustration of the Two-Stage 
Production Process for Governmental Services in his "Distributional Considerations 
in Models of Government Service Provision," a paper prepared for delivery at the 
Annual Meeting of the Southwest Political Science Association, Dallas, April 7-10, 
1976, p. 10.
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produce something,'"®^ focuses efficiency considerations on 
the performance of various services and production of various 
products without examining whether these services or products 
affect the achievement of agency goals or objectives. The 
empirical question of effect is thus left to further analy­
sis (in the evaluation of outcome effectiveness).^®
The choice of bureaucratic effort as the focus of 
efficiency and equity analysis is based upon the premise that 
government agencies have actual control only over these 
"intermediate" outputs and not over "impact" outputs which 
may be influenced by a range of extraneous variables. Thus, 
it is reasonable to "regard indicators of the nature and
intensity of government-community contact as what government
6 7produces, the level of services provided." Moreover, the 
use of effort measures facilitates the development of com­
patible definitions of bureaucratic output equity. For this 
study, equity refers to the equal distribution of bureau­
cratic efforts at the point of government-community interface.
Elinor Ostrom, "Exclusion, Choice and Divisibility: 
Factors Affecting the Measurement of Urban Agency Output and 
Impact," Social Science Quarterly 54 (March 1974): 691
(emphasis mine).
66See Fried, p. 69, where the author notes that dis­
sociating efficiency from effectiveness in this manner empha­
sizes efficiency measures of outputs that are really inputs 
(to the impact model of effect).
®^Jones, p. 10. See also Bryan D. Jones and Clifford 
Kaufman, "The Distribution of Urban Public Services," Admin­
istration and Society 6 (1974): 337-360.
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Distribution of bureaucratie effort is important to the. 
policy analyst for at least three reasons: (1) there is a
powerful symbolic component to governmental distribution 
efforts; (2) some governmental efforts have direct relation­
ships to other output indicators; and (3) efforts, as noted 
above, are what governments really produce, and their distri-
C Q
bution is itself significant.
Effectiveness 
The application of the criterion of effectiveness to 
policy outcomes, variously termed "impact analysis," "evalua­
tion research," or "program evaluation," moves beyond consid­
eration of governmental efforts to examine the impact or 
effect of such efforts on the target community. This study 
defines effectiveness as the impact of effort, including dis­
tributional factors, which corresponds to the agency's goals 
and objectives. Figure 5 graphically illustrates the rela­
tionships between service-levels (efforts), the government- 
community interface (equitable distribution), and policy 
impacts (effects). This is a variation of the impact model 
of effect outlined in Figure 3. According to this model, the 
impact of governmental effort (effectiveness) is assessed 
according to the degree to which an agency realizes both its 
stated and hidden objectives. Since a working assumption of 
this study is that the complexity of the energy policy-making
68Jones, p. 12.
FIGURE 5
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paper prepared for delivery at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the southwest 
Political Science Association, Dallas, April 7-10, 1976, p. 10.
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system and the paucity of data makes the use of causal 
analysis techniques impossible in this case, there will be 
no attempt to specify the relationship between particular 
independent variables (efforts) and the dependent variables 
(goal attainment). Instead, the evaluation of outcome effec­
tiveness will focus upon the changes which have taken place 
in the social conditions which form the FEA's raison d'etre. 
While the shortcomings of this approach are substantial— any 
number of additional variables can impinge upon a regulatory 
agency's goal attainment— this mode of analysis follows a 
rather extensive research tradition in political science.
More importantly, there have been a number of analyses of 
the energy policy-making activities of the FEA which have at 
least implicitly utilized this ap p r o a c h . T h u s ,  defining 
effectiveness in terms of agency goal attainment offers some 
special advantages for theory-building and the replication of 
research.
Respons iveness 
For the purposes of this study, responsiveness is 
defined in terms of the correspondence between agency
See Richard B. Maneke. Performance of the Federal 
Energy Office (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1975); Craig A. Wagner, "National 
Energy Goals and FEA's Mandatory Crude Oil Allocation Pro­
gram," Virginia Law Review 61 (May 1975): 903-937; and Paul
MacAvoy, Bruce E. Stangle, and Jonathan B. Tepper, "The 
Federal Energy Office as Regulator of the Energy Crisis," 
Technology Review 77 (May 1975): 39-45.
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decisions and both public opinion preferences and interest 
group demands. Figure 6 illustrates a model of responsive 
bureaucracy, as the term is utilized for this study. Accord­
ing to this model, once policies have been articulated by 
decision-makers, implemented through bureaucratic effort, and 
have had some impact on the environment of an agency, there 
is almost always an attempt to secure feedback from these out­
comes in order to enable the organization to adapt its behav­
ior to changing circumstances.^® When policy impacts produce 
responses, of either a favorable or negative nature, from 
individuals or groups in the agency's environment, the criter­
ion of responsiveness can be- used to assess the degree to 
which the bureaucracy is able to match its decisions to the 
policy preferences of the community. Two concepts are cen­
tral to this assessment of the feedback process. First, the 
response of the person or group toward whom policies have 
been directed must be manifested in the form of new demands 
or supports on the agency. Second, the bureaucracy must 
correctly perceive these pressures and act in a manner
See Edmund P. Fowler and Robert L. Lineberry, 
"Patterns of Feedback in City Politics," in David R. Morgan 
and Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, eds., Urban Political Analysis 
(New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 361-362.
7 1 Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and 
Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brovm, 1959), pp. 3-7.
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*This is a modification of the conceptual framework outlined in Russell
W. Getter and Paul D. Schumaker, "Political Structure and Policy Responsiveness 
in the Distribution of Revenue Sharing Funds in 51 American Cities," a paper 
prepared for delivery at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political 
Science Association, Dallas, April 7-10, 1976, p. 4.
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72responsive to them. Thus, "the test of a responsive 
administrative system in a democracy is how well national 
and community preferences, and the policies and actions of 
the bureaucratic agencies, suit each other.
Responsibility
As important as the manner in which a bureaucracy is
responsive to information emanating from its environment is
the way in which these external influences are combined with
internal organizational characteristics and transformed into
sources of bureaucratic power and mechanisms of bureaucratic
control. Both general public opinion and specific interest
group requests, for example, narrow into "inputs" into the
bureaucracy when they are expressed as either demands or
74supports for particular policies. VJhen combined with such 
factors as bureaucratic professionalism, special skills, or 
technological expertise, these inputs determine the extent 
to which an agency possesses political power and the tech­
niques by which society can control agency actions.
72Bryan D. Jones, "Competitiveness, Role Orientations, 
and Legislative Responsiveness," Journal of Politics 35 (Novem­
ber 1973): 925. See also M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Ziegler,
"Response Styles and Politics : The Case of School Boards,"
Midwest Journal of Political Science 15 (May 1971): 294.
^^Fried, p. 49.
74See David R. Morgan and Scunuel A. Kirkpatrick,
"Inputs of the Urban Political System," in Morgan and Kirk­
patrick, pp. 89-90.
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Administrative responsibility, for this study, is 
defined as the objective and subjective responses of bureau­
crats to the combination of external and internal controls 
which limit bureaucratic power and performance. This con­
cept is illustrated in Figure 7. It should be noted that 
this model provides for the analysis of the sources of 
bureaucratic power (e.g., mobilization of constituencies, or 
administrative expertise) within the analysis of controls; 
supports are assumed to be irrelevant outside a model which 
analyzes demands. That is, in the evaluation of internal 
controls, for example, the focus is upon the degree to which 
a source of power (expertise) is limited by and balanced with 
a source of control (professionalism), rather than focusing 
upon an independent evaluation of each factor.
A Model for the Evaluation of Public Policy
The operationalization of the evaluative criteria 
used in this study results in more specific definitions than 
those outlined earlier in the general framework for analysis 
(Figure 1). Figure 8 illustrates the manner in which these 
operational concepts have been combined to create a model for 
analyzing FEA performance. In this illustration, the cri­
teria are presented as components of a policy system (the 
arrows indicate sequential, not causal, relationships) and 
the activities necessary for their measurement are made spe­
cific. Thus, the analysis of FEA decision-maker
FIGURE 7
A MODEL OF RESPONSIBLE BUREAUCRACY*
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K)
*This is an illustration of the concepts dis­
cussed in Norman J. Powell, Responsible Public Bureau­
cracy in the United States (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 
1967), pp. 46-117; Frederick Mosher, Democracy and the 
public Service (New York; Oxford University Press, 1968), 
pp. 7-9; and Lewis C. Mainzer, Political Bureaucracy 
(Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman, 1973), pp. 11-14.
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representativeness (Chapter VI) will focus only upon the 
sociological correspondence of agency personnel to the ori­
gins of society (measured in terms of race and sex). A link­
age between these variables and active clientele representa­
tion is assumed, but not demonstrated. In Chapter VII, effic­
iency measurement has been narxowed from the more general 
ratio between resources and outputs to a consideration of 
the expenditure-effort ratio. Equity then becomes the equal 
distribution of this agency effort. The focus for the evalu­
ation of FEA efficiency and equity is the agency's compliance 
and enforcement effort.
Outcome effectiveness (evaluated in Chapter VIII) 
measures the correspondence between the impact of agency 
effort and organizational goals and objectives. Three sets 
of FEA goals will be analyzed: executive, congressional,
and bureaucratic. Measurement of feedback responsiveness—  
the correspondence between agency decisions and public opin­
ion and interest group demands— uses national survey data 
and information from the FEA's exceptions and appeals pro­
grams as a basis for Chapter IX. And evaluation of FEA's 
input responsibility is based on the agency * s responses to 
internal and external controls which limit performance 
(Chapter X).
In each chapter, the evaluation of FEA performance 
will be preceded by a statement of research hypotheses drawn 
from the existing studies of the agency's behavior. These
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hypotheses will then be tested in the course of the policy 
evaluation.
Summary
The design of this study draws heavily upon the 
research tradition, termed institutional policy analysis, 
which investigates the behavior patterns of formal, govern­
mental organizations. It takes a systems analysis approach 
to the study of bureaucracy both because of the extensive 
literature which defines policy-making structures in systems 
terms and because of the conceptual clarity of the elements 
of systems theory. The choice of this approach signals some 
basic assumptions about the nature of politics. Primarily, 
this study is based on the assumption that an analysis of 
bureaucratic behavior must consider the entire policy process 
rather than any single process component. Further, this 
design is based on a very broad concept of bureaucratic per­
formance— one which includes inputs and the conversion pro­
cess as well as the "payoff" of administrative activities.
The nature of the design— a case study— is well suited 
to meet the dual research purposes of providing a descriptive 
"feel" for the energy policy-making area and evaluating FEA 
performance. Through this format it is hoped that this 
study can make a contribution both to empirical theory- 
building in the field of public policy-making and to substan­
tive knowledge of the workings of the energy policy system.
CHAPTER III 
THE ENERGY POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM
Introduction^
A grasp of the nature of the links between the 
institutions and processes of the "energy system" is basic 
to an understanding of the role of the Federal Energy Admin­
istration in energy policy-making. Only recently viewed in 
terms of an organized policy system, the large number of 
participants with an interest in energy policy have had a 
range of overlapping roles, pursued often inconsistent goals 
and objectives, and been active in resolving multifaceted 
issues in a variety of political situations. In fact, 
rather than a comprehensive, homogeneous framework, for the 
most part what exists is an interlocking set of fuel policy 
subsystems organized around the specific politics of coal, 
oil, natural gas, electricity, and nuclear energy. Of 
course, this segmentation of energy policy-making is not an 
absolute— there is considerable "spillover" in terms of 
participants, roles, goals and objectives, and policy issues
^This chapter is based on research undertaken by the 
Science and Public Policy Program for the National Science 
Foundation under Grant SIA74-17856. See Don E. Kash, et al., 
Our Energy Future (Norman: University of Oklahoma Pre^sl 1976)
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from one subsystem to another. This complex system forms the 
policy environment within which the Federal Energy Adminis­
tration must perform; the characteristics of this system 
have shaped every action of the new agency since its crea­
tion- The purpose of this chapter is to outline this system 
in terms of its historical development, its most significant 
participants, and the policy subsystems within which these 
participants interact.
History of the Energy Policy System
The history of energy policy-making in this country 
may be seen as an evolution through three distinct, but over­
lapping periods. The first period, the nineteenth century, 
was characterized by abundant resources and little competi­
tion between private developers. The second historical per­
iod, most of the twentieth century, saw the federal govern­
ment begin to allocate resources among a pluralistic set of 
interests competing for the right to develop them. Period 
three, which began in the 1960s, has been characterized by 
the emergence of new policy-making participants, who broaden 
the range of viewpoints that must be considered in energy 
resource development.
Until very recently, energy resources were abundant 
enough to allow the evolution of piecemeal, ad hoc energy 
policy-making processes which were fragmented in theory and 
wasteful in practice. In the period prior to the turn of the
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last century, a laissez-faire tradition dominated domestic
resource allocation and development. During this period,
except for a few natural monopolies, government generally
adopted a "hands off" attitude toward private sector energy
activities. Within the public sector, a "pork barrel" or
"distributive" process governed energy decision-making.
Central to both public and private actions was the assumption
2
that energy resources were almost infinite in character. 
Moreover, agents of the government, both executive and legis­
lative, were assumed to have almost unlimited authority to 
disburse goods held in the public trust, including energy 
resources. Guided by this perception of the "free and open" 
nature of energy resource development, extraction processes 
were codified, energy prices were subsidized, and energy con­
sumption was encouraged without consideration of environ- 
m.ental costs.^ As a result of this and the federal policy 
of viewing public land distribution as a source of revenue, 
public resources rapidly passed into private hands through 
preemption sales, homestead allowances, and grants to the 
railroads. The distributive process also provided the frame­
work for later uses of public energy resources, primarily
Robert S. Gilmour, "Political Barriers to a National 
Policy," Academy of Political Science, Proceedings 31 
(December 1973): 184-186.
^John V. Krutilla and R. Talbot Page, "Towards a 
Responsible Energy Policy," Policy Analysis 1 (Winter 1975): 
78.
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through location or leasing laws. Perhaps more significantly, 
it was during this period that the treatment of each of the 
abundant energy sources as an independent entity by the gov­
ernment and the energy industries became commonplace.
Succeeding, but not eliminating, the processes of 
this early period, patterns of "pluralism"— the representa­
tion of a wide variety of value preferences and beliefs in 
the policy system— began to dominate energy decision-making 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. With the growing 
realization that energy resources were indeed finite, govern­
ment could no longer pursue an energy policy which consisted 
mainly of responses to individual private interests. Rather, 
its role increasingly became one which required allocation 
and compromises among multiple interests.^ As the number of 
participants grew, pluralism was reflected in national debates 
such as the disputes over regional versus national allocation 
of scarce resources and the conservation-production issue.
Although the pluralistic process clearly continues to 
dominate the making of today's energy decisions, since the 
1960s "veto" politics have modified its impact. Because 
decision-making in a pluralistic society requires compromises 
in the allocation of resources, and because the energy system
4
Gilmour, pp. 186-188. See also William B. Lord and 
Maurice L. Warner, "Aggregates and Externalities: Informa­
tion Needs for Public Natural Resource Decision-Making," 
Natural Resources Journal 13 (January 1973) : 108.
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is characterized by a limited amount of resources to allocate, 
there has always been a danger of stalemates. Widened par­
ticipation by strong new political interests have often 
resulted in the use of the "environmental veto" to block 
energy actions in the 1970s.
Individually, and in combination, these three policy 
processes (distributive, pluralistic, and veto) have molded 
the energy system. The present system represents a complex 
mixture of the institutions and procedures which evolved in 
each of these periods- While energy was still abundant, 
the decision-making system, though fragmented, was character­
ized by both a high degree of stability and a clear differ­
entiation between the policy roles of the public and private 
sectors. That is, as long as competition was minimal among 
private developers, government intervention was seldom neces­
sary. In those policy areas which did require public-private 
interaction, the slow rate of development allowed time for 
mutually acceptable rules to be promulgated and modified.
In this situation, each sector could predict with a fairly 
high degree of certainty the future actions of the other.
Now, resource scarcity, spotlighted by the Arab boycott, 
has contributed to the breakdown of system stability. The 
result has been a reduction in the degree of certainty which 
can be attached to any domestic energy policy. In addition, 
international energy policy-making has become less predict­
able, ending 25 years of relative stability. Thus, decisions
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have become clouded by uncertainty.^ In turn, this 
uncertainty has triggered a major debate over public versus 
private solutions to energy problems. Both governmental and 
industrial roles in the energy system have become more com­
plex and less clearly delineated. Decisions in both sectors 
have been made in an incremental manner around specific 
resources or functions. One result has been a proliferation 
of government agencies with major energy policy roles and an 
ever more complex set of overlapping administrative and 
political jurisdictions. Another has been the creation of a 
multitude of industry associations and energy-related inter­
est groups. The following sections focus upon the range of 
public (federal, state, and local governments) and private 
(industry and other interest groups) participants in the 
modern energy policy-making system.
Participants in the Energy Policy System
At each level of government and within every sector 
of industry, new energy parties-at-interest have been created 
and old energy participants have been modified. This discus­
sion briefly outlines the roles of government, energy com­
panies, and environmental interest groups in energy develop­
ment.
^Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Social System and the 
Energy Crisis," Science 184 (April 19, 1974): 255.
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The Federal_J3overnment 
Historically, the federal government has acted both 
as an external "overseer" and as an active participant in 
the energy system.^ In its oversight role, government has 
sought to coordinate energy decisions with other relevant 
policy arenas (such as the development of environmental 
standards), coordinate energy goals with broader national 
goals (for example, national defense and international rela­
tions objectives), and balance the social costs and benefits 
of energy policies (as is the case with the dual issues of 
inflation and unemployment). This role calls for the federal 
government to intervene in the energy policy system to cor­
rect policy failures.
The role of the federal government is quite different 
when it is an owner, producer, or consumer of energy. In 
these cases, the federal government is an "economic actor" 
performing many of the same functions as private participants. 
Most government participation of this sort results from its 
extensive resource holdings. The federal resource base 
includes over 50 percent of the total fossil energy resources 
in the U.S. (37 percent of the oil, 43 percent of the gas,
50 percent of the coal, and 81 percent of the oil shale) and 
approximately 50 percent of the geothermal and uranium
®J. Herbert Holloman, et al., Energy Research and 
Development (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishers, 1975), pp. 11-
14.
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resources.^ For the most part, the responsible federal 
officials (such as the Secretary of the Interior) have wide
O
discretionary authority in managing these resources.
The federal government has also become a major energy 
producer, through the creation of such electric power agen­
cies as the Tennessee Valley Authority and through the dev­
elopment of nuclear facilities. Finally, the federal govern­
ment is a large consumer of energy. The largest federal 
consumer is the Defense Department, for which special energy 
reserves are maintained.
Prior to 1973, an overall federal energy policy had 
not been articulated. After the energy crisis, however, the 
executive and legislative branches began to focus their 
efforts on defining some desired energy policy outcomes. In 
1973, the Administration defined an adequate and dependable 
supply of energy as the general policy goal. According to 
former Interior Secretary Rogers Morton, the plan was "to 
meet the nation's essential needs and assure its prosperity 
and security in ways which are consistent with natural
Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, A 
Time to Choose (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishers, 1974),
p. 271; and U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Federal Leasing and Disposal Policies (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 197.
^See Carl McFarland, "The Unique Role of Discretion 
in Public Land Law," Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 
16 (1970): 35-58.
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environmental and social objectives." More specifically, 
Morton identified Administration energy policy objectives 
to include:
1. Increasing domestic production of all forms of 
energy.
2. Conserving energy more effectively.
3- Striving to meet energy needs at the lowest cost 
consistent with the protection of both the 
national security and the natural environment.
4. Reducing excessive regulatory and administrative
impediments which have delayed or prevented con­
struction of energy-producing facilities.
5. Acting in concert with other nations to conduct
research in the energy field and to find ways
to prevent serious energy shortages.
6. Applying scientific and technological capabili­
ties, both public and private, toward utiliza­
tion of our current energy resources more wisely.. 
and developing new forms of energy more rapidly.
The first goal has, until very recently, received the primary 
emphasis. Administration statements have stressed the need 
for reducing energy imports, ending "vulnerability to eco­
nomic disruption" by foreign energy suppliers, and providing 
a greater share of the energy needs of the "Free World" from 
U.S. supplies.
In the formulation of these objectives, the Adminis­
tration has placed heavy emphasis upon the operation of a 
market device within the energy system. Since energy became
9
Rogers C. B. Morton, "The Nixon Administration Energy 
Policy," Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 410 (November 1973): 66.
^^Morton, p. 67.
llnpresident Gerald Ford's State of the Union Address 
to the Ninety-Fourth Congress," Energy Users Report 21 (Jan­
uary 15, 1975), p. 1051.
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an important issue in federal executive-legislative relations 
in the early 1970s, a central point on which the Democrat- 
controlled Congress has differed from the two Republican Pres­
idents has been the degree to which a "free market" economy 
is capable of attaining national energy goals. The execu­
tive position has essentially been that "the competitive 
pressures of the free enterprise system could do a better
job than the federal bureaucracy of ensuring sufficient
12energy supplies at equitable prices," while the congres­
sional leadership has questioned the very existence of such 
a free market system in, at least, the oil and gas industries.
Thus, while the Congress has generally accepted the 
goals outlined by the executive branch, it has seriously 
disagreed with many of the means (public versus private) and 
methods (market versus government intervention) by which the 
objectives should be achieved. For example, the Congress has 
opposed outright deregulation of oil and gas as a means of 
increasing domestic energy supply. Similarly, presidential 
plans to restrain energy demand through increased prices 
have been countered by congressional proposals for mandatory 
conservation measures and tax incentives for specific conser­
vation targets. Finally, Congress has disagreed with the 
Administration on the priorities assigned to energy goals.
12Joel Havemann, "Crisis Tightens Control of U.S. 
Energy Production," National Journal Reports 7 (April 26, 
1975): 619.
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In general, the Democrat majority has attached more importance 
to domestic economic recovery than to the Administration's 
desire to reduce dependence upon foreign oil.
The policy compromises which have resulted from these 
divergent viewpoints have focused largely upon the organiza­
tional modifications necessary to deal effectively with 
energy policy goals. Reorganization proposals since the 
early 1970s have had two objectives: the consolidation of
institutions in order to increase domestic energy production 
(primarily through better coordination or information- 
gathering activities), and the elimination of constraints on 
production (usually through the elimination of regulatory 
functions). Even before the energy crisis, a concerted 
effort had been made to consolidate energy functions. As 
early as 1971, the President's Advisory Council on Executive 
Organization recommended the establishment of a Department 
of Natural Resources as a solution to the problems of admin­
istrative fragmentation. In 1973, the Administration pro­
posed a reorganization plan which would have created a 
Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), an Energy 
Research and Development Administration (ERDA), and a Nuclear 
Energy Commission, to be formed from elements of the Interior
Francis A. Gulick, "Energy-Related Legislation 
Highlights of the 93rd Congress and a Comparison of Three 
Energy Plans Before the 94th Congress," Public Administration 
Review 35 (July/August 1975): 349-354.
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and Agriculture Departments, Atomic Energy Commission (AEG),
14and other agencies. A major aim of this proposal was an 
attempt to separate energy functions from other governmental 
activities. After the Congress refused to approve this plan, 
the temporary Federal Energy Office (PEG) was created by 
executive order, pending legislation to establish the more 
comprehensive Federal Energy Administration.^^ Following 
the passage of the Federal Energy Administration Act in May 
1974, the Energy Reorganization Act of October 1974, dis­
solved the AEG and created ERDA and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRG).
Congressional reaction to the recent reorganization 
efforts in the energy system has been mixed. Proposals to 
legislate emergency energy powers to the President were 
delayed, primarily because of controversy over provisions 
restricting windfall profits for the petroleum industry. 
Similarly, impasses have developed over legislation which 
would alter industry tax structures, require information 
disclosures by the private sector, and bring the federal 
government into a more direct role in the exploration for 
and production of domestic energy.
14-David H. Davis, Energy Politics (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 185-187.
^^Frank J. Fowlkes and Joel Havemann, "President 
Forms Federal Energy Body With Broad Regulation, Price Con­
trol Powers," National Journal Reports 5 (December 8,
1973): 1830-1838.
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U.S. foreign policy responses have also met with 
only limited success. The focus of recent American efforts 
in the international energy policy-making arena has been to 
press for the cooperation of major oil-importing nations in 
developing programs to reduce consumption, generate new 
energy resources, and assure international financial stabil­
ity. The American government has advanced the position that 
only after such programs have been agreed upon by consuming 
nations can constructive negotiations with the oil producing 
nations begin. One concrete result of this policy has been 
the creation of the International Energy Agency (as an auton­
omous organization under the Organization for Economic Coop­
eration and Development) to coordinate reactions to any fut­
ure disruption of energy supplies by the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries. Other U.S. actions have 
included modifications in the International Monetary Fund 
rules to "reshuffle" surpluses of export earnings by oil 
producing nations, and participation in cooperative energy 
supply studies, such as those sponsored by the European 
Economic Community.^  ^
State Governments 
The range of state agencies participating in the 
energy system has been increasing, but their roles continue
^^Joseph A. Yager and Eleanor B. Steinberg, Energy 
and U.S. Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishers,
1974), pp. 389-416.
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to be limited. At the time of the 1973 energy crisis, state 
government participation in energy policy-making was severely 
constrained by the inability of state authorities to deal 
with energy supply markets which were national or interna­
tional in scope, the inadequacy of traditional quasi-judicial 
state regulatory agencies to cope with complex, non-legal, 
energy problems, and the absence of effective energy policy 
coordination mechanisms between federal and state governments 
and among the states themselves.Although the scope of 
energy supply markets and the coordination of various gov­
ernmental bodies remain problems to which states have only 
begun to respond, some progress has been made in developing 
more adequate state regulatory organizations. At least
forty-two new energy councils, committees and task forces
18had been created at the state level by 1974.
Historically, states have exercised extensive author­
ity over policy decisions in such areas as the regulation of 
facility siting and licensing, the availability of state- 
owned resources for development, and the establishment of
Joseph C. Swidler, "The Challenge to State Regula­
tion Agencies: The Experience of New York State," Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 410 
(November 1973) : 106-119. See also Neely Gardner, '^ Calif­
ornia Jousts With the Energy Crisis," Public Administration 
Review 35 (July/August 1975): 336.
18Luther J. Carter, "Florida: An Energy Policy
Emerges in a Growth State," Science 184 (April 19, 1974): 
302.
90
prices and rates of production for intrastate energy resources. 
The opportunities for greater state participation in the 
energy system have, in many cases, been enhanced by the 
energy crisis. Under general federal guidelines, states 
have been delegated important responsibilities for formulat­
ing and adopting water and air quality criteria to meet fed­
eral requirements, collecting data to form the basis for 
petroleum allocation regulations, and enforcing conservation 
restrictions such as the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. More­
over, as new energy facilities become larger, they often
require special siting procedures which may involve several
19states or even several regions.
As federal policies have increasingly encroached 
upon state authority in the energy field, however, conflicts 
have become serious policy constraints. Most notable in 
this regard are the disputes over strip mining for Western 
coal and offshore oil production in the Atlantic. In the 
case of Western coal development, a number of states have 
acted to pass reclaimation standards more stringent than the 
existing federal laws, while the attempts to develop off­
shore oil resources have met with outright resistance from 
states concerned with the hazards of environmental disruption.^®
19William O. Doub, Federal Energy Regulation: An
Organizational Study (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1974), p. 19.
^®See Arthur J. Magida, "Coastal States Seek Changes 
in OCS Leasing Policy," National Journal Reports 7 (February 
15, 1975): 229-239.
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Local Governments
If state governments have been generally ineffective
in dealing with many energy problems, local governments have
been overwhelmed by t h e m . W h i l e  local administration of
zoning ordinances, building codes, and health standards can
have major impacts on energy development, the importance of
22these powers is often not fully appreciated. The limita­
tions of existing local institutions are in part a result of 
a lack of technical expertise, inadequate data bases, and a 
long tradition of decision-making which stressed accommoda­
tion with and wide discretionary authority for the private 
sector-
Because localities have continued to "decide limited
issues, play a reactive role only, and make policy by 
23default," they have increasingly found themselves follow­
ing the leadership of federal, or at times state officials 
in implementing programs such as the allocation of fuels, 
which are critical for the administration of municipalities. 
In fact, local governments have often favored federal lead­
ership as a means of circumventing state governments which 
they view as unresponsive to their needs.
^^Gardner, p. 336.
22Joan B. Aron, "Decision Making in Energy Supply 
at the Metropolitan Level: A Study of the New York Area,"
Public Administration Review 35 (July/August 1975): 344.
^^Aron, p. 344. See also Marc Roberts, "Is There 
an Energy Crisis?" Public Interest 31 (Spring 1973): 238.
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Examples of federal-local conflicts over energy policy 
are, however, easy to find. Those national energy policies
which have provoked the most local resistance have been the 
mandatory fuel allocation program and the proposed leasing of 
offshore lands for petroleum exploration and development.
In the case of fuel allocation, city governments have pressed 
for increased supplies by lobbying nationally through organi­
zations such as the League of Cities and the National Con­
ference of Mayors.
The offshore leasing plans have provoked even stronger 
responses; for example, both city and county governments in 
New Jersey have filed lawsuits to block implementation of the 
Interior Department's development programs.Significantly, 
these local actions preceded any opposition by the state gov­
ernments. Such responses are typical of the growing pres­
sures being brought to bear on local governments to respond 
to new citizens' groups and consumer advocates which operate 
through ad hoc coalitions such as the Georgia Power Project 
(in the city of Atlanta) or Strike Committee on Philadelphia 
Electric Company (SCOPE) to influence local energy policy.
^^"Communities File OCS Suits," National Journal 
Reports 7 (February 15, 1975): 238.
2 5James Ridgeway and Bettina Conner, "Toward Public 
Energy," Current 72 (April 1975): 11.
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The Energy Industry
The most significant change in the energy industry
in recent years has been the growth of conglomerates which
own multiple resources. Especially important have been the
acquisitions over the last decade by the oil industry
of coal and uranium resources. Entry by these new "energy
companies" into multiple fuel areas has generally been
accomplished by acquiring energy reserves or production
26facilities, or through joint-venture agreements.
These tendencies toward integration, coupled with 
recent (1973-1974) increases in energy prices and industry 
profits (particularly in some sectors of the oil industry), 
have created a political issue over the role of energy firms 
in public policy. Questions have been raised as to competi­
tiveness, attentiveness to the "public interest," and the 
type and degree of government control over the energy indus­
try. One view of the industry argues that "present market
27structures are not monopolisitic," and that to blame the
energy companies alone for the energy crisis would be a
"naive exaggeration" of the industry's effectiveness as a
28political pressure group. The Ford Foundation's Energy
^^Thomas D. Duchesneau, Competition in the U.S.
Energy Industry (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishers, 1975),
p. 7.
27Duchesneau, p. 178.
28Richard L. Gordon, "Mythology and Reality in Energy 
Policy," Energy Policy 2 (September 1974): 195.
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Policy Project, however, notes that the industry wields 
"exceptional political power" in the pursuit of goals 
which are often not congruent with the public interest.
Environmental Interest Groups 
Environmental interest groups represent the best 
known of the new participants in the energy system. In terms 
of organization, these groups often do not have professional 
staffing or large memberships. Nor do they usually control 
sizeable budgets or other economic or political resources.
Of the more than 3,000 organizations in the U.S. concerned 
with the environment/energy interface, only a few of the 250 
national and regional groups have had the resources to under­
take major policy initiatives. For example, only about 
twenty environmental protection groups maintain offices in 
Washington,^® and even fewer organizations have specifically 
focused their activities on the environmental aspects of 
energy policy.
The most influential environmental groups are the 
general public, or "citizens'," groups, including the Sierra 
Club, Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth, and Environ­
mental Defense Fund, which have dedicated themselves to the 
achievement of such broad sociopolitical goals as the
29Energy Policy Project, p. 230.
^®S. David Freeman, Energy: The New Era (New York:
Random House, 1974), p. 191.
95
"restoration and preservation of the earth's resources.
These groups have, for the most part, moved beyond a tradi­
tional emphasis on resource conservation to focus on the 
more general problems associated with the environment, both 
as a source of raw materials needed to generate energy and 
as a depository of the pollution resulting from the produc­
tion and use of energy. Increasingly citizens' groups have 
come to rely upon the judicial system as a secondary "fall­
back" mechanism when neither the economic market nor the 
legislative-administrative political system have reacted to 
the degradation of the environment. As Michael McCloskey,
conservation director of the Sierra Club, characterized this
3 2activist strategy, "We will sue and sue and sue." Exam­
ples of the legal actions of citizens' groups are the suits 
against Consolidated Edison's planned pump-storage electric 
generation plant at the Storm King Mountain preserve (Scenic 
Hudson vs. Federal Power Commission, 1965) and against 
Environmental Protection Agency orders to relax air quality 
standards (Sierra Club vs. Ruckelshaus, 1970).
^^The Onyx Group, Environment U.S.A. (New York:
R. R. Bowler, 1974), p. 80.
32Gerald Garvey, "Environmentalism Versus Energy 
Development: The Constitutional Background to Environmental
Administration," Public Administration Review 35 (July/ 
August 1975): 328-330. See also Walter A. Rosenbaum, The
Politics of Environmental Concern (New York: Praeger, 1973).
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The Energy Policy Subsystems 
The preceding discussion focused upon the changing 
character of energy organizations, policies, and partici­
pants. All of these changes have taken place in a set of 
policy subsystems which have developed around coal, oil, 
natural gas, electricity, and nuclear energy. The following 
section sketches the interactions of government, industry, 
and labor in each of these fuel subsystems.
The Coal Policy Subsystem 
Of all the energy resources, coal has been the least 
subject to governmental control and has the fewest links to 
government agencies. Although the Interior Department re­
tains a major role in making federally-owned coal resources 
available for development, the major governmental interests 
in the coal subsystem are focused on environmental, health, 
and safety programs. Environmental issues hinge on two 
issues: surface mining and air pollution. Enforcement of
strip-mining and reclamation regulations is divided between 
Interior and the individual state governments. Air quality 
standards regarding coal combustion are promulgated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency and implemented by the states. 
Federal control over the health and safety aspects of coal 
development has been more extensive— the Bureau of Mines and
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the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration enforce 
standards in this area.
The most striking characteristic of the modern coal 
industry has been the degree to which producers are increas­
ingly owned by corporations whose primary business is not 
coal. In 1973, two of the three largest coal producers, 
five of the top ten, and seven of the top fifteen were owned 
by oil conglomerates.^^ This infusion of capital and exper­
tise from outside the traditional coal industry has slowly 
begun to alter the status of coal companies as the least 
efficiently organized, economically poorest, and "worst 
functioning industry in the country.Handicapped by 
recent decreases in worker productivity (at least in part as 
a result of the passage of the 1969 Coal Mine Health and 
Safety Act) , disputes over the environmental consequences 
of strip mining, and labor problems with the United Mine 
Workers (UMW), the coal industry has never been capable of 
the advertising, lobbying, and campaign spending levels which 
characterize the oil and natural gas industries. Moreover,
Science and Public Policy Program, University of 
Oklahoma, The Coal and Oil Shale Resource Development System: 
An Interim Report (Norman: Science and Public Policy Program,
University of Oklahoma, 1974), pp. 202-204.
34James Ridgeway, The Last Play (New York: E. P.
Dutton, 1973), p. 208.
^^Glen L. Parker, The Coal Industry: A Study in
Social Control (Washington: American Council on Public
Affairs, 1940), p. 15.
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the coal industry's political orientation and influence has 
been directed primarily at the state governments, since, until 
the late 1960s, it was at that level of government that most 
coal regulatory functions were carried out. Thus, coal firms 
today do not have the same history of contact and interaction 
with federal regulators as have oil and gas producers.
Among the professional associations which do repre­
sent the coal industry at the national level, the most impor­
tant is the National Coal Association (NCA), whose membership 
is composed of coal producers and "associates" (sales com­
panies, railroads, mine equipment manufacturers, etc.). The 
NCA is affiliated with the Coal Exporters Association, impor­
tant for its role in international trade of U.S. coke and 
coal. Other major industry organs are the Bituminous Coal 
Operators Association, composed of the major operators (and 
industry negotiator for labor contracts), and the National 
Independent Coal Operators Association, which represents 
smaller firms. Some coal interests are also articulated by 
more general business organizations such as the American 
Mining Congress and the American Iron and Steel Institute.
Of all the energy resources, coal has been the one 
most influenced by labor union participation. The UMW has
^®See Energy Policy Project, p. 242, and Davis, 
pp. 17-40.
^^National Coal Association, Bituminous Coal Facts, 
1972 (Washington: National Coal Association, 1972), pp. 40-
47, and Ridgeway, p. 18.
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dominated the history of coal production since the 1870s,
although its influence within the coal industry has varied
from a low point during the 1930s (when membership fell from
a 1920 peak of over 750,000 to only 75,000) to a high point
during the period of "union autocracy" and militancy in the 
38194 0s. Since 194 5, the UMW has retreated somewhat from 
its early radical stance to negotiate with the Bituminous 
Coal Operators Association for the control of market, produc­
tion, and employment conditions. In return for the stability 
which these industry-union agreements have brought to the 
coal subsystem, the UMW paid a price. As the industry has 
become mechanized and diversified, many mining jobs were 
lost to other unions or went entirely nonunion. Between 1947 
and 1973, over 300,000 mining jobs ceased to exist and the
remaining coal work force of 150,000 men includes over
3935,000 nonunion personnel. In addition, the UMW has entered 
an era of competition with the International Union of Operat­
ing Engineers (lUOE), which operates the strip mining equip­
ment utilized in most Western coal operations. About 90 per­
cent of the UMW membership works in the deep mines of the 
East, so any move away from underground coal extraction tech­
niques to stripping in the West would enable operating
38Lester Velie, Labor U.S.A. (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1958), pp. 142-143; and John Hoerr, "Coal and 
the Mine Workers," Atlantic 235 (March 1974): 14.
^^Hoerr, p. 20.
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companies to contract with the lUOE on what some observers 
feel would be more favorable terras than the UMW offers. 
Despite these threats to UMW control, the union continues 
to be the most significant labor force in the energy policy 
system, as has been demonstrated by its ability to gain pas­
sage of such important standards as the 1969 Coal Mine Health 
and Safety Act provisions regarding compensation for "black 
lung" disease victims.
The Oil Policy Subsystem
The oil industry has perhaps the most advantageous
position in gaining access to its policy subsystem. As the
energy industry with the greatest economic resources at its
disposal (in 1972, 23 oil companies each had revenues of
41$250 million or more), it is easily able to pay the costs 
associated with political involvement. In addition, the oil 
industry has had relatively few manpower problems since it 
has generally been able to come to terms with the major oil 
labor unions.
Other structural factors which have worked to the 
advantage of the petroleum companies are their high degree 
of vertical and horizontal integration. That is, at least
^®james A. Noone, "Administration Joins Opposition 
to Strip Mining Bill," National Journal Reports 6 (June 15,
1974); 888.
41John E. Gray, Energy Policy; Industry Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishers, 197 5), p. 8.
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18 oil firms explore for, produce, refine, transport, and 
market crude oil (vertical integration), while many oil com­
panies have diversified their energy resource holdings to 
enable them to produce gas, coal, or uranium (horizontal 
integration) or to influence the development of these resour­
ces. These factors and the fact that seven international oil 
companies are in a dominant world leadership position in the 
industry have led to a significant community of interest 
among oil firms on political matters, although differences 
between the integrated "majors" and the more specialized 
"independents" have somewhat weakened this consensus on con­
troversial matters such as the removal of price controls.
The major avenue through which petroleum firms exer­
cise policy influence is lobbying. At every level of govern­
ment, industry associations such as the American Petroleum
Institute (API) gather data, do research, and present policy
42recommendations to public officials and the media. It
has been estimated that over $10 million per year is spent
for lobbying payrolls by the 60 oil and gas firms in Wash- 
43ington alone. The "oil lobby" has, in fact, expanded to 
such an extent that foreign governments have begun to engage 
their own Washington lobbyists to monitor petroleum policy 
developments on their behalf.
^^A. Robert Smith, "No Shortage of Energy Lobbying,' 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 30 (May 1974): 12.
43Freeman, p. 179.
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Campaign contributions are a second major policy
lever for the petroleum industry. For example, over $5
millionv/as supplied to the 1972 Presidential campaign by oil
44industry officials and stockholders. Finally, oil indus­
try positions are advanced through the government-sponsored 
policy advisory structure of the National Petroleum Council 
(NPC). Composed of members from industry associations such 
as the API and the Independent Petroleum Association of 
America, representatives of the major oil companies, and
other private oil interests, the NPC has access to a broad
45range of energy regulatory agencies and the Congress.
These advantages by the industry are balanced some­
what by the fact that the oil policy subsystem is very com­
plex and petroleum and its products are regulated at every 
level of government. In addition to the Interior Depart­
ment’s control of federal leasing and disposal policies, oil 
resources are regulated at the national level by the FEA, 
which operates the oil allocation, conservation, and imports 
programs, coordinates planning and data-gathering activities, 
and develops policy alternatives. At the state level, each 
state with producing oil fields within its boundaries has 
regulatory authority for those operations. The Interstate 
Oil Compact Commission performs a coordinating role between 
these oil producing states and the industry.
Smith, p. 12.
45Davis, p. 79.
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Labor has not been a major factor in the oil policy 
subsystem. The major labor organization in the oil and natu­
ral gas subsystems is the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers 
International Union (OCAW), which has approximately 200,000 
blue-collar members.Although limited in its impact on 
the petroleum subsystem by the relative prosperity of the 
entire industry and the traditionally weak unionization his­
tory of many oil states, the OCAW has taken a more active 
role since the energy crisis. In an attempt to gain more 
political leverage by expanding its membership, the OCAW in 
1973 began an effort to organize the white collar (scientists
and engineers, for the most part) sectors of the petroleum,
47chemical, and nuclear energy industries. The union has 
also taken a more militant stand regarding industrial rela­
tions— strikes against oil companies in 1973 sought union 
authority over such traditional management spheres as health 
and safety conditions for workers.
The Natural Gas Policy Subsystem 
The natural gas policy subsystem is closely related 
to the oil subsystem, but the major industry participants in
"Professional, Trade, and Non-Governmental Organi­
zations," The Energy Directory, Vol. 1 (New York: Environ­
ment Information Center, 1974), p. 254.
47"A Union for Industrial Scientists?" Science 181 
(September 14, 1973): 1030.
^®Deborah Shapley, "Shell Strike: Ecologists Refine
Relations With Labor," Science 180 (April 13, 1973): 166.
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the making of gas policy are neither politically as powerful 
nor organizationally as similar as the petroleum companies. 
Natural gas companies have close ties to the oil policy sub­
system because many gas producers are, in fact, oil compan­
ies. But, unlike the oil industry, most natural gas com­
panies are not characterized by vertical integration. They 
are, however, frequently complex organizations, because most 
gas producers also produce oil and many gas distribution 
companies also sell electrictiy. The result is an intricate 
industry ownership pattern in which a few large petroleum 
companies dominate a plethora of relatively small indepen­
dent gas firms in the production sector, independently-owned 
companies control transmission, and both investor- and 
publicly-owned businesses link the transmission system to 
consumers. Clearly this diversity of ownership does not 
encourage the community of interest which characterizes the 
oil industry.
Foremost among the representatives of the natural 
gas industry is the American Gas Association (AGA), a con­
vention of distributors and transporters. The AGA's most 
important policy role has been as the primary source of data 
on gas reserves for the Federal Power Commission (FPC). 
Usually in opposition to the AGA has been the consumer- 
oriented American Public Gas Association, composed of city- 
owned utilities. The major gas pipeline companies are 
represented by the Interstate Natural Gas Association. In
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addition, the API and the NPC are partial spokesmen for the
49natural gas industry.
At the apex of the governmental authority in the natural 
gas policy subsystem is the FPC, which is responsible for 
the regulating of pipeline construction, the pricing of 
interstate gas, and the allocation of gas supplies to utili­
ties. However, of the approximately 30,000 domestic oil and 
gas producers, only one in ten is subject to FPC regulations. 
Federal law requires separate firms to transport and dis­
tribute the product, and it is the transmission companies 
that are the most clearly tied to the natural gas subsystem. 
There are over 100 regulated interstate pipeline companies 
(of which about 30 are considered "major"), and more than 
1,500 gas distribution f i r m s . O t h e r  governmental controls 
are exerted on gas companies by the Interior Department, 
which has responsibility for leasing, and by state govern­
ments, which have control over their own producing areas.
Labor participants in the natural gas subsystem 
closely parallel those discussed in the oil subsystem.
The Electricity Policy Subsystem 
The electric utility industry, perhaps the most com­
plex and diverse in the entire energy policy system, is
49Davis, p. 109.
^®Gray, p. 30. See also Stephen G. Breyer and Paul 
W. MacAvoy, Energy Regulation by the Federal Power Commission 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 16-
88.
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composed of both investor-owned and public companies. The 
approximately 275 investor-owned firms are generally large, 
integrated, and produce over 7 0 percent of the nation's 
electricity, while the 2,900 public utilities are mostly 
small, more specialized, and account for slightly more than 
20 percent of p r o d u c t i o n . O n e  result of the extreme diver­
sity of the firms included within these categories— the pri­
vate sector includes both independents and subsidiaries of 
holding companies, while the public sector encompasses fed­
eral systems (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority), non- 
federal systems (state, county, and city utilities), and 
rural cooperatives— has been the absence of any community of 
interest in the electric power industry. However, the elec­
tric companies do have certain advantages in the energy sys­
tem. Electric utilities comprise the largest American indus­
try in terms of total assets, and require more annual invest­
ment than any other industry. In addition, electricity is 
produced everywhere in the nation; there are no "electricity 
states" as there are the "coal states" of Pennsylvania and 
West Virginia or the "oil states" of Texas and Louisiana. 
Finally, as the electric utility indusf^&r'position is 
strengthened by the politics of resource scarcity and a mush­
rooming demand for electric power, electric companies are 
gradually improving their lobbying activities and their 
interactions with government.
^^Gray, p. 20.
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Although the electric utilities have developed few 
powerful, industrywide associations which represent industry 
positions to government, bodies such as the Edison Electric 
Institute (an industry trade association) do exchange techni­
cal, operational, and marketing data and coordinate electric 
power company views with both public and private interests. 
Cooperation between the industry and government on research 
and development policy issues is promoted by the Electric
52Research Council and the Electric Power Research Institute.
While electricity generation is regulated at the 
federal level by the FPC, state governments have the primary 
regulatory role in the siting of generation plants, the set­
ting of rate structures for utilities, and the initiating 
of intrastate cooperative arrangements. The FPC authorizes 
the licensing of hydroelectric facilities and controls prices 
of interstate sales of electricity, but plays only a coordi­
nating role in the encouragement of the formation of regional 
electric reliability councils and the development of pooling 
arrangements.^^ There is no significant labor union indige­
nous to the electric power industry.
The Nuclear Energy Policy Subsystem
Among the five fuel subsystems, the nuclear energy 
policy subsystem is unique in the degree to which the resource
^^Gray, p. 74.
Breyer and MacAvoy, pp. 89-121.
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has remained a government monopoly. Between 1946 and 
1974, the Atomic Energy Commission exercised extensive fed­
eral control over the entire subsystem. Since the creation 
of ERDA and the NRG, the gradual shift from military to 
civilian control within government which characterized the 
final years of the AEC's administration has continued, 
accompanied by a shift from public to private sector involve­
ment in policy-making.
Because of the military nature of the fuel's early 
development, it was not until the 1950s that private indus­
try was even allowed to participate in nuclear energy dev­
elopment. The special organizational arrangements imple­
mented in the 1940s included not only the AEG, but a single 
joint committee in Congress to assure adequate oversight of 
the resource's development and control. While the subsystem 
has become increasingly civilianized and more outside inter­
ests have been granted access to the policy-making levers, 
nuclear energy continues to be dominated by those scientists 
and administrators with access to information and expertise
previously the property of the AEG and the Joint Committee
54on Atonic Energy.
Neither the NRG nor ERDA has the authority which 
once belonged to the AEG. The NRG is charged with regulat­
ing the use of atomic energy in the interests of public
^^Davis, p. 169.
lOS
health, safety, and protection of the environment. 
Responsibility for the development of atomic energy has been 
delegated to ERDA, through its research and development 
functions. Since, in recent years, over 90 percent of fed­
eral research funding has been devoted to nuclear energy, 
the significance of governmental control of this subsystem 
is apparent.
Conclusion
Two conflicting conclusions can be drawn from this 
description of thr energy policy-making system. First, 
there are growing pressures for the development of more 
rational and comprehensive national energy policies, as 
reflected in the recent efforts to establish national energy 
goals and objectives. The most important factors in this 
movement toward comprehensiveness are the desires of politi­
cal decision-makers to appear rational and the demands of a 
wide range of pressure groups to avoid the failures of pre­
viously limited approaches to planning and decision-making.
Countering the drive toward rationality in energy 
policy, however, are a number of factors which make such 
coordination difficult at best. The two most important 
factors, as implied in the description of energy institu­
tions, are the complexity of the decision-making process and 
resource scarcity. The energy policy system, composed of 
the five resource subsystems organized around coal, oil.
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natural gas, electricity, and nuclear energy, suffers from 
all the problems associated with pluralism, fragmentation, 
and incrementalism. Pluralistic politics requires an often 
debilitating process of accommodation between competing 
interests— a process which governmental institutions with 
fragmented and overlapping energy responsibilities and ad 
hoc, incremental modes of operating are often ill-equipped 
to handle. Resource scarcity resulting from the depletion 
of finite resources and an artificially-imposed oil embargo, 
intensified each of these difficulties by bringing an end 
to the long history of stability which had characterized 
the energy system.
Until the 1973 Arab oil boycott, the five resource 
subsystems had been relatively self-contained decision­
making communities, each with a relatively stable set of 
participants and decision procedures. This is not to say 
that decisions were at all centralized or directed by com­
prehensive planning. Quite to the contrary, each resource 
development subsystem had its own unique form of problem­
solving which allowed it to cope with situations in which 
goals, alternatives, consequences, and even the problems 
themselves were often undefined. Resource scarcity and the 
resulting instability it brought to bear on these already 
complex resource subsystems increased problems of pluralism 
by bringing more participants into every energy decision. 
Groups whose interests were either adversely affected or
I l l
visibly threatened began immediately to demand the right 
to participate in the policy process. Whether it was the 
agricultural sector seeking larger fuel allocations or East 
Coast states fearful of the consequences of offshore dev­
elopment, the strategy was to seek governmental action or 
inaction. These pressures on political institutions accus­
tomed to assuming only limited authority over particular 
energy sources multiplied the problems of fragmentation.
Increasingly, after 1973, the federal government 
sought to develop energy agencies able to respond to partic­
ipants who either did not understand the established 
decision-making procedures or did not subscribe to them.
The FEA was established as one such response. The creation 
and development of this new agency is the focus of the 
following chapter.
CHAPTER IV 
THE FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION 
Introduction
The steady convergence of formerly disparate elements 
into an energy crisis has been reflected in American politi­
cal institutions for some time. As was pointed out in 
Chapter III, federal executive branch organizational poli­
cies have focused upon the consolidation of energy-related 
functions at least since the early 1970s. Although the 
reorganization of executive agencies must be assumed to be 
an ongoing, incomplete process even after five years, the 
Federal Energy Administration (FEA) represents the most com­
prehensive centralization of energy operations to date.
In order to evaluate the regulatory performance of the 
FEA a basic understanding of its prescribed and actual roles 
in the energy policy-making system is required. Toward this 
end, the focus of the following discussion is upon delineat­
ing the energy reorganization proposals and policies which 
led up to the establishment of the FEA, and describing the 
agency itself.
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The examination of the evolution of executive 
energy policy organizations prior to the creation of the 
FEA emphasizes the period between the election of President 
Nixon in November 1968 and the realization of the full 
impact of the Arab oil embargo in December 1973, character­
ized by the absence of any centralized energy policy struc­
ture in the executive branch.
The description of the FEA focuses upon a general 
examination of the period between the creation of the tem­
porary Federal Energy Office (FED) in December 1973 and the 
establishment of the FEA in May 1974, characterized by move­
ment toward energy policy centralization and coordination. 
Then the policy-making structures and functions of the FEA 
are elaborated and FEA relationships with other energy agen­
cies are examined.
A Framework for Analysis: The SET Novelty
In an attempt to develop a more comprehensive and 
analytical framework to understand the processes by which 
federal agencies are created, Carl Grafton has proposed that 
the primary stimulus for creation is the "socio-economic- 
technological (SET) novelty." Defined in terms of "a sudden 
shift in social, economic, or technological c h a n g e , t h e  
SET novelty is composed of three elements. First, the SET
^Carl Grafton, "The Creation of Federal Agencies,' 
Administration and Society 7 (November 1975): 331.
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novelty requires that there must be dramatic paradigmatic 
shifts within the relevant scientific and political communi­
ties- That is, there must be feelings that the existing 
accepted models and their applications are not functioning 
adequately. Second, and as a result of these shifts, indi­
viduals must begin doing things that they had not been doing 
before. Decision-makers, for example, must alter goals and 
responses as their "definition of the situation" is changed. 
And third, there must be a sudden shift in the order of mag­
nitude of events in a SET novelty. Thus, a trend line over 
time will not permit prediction of a phenomenon after a nov­
elty appears. These "objective" novelties are distinguished
by Grafton from "perceptual" novelties, or new perceptions
2
of already existing phenomena. According to this defini­
tion, SET novelties which have led to the creation of fed­
eral agencies would include electrical power (the Rural Elec­
trification Administration), atomic energy (the Atomic Energy 
Commission), and pollution (the Council on Environmental 
Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency).
Once this stimulus has occurred, Grafton posits a 
process of agency "conceptualization." Included within this 
process are three stages of interest group and government 
interaction: (1) an attempt is made to understand the impli­
cations of a SET novelty; (2) an attempt is made to modify
^Grafton, pp. 332-337.
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the novelty to fit socio-economic-political systems; and 
(3) an attempt is made to modify the socio-economic- 
political systems to fit the novelty. When problems arise in 
the conceptualization process, such as group conflict or the 
necessity for government resources, an "escalation tendency" 
of problem-solving takes place. This process tends to move 
from private solutions, to state and local government actions, 
to congressional legislation, to new federal programs, to fed­
eral agency reorganizetioi.. When a "residual problem" con­
tinues to exist, the eventual solution is then a new federal 
agency.^
In terms of the actual evolution of the agency, 
Grafton's framework includes consideration of four stages.
The first, the "proposal point," is usually characterized by 
a "prestigious, respected individual or group" suggesting 
agency creation. The proposal itself is -termed the "first 
proposal." Congressional review of the proposal (the "hearing 
point"), and the final product are the final two stages. 
Utilization of this framework allows comparisons to be made 
between the final product and the proposal, as well as 
enabling generalizations to be made regarding the relation­
ships between the conceptualization process, proposals, and 
the final structure. As important are the framework's identi­
fication of the proponents and opponents of agency creation.
^Grafton, pp. 341-347.
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the time span between proposal and creation, and the
influence of problem resolution escalation on all these pro- 
4cesses.
The energy crisis is one of the novelties which had 
not yet produced an agency at the time of Grafton's work. 
Since then, however, the Federal Energy Administration has 
been established as a direct response to the SET novelty of 
energy shortages. This chapter attempts to trace the evolu­
tion of the creation of the FEA according to Grafton's frame­
work.
The Energy Crisis As A SET Novelty 
The energy crisis of the 1970s meets all the criteria 
of an objective socio-economic-technological novelty. The 
events which led up to and accompanied the October 1973 oil 
embargo certainly represented a "sudden shift" in American 
industrial and governmental stances toward energy policy.^ 
The abruptness with which the boycott brought home the inter­
national nature of the problem and the energy dependence of 
the United States forced a number of related issues to the 
attention of both the public and private sectors. Among the 
more important alterations were consideration of the impli­
cations for future economic growth of energy scarcity and
^Grafton, pp. 347-358.
^See David H. Davis, Energy Politics (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 1-16.
117
the need to diversify energy sources as a result of such 
scarcity. As a consequence, energy policy-makers had to 
deal with new issues characterized by insufficient informa­
tion and outcome uncertainty.^ Further, the proliferation 
of new participants in this unstable policy arena raised 
questions regarding the need to develop socio-political solu­
tions as alternatives to traditional "technical fix" options.^ 
In addition to these paradigmatic shifts, individuals 
did begin to do things toward achieving energy goals that 
they had not done before the crisis. Especially significant
g
was the increased attention given to conservation efforts. 
Examination of alternative energy sources also exemplified 
the changes in policy brought about by the boycott. Increased 
research was devoted to such well-known energy supply alter­
natives as domestic oil shale, tar sands, and geothermal 
resources, as well as more exotic sources such as solar
9
energy and organic wastes.
See Roger G. Noll, "Information, Decision-Making Pro­
cedures, and Energy Policy," American Behavioral Scientist 
19 (January/February 1976): pp. 267-278.
^See Don E. Kash, "Energy in the 1970s— The Problem 
of Abundance to Scarcity," in Walter F . Scheffer, ed., Energy 
Impacts on Public Policy and Administration (Norman: Univer­
sity of Oklahoma Press, 1974), pp. 35-75.
p
See Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, A 
Time to Choose (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishers, 1974),
pp. 325-343.
Q
See Science and Public Policy Program, University of 
Oklahoma, Energy Alternatives: A Comparative Analysis
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).
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Finally, the energy crisis accelerated the order of 
magnitude shifts in phenomena such as domestic energy con­
sumption and production, oil prices, and industry profits. 
Trend analysis could not have predicted, for example, that 
the posted price of crude oil from the Persian Gulf would 
increase from $1.80 per barrel in January 1970 to $11.65 per 
barrel by October 1973. Similarly, the 50 percent rise in 
oil company profits from 1972 to 1973 and the decreases in 
the rates of domestic energy consumption and production growth 
were sudden shifts in the order of magnitude which resulted 
from the SET novelty of energy shortages.
Conceptualization of the FEA 
In seeking to understand the elements of the SET 
novelty of the energy crisis of 197 3, the political system 
initially reacted by undertaking studies of the existing 
national energy policy-making framework. Thus, as was noted 
in Chapter III, in 1970 the President's Advisory Council on 
Executive Organization (the "Ash Council") assumed a role in 
the development of solutions to the problems of administra­
tive fragmentation in the energy arena. That same year. 
Congress increased its involvement in the learning process by 
authorizing a series of background documents for the National 
Energy' Policy Study. In an effort to make the SET novelty
^®S. David Freeman, Energy; The New Era (New York: 
Random House, 1974), pp. 138-157.
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fit the existing political system, a great deal of this 
early phase of conceptualization was devoted to debate over 
the recurrent charges that the fuel crisis was a deliberate 
conspiracy by the major petroleum firms to drive independent 
marketers and refiners out of business and to repeal environ­
mental quality standards. Toward the resolution of this dis­
pute, the Federal Trade Commission was given the task, in 
1973, of analyzing the oil industry's role in the crisis.
Modifying the socio-economic system to fit the novel­
ty began with alterations in the Mandatory Oil Import Program 
(MOIP), the implementation of price controls on crude oil and 
petroleum products, and the introduction of mandatory alloca­
tion regulations for the entire range of fuel types. The 
MOIP, which had set a national quota for imported crude, in 
order to reduce the threat of foreign producers to domestic 
markets, was made more flexible in 1970 as a result of short­
ages. It was finally abolished in April 1973 and replaced by 
an import fee system. Oil price controls (Phases 1-4 of the
Economic Stabilization Program) began in August 1971 and con-
12tinue in modified form today (see Chapter V).
^^Richard B. Mancke, "Petroleum Conspiracy: A Costly 
Myth," Public Policy 12 (Winter 1974): 1-13.
^^William A. Johnson, "The Impact of Price Controls 
on the Oil Industry: How to Worsen an Energy Crisis," in
Gary D. Eppen, ed., Energy: The Policy Issues (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 100-108.
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Two major sources of dissatisfaction with import and 
price regulations led to the promulgation of regulations 
establishing allocation priorities for crude oil and petro­
leum products in the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 
(EPAA) of 1973. Primarily, it was felt that the small, inde­
pendent oil companies needed protection from the competitive 
advantage enjoyed by the major firms under price controls.
The second force behind the allocation legislation was the 
related concern for controlling inflation and preventing pos­
sible windfall profits by the large oil companies.
The passage of the EPAA in November 1973 was a sig­
nificant event in the conceptualization process, since, with 
the arrival of mandatory allocation, the drive toward crea­
tion of a new agency to develop and implement the regulations 
was overwhelming.
The Escalation of Problem Resolution
Coinciding with the conceptualization process, gov­
ernmental problem-solving efforts were escalating. Since, 
at the time of the 1973 crisis, both state and local govern­
ments appeared incapable of dealing with the significant 
issues (see Chapter III), the federal policy-makers became 
the major public participants. The federal problem resolu­
tion process which led to the creation of the FEA can be 
divided into three time frames, each dominated by a different 
set of regulatory institutions. From 1970 until January
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1973, energy policy planning at the White House was carried
out through Domestic Council's Subcommittee on Energy, an ad
hoc body formed to deal with the emergency fuel shortages.
At a narrower policy level, the Oil Policy Committee (CPC)
had authority over oil imports and related fuel policies.
Beyond these restricted planning mechanisms, consideration
of most energy policy during the first Nixon administration
was divided among more than sixty federal agencies, bureaus
and commissions. According to a study undertaken by the
Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, this lack of
"high-level surveillance of the energy system and policy
advice" constituted one of the major deficiencies in federal
14energy organization.
To correct these problems, after the 1972 election, 
the Secretaries of Agriculture and Treasury (Earl Butz and 
George Shultz) were given greater energy policy roles by nam­
ing the former to the additional post of Counselor for 
Natural Resources and the latter to Assistant to the Presi­
dent for Economic Affairs. These assignments and the appoint­
ment of William Simon, Deputy Treasury Secretary, to the 
chairmanship of the OPC meant the end of the Subcommittee's 
policy role.
^^See Davis, p. 187.
^^U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Federal Energy Organization (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 11-12.
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In February 1973, the President formalized the energy 
advisory structure by giving the title of Special Energy 
Committee to the trio of Shultz, Presidential Advisor for 
National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, and Assistant to 
the President for Domestic Affairs John Ehrlichman. At the 
same time, Charles DiBona was appointed Special Consultant 
on Energy and assigned the task of establishing a separate 
policy analysis staff in the White House. This operation 
was given the name of National Energy Office (NEC) and struc­
tured to report to the President through the Special Energy 
Committee. The "referee" for disputes between the various 
energy agencies in this arrangement was the Counselor for 
Natural R e s o u r c e s . A s  a result of these actions, by the 
time the President's first major energy message was final­
ized in March 1973, the federal energy policy-making struc­
ture had been significantly altered. Figure 9 illustrates 
the energy "chain of command" as it existed at that time.
Less than three months later, the Administration 
issued an even more comprehensive reorganization plan. In 
June 1973, John Love was installed as the first "energy czar" 
by combining the duties of the Special Energy Committee and 
the NEO in an Energy Policy Office (EPO) . The EPO was 
responsible for the formulation and coordination of energy
^^Richard Corrigan, "Nixon Message Follows Months of 
White House Wrangling," National Journal Reports 5 (April 
21, 1973): 574-575.
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FIGURE 9
FEDERAL ENERGY ORGANIZATION, MARCH 1973
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policies at the highest level.Although, in theory, the 
creation of the EPO placed it at the apex of federal decision­
making for energy (especially since the new agency was given 
authority for providing guidance and direction to the OPC), 
the organization was understaffed and confronted with the 
growth of rival centers of power in the Treasury and Interior 
Departments. As a result, the EPO was unable to cope with 
the steadily escalating energy emergency in the summer and 
fall of 1973. Fuel shortages were such a major policy dil­
emma by November that a cabinet-level committee, given the 
title of the Emergency Energy Action Group (EEAG), was estab­
lished to deal with the supply-demand imbalances which had 
developed, and an interagency task force, the Energy Emer­
gency Planning Group (EEPG), was assigned the task of pro­
viding the EEAG with policy analysis s u p p o r t . F i g u r e  10 
outlines the structure of federal energy organization as it 
appeared at the end of November 1973.
As was noted in Chapter III, this federal framework 
suffered from lack of overall guidance and management; the 
government had no coordinated energy policy-making mechanism 
and existing regulatory agencies tended to be inflexible and 
narrow-minded. Thus, the "residual problems" of uncertainty.
"President Overhauls Energy Machinery," Oil and 
Gas Journal 71 (July 9, 1973): 34-36.
^Tjuan Cameron, "Reaching for an Energy Policy: Years
of Drift, Weeks of Panic," Fortune 89 (January 1974): 76-77
and 158-159.
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FIGURE 10
FEDERAL ENERGY ORGANIZATION, NOVEMBER 1973
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instability, delay, and policy contradiction encouraged the 
creation of the Federal Energy Administration.
The Creation of the FEA 
Beginning in the 1970s, there had been a number of 
efforts to consolidate energy functions in various depart­
ments and commissions (see Chapter III). That same year, 
the first of several "prestigious groups" would make recom­
mendations which would eventually lead to the FEA.
The Proposal Point 
The Ash Council, as a part of its recommendation to 
establish a Department of Natural Resources, included a pro­
posal for an Energy and Mineral Resources component of that 
agency to administer fuel policies. This recommendation 
was expanded and modified by the President's reorganization 
plan of June 29, 1973, which contained a proposal for an 
Energy and Mineral Resources Administration as part of the 
broader Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR). 
Congressional resistance to this proposition was reflected 
in a number of bills proposing instead the creation of a 
Council on Energy and/or a more comprehensive National
Energy Advisory Board to take on the task of energy policy 
18direction. The inability of the Administration to gain 
acceptance of a comprehensive reorganization of energy
18U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, pp. 45-58.
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activities at the departmental level meant that by the end 
of 1973 the focus of most recommendations had been narrowed 
to the individual agency level. Thus, in November 1973, the 
President asked the Congress to postpone consideration of 
the DENR proposal in order to concentrate on the Energy 
Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the FEA.
The First Proposal
On December 14, 1973, the Administration submitted 
to Congress a proposal for the creation of the FEA. The 
same day. Senator Henry Jackson introduced legislation simi­
lar to the White House proposal (S. 2776) and the House fol­
lowed suit on December 5 (with H.R. 11793, introduced by 
Representative Chet Holifield). Figure 11 illustrates the 
organization of the Administration's FEA proposal.
Pending legislative approval of the FEA, Executive 
Order 11748, of December 4, abolished the Energy Policy 
Office and established the Federal Energy Office (FEO) to 
create the framework for the new agency and to manage and 
coordinate energy policy in the interim period. While the 
Congress debated the merits of the proposed agency, the 
heads of five units named to become components of the FEA 
were ordered to "be responsive" to the FEO. Included were 
four offices from the Interior Department (Petroleum Alloca­
tion, Oil and Gas, Energy Conservation, and Energy Data and 
Analysis) and the Cost of Living Council's Energy Division.
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William Simon was named FEO Director and nominated to the
19post of FEA Administrator.
Under this arrangement, the EEAG continued to func­
tion, with the President becoming its chairman and Simon act­
ing as Executive Director. The staff of the EEPG was 
assigned to the FEO. Originally, the Administration had 
also planned to call up 200 specialists from the oil indus­
try to act as an executive reserve and to aid in the imple­
mentation of mandatory fuel allocation programs, but that 
alternative was dropped after congressional charges of 
conflict-of-interest were made.^®
While most FEO activities were directed toward the 
correction of short-term resource allocation and distribu­
tion problems, the interim office did have longer-term 
responsibilities associated with Project Independence. As 
could be expected of an organization which functioned for 
less than six months in a highly visible, highly political 
environment, the FEO suffered from a number of serious organ­
izational problems. Most of the difficulties which limited
19Frank V. Fowlkes and Joel Havemann, "President 
Forms Federal Energy Body with Broad Regulation, Price Con­
trol Powers," National Journal Reports 5 (December 8, 1973): 
1830-1838.
^^"Nixon Tries Again on Energy Policy," Business 
Week, December 8, 1973, pp. 34-35; "Simon Heads New Federal 
Energy Setup," Oil and Gas Journal 71 (December 10, 1973): 
50-51; and Robert Gillette, "Energy Organization: Love's
Labour's Lost," Science 183 (December 21, 1973): 1225-1226.
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FEO performance were associated with personnel or program
factors. For the first sixty days of its existence, the
most troublesome personnel problems were the high turnover
rate among employees who had been delegated to the office
from other agencies and the lack of energy expertise among
some government officials who were transferred. At a later
stage, morale problems developed when the oil embargo ended
in March and the FEO lost its "crisis spotlight." Finally,
the FEO went through a leadership change when Simon was
appointed Treasury Secretary and John Sawhill was named
21Director in April.
The program problems of the FEO have been summarized 
as attempting to "do too many things on too many fronts." 
According to this analysis, the fragmentation which charac­
terized FEO policy-making led to rules and regulations based 
upon extrapolations of conditions in existence prior to the 
energy crisis. In addition, the FEO has been accused of 
manifesting typical bureaucratic behavior patterns by adopt­
ing limited goals, invoking rigid operating procedures, and 
evaluating the future in terms of the "worst possible" 
event. That is, there was a focus upon avoiding the
"Bitter Sniping at Simon," Time 103 (March 18,
1974): 25; "The New Man at FEO," Time 103 (May 6, 1974):
70; and Caroline Mayer, "FEO Will Steer Different Course 
Under Sawhill," Oil and Gas Journal 72 (April 29, 1974): 
16-17.
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predictions of massive unemployment, brownouts, and general
22economic disruption as a result of energy shortages.
The Hearing Point 
In the nearly five months that the proposal to 
create the FEA was debated by the Congress, three sets of 
issues played vital roles. First, there were differences 
between the House and Senate regarding the specific form and 
duties of the new agency. As submitted to the Administration 
the FEA was to "plan, direct, and conduct programs related 
to the production, conservation, use, control, distribution 
and allocation of all forms of energy" and function as the 
primary source of energy advice to the President. Although 
both houses of Congress concurred with this major function, 
there was debate over the issues of the length of the grant 
of agency authority, the holding of multiple government posi­
tions by the agency's leaders, transfers of other agency func­
tions to the new organization, and the maintenance of a White 
House energy office after the FEA's establishment.^^ These
22See Paul W. MacAvoy, Bruce E. Stangle, and Jonathan 
B. Tepper, "The Federal Energy Office as Regulator of the 
Energy Crisis," Technology Review 77 (May 1975): 39-44; and
Richard B. Mancke, Performance of the Federal Energy Office 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1975), pp. 22-24.
23U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 
Federal Energy Administration Act (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1973) ; and U.S. House, Committee on 
Government Operations, Federal Energy Administration (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973),
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issues were resolved in conference committee by April by 
adding six months to the Administration's request for the 
agency’s lifespan (to a June 30, 1976 termination date) , pro­
hibiting concurrent office-holding by the FEA Administrator 
(Simon had wanted to hold Treasury and FEA posts simultan­
eously) , restricting the President's authority to transfer 
additional agency funtions to the FEA, and eliminating the 
Administration's proposal for a small FEO to remain in the 
White House. Other significant results of the Senate-House 
conferences were the creation of an Office of Private Griev­
ances and Redress, the elimination of a Senate-proposed Coun­
cil on Energy Policy, and the specification of FEA appropri­
ations of $75 million for fiscal 1974 and $200 million each 
for fiscal 1975 and 1976.^4
The second set of issues which influenced the hear­
ing point focused upon the conflicts within Congress regarding 
the FEA's role in overall energy policy organization, partic­
ularly the FEA's relationships with the other proposed 
energy agencies, the DENR and ERDA. At the root of the prob­
lem was the "bewildering array" of possible reorganization 
alternatives which Congress considered in the first few 
months of 1974. These included proposals to create: (1) a
DENR including ERDA (Jackson's S. 1283); (2) a DENR without
24U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, Federal 
Energy Administration Act of 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1974), pp. 23-24.
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ERDA (H.R. 9090 and S. 2135, from the President's 
reorganization plan of June 1973); (3) a separate agency 
combining ERDA and the FEA (as proposed by Representative 
Mike McCormack); and (4) an independent ERDA (Holifield's 
H.R. 11510) and an independent FEA (S. 2776 and H.R. 11793). 
Since Congress had already reached a stalemate over the 
issue of ERDA's independence by December 1973, the introduc­
tion of the FEA proposal only served to complicate an al­
ready complex si t ua ti on .T h os e legislators, like Jackson, 
who had initially favored a comprehensive DENR saw little 
need for the establishment of "interim" agencies such as the 
FEA, while those, like Holifield, who had argued for a sep­
aration of general energy policy from research and develop­
ment (R&D) saw in the FEA a potential threat to any R&D 
agency's independence. These perceptions and the pressures 
exerted by the general public to "do something" in the 
short-term, when coupled with the absence of concensus on 
the issue within the Administration, finally resulted in 
the agreement to postpone consideration of DENR while estab­
lishing ERDA and the FEA separately.
As important as these internal congressional consid­
erations were to the debate over the FEA proposal, perhaps 
a more significant obstacle was an external dispute with the
25Claude E. Barfield, "Fuel Crisis Management Pro­
duces Reorganization Debate," National Journal Reports 6 
(February 16, 1974): 229-237.
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executive branch. At issue was the President's 1973 
request for broader legislative authority to deal with the 
energy crisis. The congressional response, the National 
Energy Emergency Act, contained rationing, conservation, and 
price control provisions as well as relaxed environmental 
standards, but went well beyond the Administration's request 
in establishing windfall profit limitations. In Senate-House 
conferences, a price rollback on oil was substituted for the 
controversial windfall profit provision, but the Administra- 
tin opposed the rollback as vigorously as it had the profit 
limitations. In an attempt to force Administration acceptance 
of the rollback, therefore, the House, which actually had 
little opposition to the FEA proposal, held the FEA bill 
"hostage"— keeping it from a floor vote— until the President 
ended the stalemate by vetoing the National Energy Emergency 
Act on March 6, 1974.
The Final Product 
The Federal Energy Administration Act became effec­
tive on June 28, 1974. Three days before. Executive Order 
11790 abolished the FEO and transferred its functions to the 
FEA. Figure 12 outlines the organizational structure of the 
new agency.
James W. Curlin, "Congressional Initiatives in 
Energy Policy," in Walter F. Scheffer, ed., Energy Impacts on 
Public Policy and Administration (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1974), pp. 140-141.
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SOURCE; Federal Energy Administration, Telephone Directory 
(Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 6.
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Structures and Functions of the FEA 
The Federal Energy Administration is composed of 
twelve headquarters offices and ten regional offices, which 
are grouped into the six activity components for budgetary 
purposes shown in Table 1. This table outlines the funding 
and manpower allocations to each of these activities; it 
shows that regulatory programs are allocated the largest por­
tion of the FEA's personnel, while the conservation and 
environment component receives the greatest share of the 
funding.
In terms of functions, the Office of the Administra­
tor is the major energy policy advisor to the President, both 
through direct access and through the Energy Resources Coun­
cil (a communication and coordination mechanism at the cabi­
net level which was established by the legislation which
27created ERDA in 1974). Assisting the Office of the Admin­
istrator, which includes the Administrator, his Deputy, and 
their staffs, are the legal advisors of the General Counsel, 
the various non-governmental task forces, commissions, and 
liaison offices to the legislative branch (Congressional 
Affairs), the general population (Communications and Public 
Affairs), and state, local, and regional governments (Inter­
governmental, Regional, and Special Programs). Providing 
support, personnel, and procurement services to this executive
27"Morton Will Determine Energy Policy," National 
Journal Reports 6 (November 2, 1974): 1654.
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TABLE 1
FEA BUDGET, BY ACTIVITY, ACTUAL 1975 
AND 1976 ESTIMATES
Activity
Positions 
FY75 FY76
Man-Years 
FY75 FY76
Amount^ 
FY75 FY76
Executive Dir. 
& Admin. 901 937 934 937 38.6 43.6
Policy & 
Analysis 401 400 366 400 21.8 25.7
Regulatory
Programs 1338 1179 1338 1299 33.0 32.0
Conservation 
& Environment 282 316 255 316 18.2 141.7
Energy Res. 
Development 282 326 284 326 13.8 15.5
International 
Energy Affairs 41 42 41 42 1.3 1.6
Total 3245 3200 3218 3320 126.6 260.1
SOURCE: U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, 
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropria­
tions for Fiscal Year 1976 (Washington , D.C. : Government
Printing Office, 1975) » pp. 2754-2755.
In $ millions.
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component as well as to the entire organization is the 
Office of Management and Administration.
The Office of Policy and Analysis, a combination of 
Interior's old offices of Oil and Gas and Data and Analysis, 
and the EEPG, is the FEA's energy forecasting, policy dev­
elopment, and data collection arm. The National Energy 
Information Center is operated through this office.
Project Independence is supervised by the Office of 
Energy Resource Development, which takes the general strate­
gies developed by the Office of Policy and Analysis and plans 
the specific tactics for achieving the proper "mix" of energy 
supply sources. The Office of Energy Resource Development's 
task is to expand currently available energy sources and 
facilitate the movement toward new resources.
The International Energy Affairs Office is respon­
sible for coordinating energy and national security policies 
with the State and Defense Departments and for overseeing 
U.S. international energy programs. It also attempts to
"assure appropriate interface" between foreign policy and
28domestic actions.
Promoting the efficient use of energy resources and 
minimizing the environmental impact of this use is the task 
of the Office of Conservation and Environment, a modification
28Federal Energy Administration, Organizational 
Structure January 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Federal Energy
Administration, 1975), p. 4.
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of Interior's former Office of Energy Conservation. More 
specifically, this office works to reduce the rate of energy 
demand growth, to coordinate federal-state conservation pro­
grams, to identify R&D for improving energy efficiencies, to 
develop public awareness of conservation needs, and to analyze 
environmental consequences of conservation and energy policy 
alternatives.
The largest and most significant FEA component is 
the Office of Regulatory Programs, composed of an expansion 
of the old Office of Petroleum Allocation in Interior. This 
office administers federal energy allocation programs and 
price controls. A detailed discussion of the FEA's alloca­
tion and pricing programs follows in Chapter V.
Closely related to the regulatory programs is the 
Office of Private Grievances and Redress, which combines the 
functions of the Office of Special Redress Relief, the 
Office of Exceptions and Appeals, and the Oil Import Appeals 
Board. The Office of Exceptions and Appeals is responsible 
for responding to all requests for exceptions, exemptions, 
stays, or appeals filed with the FEA from the mandatory pro­
grams. The Oil Import Appeals Board hears appeals from the 
Mandatory Oil Import Program. The Special Redress Relief 
Office performs an "ombudsman" function by responding to all 
those adversely affected by FEA policies but who have no
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redress from either of the other two offices discussed 
29above.
The Regional Offices are charged with the implemen­
tation of all agency programs at the field level, most sig­
nificantly the allocation and pricing regulations. The 
offices are headquartered in the standard federal regional 
locations. Most of '-he agency's large number of regulatory 
personnel are assigned to the ten Regional Offices.
FEA Relationships With Other Energy Agencies
The Federal Energy Administration has two major 
policy foci in which its relationships with other federal 
energy agencies are of crucial importance: (1) energy policy
development and program policy coordination; and (2) regulat­
ing the energy sector.
In the area of policy development and coordination, 
the FEA relies upon both formal, institutional mechanisms 
and informal, interpersonal contacts to produce cooperation, 
consultation and integration on energy matters. The foremost 
institutional interagency coordination body for energy policy 
is the Energy Resources Council, which includes in its mem­
bership 23 federal agencies or representatives in addition to 
the FEA. Representation on the Council insures communication 
between all governmental participants and promotes the
29Federal Energy Administration, Quarterly Report on 
Private Grievances and Redress (Washington, D.C.: Federal
Energy Administration, July 1, 1974 to September 30, 1974), 
pp. 1-3.
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development of sound policy advice to the President on energy 
reorganization matters.
Informal FEA contacts with other energy agencies are 
a combination of common government service backgrounds and 
common agency tasks. Since the FEA was organized around 
offices transferred from the Interior Department and the Cost 
of Living Council, coordination between these established 
organizations and the new agency has been facilitated.
Common tasks have brought the FEA into contact with, for 
example, ERDA (through the Office of Energy Resource Develop­
ment's work with Project Independence), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (through the Office of Energy Conservation 
and Environment's fuel economy labeling program), and the 
State Department (by the International Energy Affairs 
Office's interest in U.S. bilateral and international 
energy agreements).
Energy sector regulation necessitates FEA coordina­
tion with the range of state government units involved in 
facility siting, land use, and environmental impacts. Due to 
the strategic nature of fuel allocations, the FEA has impor­
tant ties to the Defense Department. Creation of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and ERDA has meant that the FEA now 
has less responsibility for energy conservation and almost no 
role in research and development.^®
Dorothy M. Bates, "Federal Interagency Coordination 
of Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development," a paper pre­
pared by the Congressional Research Service, 1975.
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Conclusion
From this brief description of the evolution of the 
Federal Energy Administration, it appears as if the process 
by which the FEA was created closely corresponds to the data 
provided by Grafton through his SET novelty framework. For 
example, the advocates (Presidential advisers and key legis­
lators) and opponents (private interest groups) of the FEIA 
proposal were typical of the previous findings. The same 
can be said for the time span of agency creation— one to two 
years. Neither of Grafton's primary reasons for creation 
delays— opposition from other agencies or temporary effec­
tiveness of other problem-solving techniques— was operative 
in the FEA case. Finally, Grafton's observation that "when 
a new agency proposal occurs after conceptualization, the 
first proposal is a reliable guide to the organizational 
structure and powers of the final product" appears to have 
held true for the FEA. As established in June 1974, the FEA 
differed from the Administration's December 1973 proposal 
only in terms of greater structural emphasis on feedback 
mechanisms (the Office of Private Grievances and Redress 
having been added) and slightly less functional flexibility 
(because of the limits placed on the transfers of other agency 
functions and concurrent officeholding).
Thus, the FEA has apparently undergone a relatively 
typical creation process. Moreover, there is some evidence 
that the agency has followed the typical "life cycle" pattern
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of most independent regulatory b o d i e s . T h a t  is, the FEA 
has, during its existence, exhibited many of the traditional 
characteristics of a "youthful" regulatory bureaucracy. As 
this chapter has pointed out, the climate which the new FEO 
entered in 1973 featured strong demands for a regulatory 
response to the energy crisis. The agency entered the 
legislative battles of early 1974 with widespread support 
and attracted a number of aggressive, ambitious policy­
makers. IVhether the agency will follow the traditional 
pattern of "aging" and developing organizational rigidity 
is not yet clear. But there are some signs that the tem­
porary nature of the FEA may have caused its maturation 
process to accelerate. For example, in just two years 
public, congressional, and executive support for the FEA 
has seriously declined.Appropriations have become 
increasingly difficult for the agency to justify to the 
Congress as the organization has been unable to rally wide­
spread interest group support. And the agency has increas­
ingly been plagued with bureaucratic backlogs and complex 
workload problems. These and other issues are the subject 
of the policy analysis in Part Two of this study. But
See Kenneth J. Meier and John P. Plumlee, "Regula­
tory Administration and Organizational Rigidity," a paper 
prepared for the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political 
Science Association, Chicago, 1976, pp. 2-4.
3 2 See Edward Cowan, "Who Needs the Energy Agency?"
New York Times 125 (May 30, 1976): F-1 and F-6.
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first, it is necessary to briefly outline the major policy 
activities of the FEA: the fuel allocation and price con­
trol regulations. This is the subject of Chapter V which 
follows.
CHAPTER V
THE MANDATORY PETROLEUM ALLOCATION 
AND PRICING PROGRAMS
Introduction 
The major raison d'etre for the Federal Energy 
Administration was the need, during the energy crisis, to 
minimize the economic impact of fuel shortages through the 
implementation of policies which would distribute petroleum 
and its products equitably among all consuming sectors of 
society. The congressional response, the mandatory fuel 
allocation and pricing programs, was designed to prevent 
economic dislocations, preserve industry competition, and 
control fuel prices. These functions have proven to be the 
most fundamental activities of the FEA; they occupy the 
largest portion of the agency's manpower and funding, as was 
discussed in Chapter TV. And these programs have been the 
most controversial FEA responsibilities. Critics from both 
the political right and left have focused upon the agency's 
regulation of the petroleum industry— conservatives say the 
FEA unfairly limits "free market" competition, while liberals 
accuse the agency of favoring the big oil companies.
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Thus, the mandatory petroleum allocation and pricing 
programs are the focus of the policy analysis in Part Two 
of this study. Prior to evaluating the FEA's performance in 
these areasf however, it is necessary to describe the evolu­
tion and application of the pricing and allocation standards 
which have governed the distribution of crude oil and petro­
leum products for over two years. This chapter seeks to pro­
vide this description by analyzing: (1) the history of fed­
eral allocation and pricing regulation of the oil industry;
(2) the most significant aspects of the FEA's mandatory rules 
and regulations; and (3) the major problems which have emerged 
from the application of these rules.
History of Federal Allocation 
and Pricing Regulation
The history of mandatory petroleum allocation and 
pricing rule-making is divided into three phases: (1) the
initial federal interventions into oil policy via import and 
price controls in the period between 1959 and 1973; (2) the 
development of allocation regulations which were incorporated 
into the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) of 1973; 
and (3) the legislative-executive dispute over the extension 
of EPAA controls in 1974-1975, leading to the passage of the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975.
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The Mandatory Oil Import Program 
During the extended period of U.S. crude oil surpluses 
between the early 1930s and the mid-1950s, federal interven­
tion in oil politics was designed to guarantee the dual goals 
of achieving domestic production levels which matched demand, 
and protecting domestic markets from expanding foreign produc­
tion. In an attempt to meet the first objective, a number of 
oil-producing states developed "prorationing" systems designed 
to place limits on production and keep prices high. But these 
state laws proved to be ineffective without federal regula­
tions to control crude pumped in excess of the state quotas. 
Legislation such as the 1935 Connally Hot Oil Act, which pro­
hibited interstate shipment of oil in violation of these state 
laws, served to conserve domestic oil reserves, protect domes­
tic oil firms, and assure domestic market stability. This 
legislation marked the first major federal regulation of oil 
allocation and pricing.^
As long as U.S. consumption remained well below pro­
duction, this system was successful in shielding American 
oil interests. However, by 1947 the U.S. had become a net 
oil importer and foreign oil began to be seen as a threat to 
system stability. The reaction of the federal government 
was to encourage voluntary limits on imports beginning in
Richard B. Mancke, The Failure of U.S. Energy Policy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 72-76; and
David H. Davis, Energy Politics (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1974), pp. 44 and 52.
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1955. After four years in which imports increased forty 
percent, the Eisenhower administration imposed the Mandatory 
Oil Import Program (MOIP) in March 1959. Designed tc regulate 
the level of imports through a quota system, allocate per­
mitted imports among domestic users, and manage program 
administration, the MOIP first set a national quota for im­
ported crude, finished petroleum products, and unfinished 
oils at 12.2 percent of domestic production. Justified in 
terms of "national security," the MOIP increasingly came 
under criticism from those who felt that the quotas were 
costing consumers by restricting price competition. Several 
investigations of the MOIP in the late 1960s were unanimous 
in recommending its abolishment.^ However, it was not until 
April 1973 that the system of quotas was replaced with an 
import fee system. These fees were maintained until the 
Administration terminated them as part of the compromise
4
leading to the passage of the EPCA in December 1975.
Price Controls 
The federal government placed controls on crude oil 
and petroleum products prices in August 1971. Price controls
2
S. David Freeman, Energy: The New Era (New York:
Random House, 1974), p. 169.
^See Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, The 
Oil Import Question (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1970).
^See Joel Haveman, "Crisis Tightens Control of U.S. 
Energy Production," National Journal Reports 7 (April 26, 
1975): 621.
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fell into four distinct "phases." "Phase 1," the initial 
90-day freeze on prices, established base levels for the later 
regulations. "Phase 2," lasting from November 1971 to Janu­
ary 1973, implemented stricter requirements for justifying 
price increases. "Phase 3," from January to June 1973, per­
mitted the industry to pass on cost increases to consumers. 
Finally, "Phase 4," implemented in August 1973, established 
the price controls for petroleum and its products which con­
tinue to exist today in modified form.^
The most significant provisions of the "Phase 4" 
rules developed by the Cost of Living Council (and adopted 
by the FEO after it assumed control of the program in Decem­
ber 1973) were those creating a "two-tier" pricing system of 
"old" and "new" oil. Under this framework, the amount of 
oil produced from a given property at a level equal to or 
less than the amount produced from that property in 1972 was 
controlled at the price which prevailed on May 15, 1973, plus 
$1.35 per barrel. This "old" oil was thus subjected to regu­
lation at a national average price of $5.25 per barrel. The 
second tier included three types of production not subject 
to the "old" oil ceiling price. Included within this cate­
gory were stripper wells which produced less than 10 barrels
William A. Johnson, "The Impact of Price Controls 
on the Oil Industry: How to Worsen an Energy Crisis," in
Gary D. Eppen, ed., Energy: The Policy Issues (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 100-108.
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per day, any "new" oil produced from properties in excess of 
1972 levels, and a volume of "old" oil equal to the amount of 
"new" oil produced (termed "released" o i l ) T h i s  uncon­
trolled sector of oil production has averaged a price level 
between $10 and $12 per barrel.
With the passage of the EPCA, price controls were 
assured another 40 months duration, but the specific pricing 
formulas and mechanisms were left to Presidential discretion. 
As long as a new average domestic price of $7.66 per barrel 
is achieved (a reduction from the 1975 composite price of 
$8.75), the President is allowed considerable leeway in 
structuring the pricing system.^
The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
Less than two weeks after the MOIP was abandoned, the 
Economic Stabilization Act was amended to allow the President 
to promulgate regulations establishing priorities and allo­
cating crude oil and petroleum products. Even prior to this 
legislation, "voluntary guidelines" for an allocation program 
had been prepared, but the amendments provided the authority 
for the Energy Policy Office to develop and issue its first
Johnson, pp. 108-115; Haveman, p. 622; and "Federal 
Energy Administration Regulations for Control of Petroleum 
Prices," Energy Users Report 31 (September 18, 1975): 45-64.
^Richard Corrigan, "'Compromise' Oil Bill Ends Up 
Pleasing Few," National Journal Reports 7 (December 27, 1975) 
1735.
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proposed regulations for mandatory petroleum allocations on
g
August 31, 1973. The propane allocation program was issued 
first, in October 1973, followed closely by similar rules for 
middle distillates. These two programs were thus well under 
way when the EPAA was signed into law in November. The EPAA 
itself mandated regulations which would: (1) protect public
health, safety, welfare, and national security; (2) maintain 
public services; (3) maintain agricultural operations;
(4) preserve "an economically sound and competitive" petro­
leum industry; (5) permit refineries to operate at full 
capacity; (6) allocate fuels to maintain exploration, pro­
duction, extraction, and transportation activities in the 
energy sector; (7) equitably distribute fuels among geograph­
ical regions and among industrial sectors; (8) promote eco­
nomic efficiency; and (9) minimize "economic distortion" and
q
"unnecessary interference" with market mechanisms.
Generally, the EPAA has sought to achieve these goals 
by requiring that products be made available to marketers and 
refiners in the same amounts as the corresponding period of 
the base year (1972), taking into account such factors as new 
entries into tlie market or alterations in market facilities.
g
Anthony M- DiLeo, "An Introduction to the Mandatory 
Petroleum Allocation Regulations," Louisiana Bar Journal 22 
(September 1974): 108-109.
q
U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Oversight— Mandatory Petroleum Allocation Programs 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp.3-
5.
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If the aggregate amount available is less than that available 
in the base year, products are reduced proportionately.
Disputes Regarding EPAA Extension 
Originally, the EPAA was written with a termination 
date of February 28, 1975, but it was extended until August 
31, 1975, by an amendment. As early as June 1974, the Admin­
istration had begun to pressure the Congress to allow the 
EPAA to expire on schedule, using the argument that since 
oil supplies were again adequate, allocation regulations 
merely frustrated the "free market." However, at least two 
major obstacles to the Administration's proposals for decon­
trol existed in Congress. First, there was widespread leg­
islative resistance to the subjection of small independent 
oil companies to a system free of allocation controls. At 
issue was the capability of the major petroleum firms to 
take advantage of the price disparity between "old" and "new" 
oil to force the independents out of business. That is, the 
potential existed that the major oil companies, which had 
access to lower priced crude, could undersell the indepen­
dents. According to one analyst, the 15 largest oil firms 
paid only $8.70 per barrel for their crude in 1974, while 16 
independents paid more than $9.20 a b a r r e l . E v e n  with the
^®Joel Haveman, "Oil Allocation Pullout Frustrates 
Administration," National Journal Reports 6 (September 7, 
1974): 1352.
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protection of the EPAA, the independents' share of the retail 
petroleum market had decreased from 28 percent in 1972 to 17 
percent in mid-1974.
The second major source of legislative opposition to 
termination of the EPAA was the related concern for control­
ling inflation and preventing possible windfall profits by 
the major oil companies. According to one congressional 
estimate, the EPAA had been responsible for preventing al­
ready large (about $10 billion in 1973) industry profits 
from increasing by another one-third.
In July 1974, the FEA attempted to begin a "practi­
cal demonstration" of the feasibility of incrementally 
exempting fuels from the mandatory regulations when residual 
fuel oil distribution rules were relaxed. The immediate 
pressure against this policy by the independents and East 
Coast consumers brought this experiment to a hurried end.
By September 1974, the FEA had abandoned this "partial 
exemption" approach and outlined five alternatives for deal­
ing with the pricing and allocation problem: (1) complete
decontrol of all domestic crude, combined with some form of 
windfall profits tax; (2) limited decontrol, in which price 
controls would be removed but major firms would be limited 
to purchasing $5.25 per barrel oil; (3) a single price ceil­
ing on all domestic crude (initially proposed at $7.15 per 
barrel); (4) a system providing financial aid to individual 
companies; and (5) an entitlements program to equalize oil
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costs and compensate firms with little access to uncontrolled 
oil.
Eventually, the FEA adopted the entitlements option. 
The program, implemented on November 29, 1974, established 
a monthly average of old oil supplies to refineries and 
issues "entitlements" to refiners to guarantee them access 
to price-controlled c r u d e . T h i s  policy in no way altered 
the Administration's advocacy of decontrol, however. Adding 
another "complicated regulatory system" to those already 
being implemented by the FEA only increased efforts by Admin­
istration spokesmen to terminate EPAA constraints. The FEA's 
Deputy Administrator, John Hill, outlined the four major 
Administration objections to the continuation of the EPAA's 
regulatory programs as: (1) being inconsistent with Project
Independence objectives in terms of creating disincentives 
to increased domestic production; (2) denying consumers the 
benefits of competition by restricting ease of entry into 
sectors of the oil industry; (3) prolonging economic distor­
tions and inefficiencies by using an arbitrary base period; 
and (4) inhibiting long-range planning by the industry by 
constantly changing regulations to meet market conditions.
See U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Small Refiners Exemption Act of 1975 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 5.
12"Statement of John A. Hill, Deputy Administrator, 
Federal Energy Administration," before the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, Septem­
ber 4, 1975 (mimeographed), pp. 1-4.
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For these reasons. President Ford vetoed a proposed six- 
month extension of the allocation regulations in September 
1975. However, as a compromise, the regulations were 
extended on a temporary basis until an agreement with the 
Congress was reached via the EPCA in December. As was 
noted above, the provisions of the EPCA ordered a 40-month 
phaseout of the regulations and a conversion to standby 
authority.
FEA's Petroleum Allocation Regulations 
As of January 1976, the FEA was charged with the 
continued implementation of the petroleum pricing and allo­
cation regulations in some form for at least another three
years. As the controls are gradually phased out and trans­
ferred to standby status, maintaining a balance between the 
goals of Project Independence (increasing domestic explora­
tion for arid production of crude oil, for example) and the 
objectives of the EPAA (maintaining the competitive viabil­
ity of the oil industry and equitably distributing petroleum 
and its products) will be a major policy dilemma for the 
agency. For this reason, it is important to understand the 
general provisions of the regulations themselves, as indi­
cators of the ways in which the fuel control systems function.
Background
The FEA's pricing regulations are divided into three 
sets of rules: those for producers, refiners, and resellers
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(wholesalers) and retailers. The producers of crude oil are 
subject to the two-tier pricing system except for the "first 
sale" of imported crude. Refiners, resellers, and retailers 
are allowed a dollar-for-dollar passthrough of increased pro­
duct costs to the consumers.
Allocation regulations are organized around two pro­
grams: crude oil, and refined petroleum products. Those
fuels included within the second category range from propane 
and butane to lubricants, greases, and solvents.
Base Periods
The years 1972 and 1973, chosen because they repre­
sented the most recent periods of petroleum abundance in 
the U.S., provide the base periods for the FEA's regulatory 
programs. In general, the regulations provide that a pur­
chaser must buy supplies from his supplier of record during 
this period. For example, the crude oil rules specify a 
"freeze date" for all supplier/purchaser contractual rela­
tionships as of December 1, 1973, and base the allocations
to refiners on the amount of crude refined during the year 
141972. There are, however, significant variations in the
"Statement of Frank G- Zarb, Administrator, Federal 
Energy Administration," before the Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, May 19, 1975 (mimeographed), pp. 22-47.
^^DiLeo, p. 107. See also Stephan A. Wakefield, 
"Allocation, Price Control and the FEA: Regulatory Policy
and Practice in the Political Arena," Rocky Mountain Mineral 
Law Institute 21 (1975): 259-261.
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way in which the time frames are defined for the other fuel 
types. The three main definitional schemes utilized are 
based upon: the corresponding month of a previous year (used
for motor gasoline and middle distillates, for example), the 
corresponding calendar quarter of a previous year (for pro­
pane and butane), and an arbitrary period which overlaps 
more than one year (as is the case with residual fuels).
Coverage and Scope 
Generally, the allocation regulations cover all 
petroleum and petroleum products produced, refined, or 
imported into the U.S. Exceptions to this rule include 
paraffin wax, petroleum coke, asphalt, road oil, refinery 
gases and natural g a s . T h e r e  are also certain forms of 
the fuels regulated by the program which are excluded from 
the allocation provisions— for example, bottled propane and 
the propane content of natural gas liquids are exceptions 
to the coverage requirements. The scope of the allocation 
program generally extends to all producers, refiners, or 
"others who purchase or obtain" the fuels for resale, trans­
fer, or use.
Preference Categories, Levels, and Priorities
The regulations make a distinction between the small 
"end-users" or resellers who purchase petroleum products and
15Federal Energy Administration, Mandatory Petroleum 
Allocation Summary (Washington, D.C.: Federal Energy Adminis­
tration, 1974), p. 1.
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the larger "wholesale purchasers" who obtain allocated 
products from suppliers either for resale or consumption.
A variety of relationships between these purchasers of petro­
leum (both end-users and wholesale purchasers) and the sup­
pliers are also delineated (as discussed below) . In addi­
tion, end-users, wholesale purchasers, and suppliers are 
identified as either "importers" or "non-importers." Final­
ly, suppliers are divided into six categories: refiners,
natural gas fractionating plants or processing plants, 
importers, resellers, jobbers, or retailers.
Allocation levels are determined by the availability 
of a particular product and are distributed according to a 
percentage of current requirements or base period use. While 
allocation levels are mandated for essential public services 
and critical industries (agricultural production or national 
defense) at 100 percent, the specific priorities for alloca­
tion are different for each fuel. Thus, motor gasoline pri­
orities are highest for such end-users as passenger trans­
portation services and aviation ground support vehicles, 
while residual fuel oil is allocated to such high priority 
users as manufacturers of drugs.
Supplier/Purchaser Relationships
As was mentioned above, the EPAA established fixed 
fuel-supply requirements by directing suppliers to maintain 
their 1972-1973 relationships with their purchasers. These
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relationships are usually established for the duration of 
the allocation program, but there are provisions for mutual 
termination of contracts between suppliers and wholesale 
purchaser-consumers and end-users. Wholesale purchaser- 
resellers must have prior FEA approval to terminate such 
supplier relationships. Any new obligation between a whole­
sale purchaser-consumer or wholesale purchaser-reseller and 
a supplier must also be approved by the agency. End-users, 
however, may form new relationships without the agency's 
certif ication.- -
Adjustments and Exceptions 
Because conditions have changed for many of the fuel 
systems since the base period of 1972, the FEA developed a 
set of adjustments to base period volumes for wholesale 
purchasers and end-users. In cases of "unusual growth" in 
excess of 1972 purchases, of "increased current requirements,' 
fuel allocations may be adjusted upward. The adjustment pro­
cess may be initiated either by suppliers, wholesale produc­
ers, or end-users, but all "unusual growth" adjustments are 
subject to FEA validation. "Current requirement" increases 
are built into the regulations and take effect automatically. 
The allocation regulations also provide for exceptions, 
exemptions, interpretations, appeals, and other standard 
administrative procedures. These rules and regulations are 
discussed in detail in Chapter IX.
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Problems with the Regulations 
The FEO's initial attempts to develop mandatory 
allocation regulations were less than fully successful. The 
first rules, issued on January 15, 1974, were promulgated 
hastily and in a crisis atmosphere.^® Comments from indus­
try and the public were difficult to incorporate in the 
fifteen-day preparation period for the original proposals, 
and the revision process was hampered by the FEO's staffing 
problems. As a result, evaluations of the early rules by 
the Federal Trade Commission and other agencies pointed out 
at least four major flaws. First, the regulations provided 
a disincentive for increasing refinery inputs through either 
production or imports by their requirement that any refinery 
outputs which exceeded the estimates of inputs given the FEA 
each quarter should be allocated away in subsequent quarters. 
Second, the early rules required companies with supply/ 
capacity ratios below the national average to sell petroleum 
to other firms. Third, the FEO's price controls discriminated 
against the refiner-seller who had access to crude. And 
fourth, the regulations resulted in regional shortages and 
product dislocations.^^
^®See "Sweeping U.S. Allocation System Readied,"
Oil and Gas Journal 71 (December 17, 1973): 30-31.
^^Craig A. Warner, "National Energy Goals and FEA's 
Mandatory Crude Oil Allocation Program," Virginia Law Review 
61 (May 1975): 912-914.
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These difficulties prompted a lawsuit against the 
rules by Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf Oil Corporation vs.
Simon, 1974) which had been forced to sell 12 million bar­
rels of crude to refiners with less than the national average 
of 76 percent requirements. Although the District Court 
denied all Gulf's claims of arbitrary seizure of property, 
the court action did spur the FEA to revise the regulations.
By March 1974, the FEA had developed a revised set
of rules aimed at eliminating equal sharing of crude by
refineries by giving aid only to refiners with capacities
under 175,000 barrels per day. Also proposed was a plan to
let refiners keep imports above quarterly refinery input
estimates. However, before the rules were enacted, the
agency published a completely different mandatory allocation
program on May 14, 1974, giving no reason for the abrupt
18change in direction.
The regulations published in May are, with modifica­
tion, those in effect today. The controversies they have 
fostered have focused upon the difficulties involved in 
administering the two-tier pricing system (to which the 
entitlements program was a response). Challenges to the 
present program have largely been in the form of refiner- 
sellers undertaking agency proceedings to attempt to gain
18See "Crude-Allocation Plan to Change May 1," Oil 
and Gas Journal 72 (March 4, 1974): 26-27; and "Details of
New Allocation Plan Told," Oil and Gas Journal 72 (March 11, 
1974): 50-51.
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exceptions to sales obligations, although there continue to
be court tests of what some firms term the FEA's "taking of
property without just compensation" (as in Union Oil Company
vs. PEA, 1974/ for example)• There have been, however, no
19judicial invalidations of FEA allocation rules.
Conclusion
The three major analyses of early FEO/FEA regulatory 
behavior are generally negative in their appraisals of the 
degree to which the fuel allocation and pricing regulations 
dealt with oil supply problems.However, these evaluative 
efforts are limited by their reliance upon only the tradi­
tional performance criteria of efficiency and effectiveness. 
They lack any consideration of the broader political criteria 
such as the representativeness, responsiveness, or responsi­
bility of allocation policies. That is, one gets no indica­
tion of the levels of public participation, the focus and 
direction of public attitudes, or the interaction between 
the agency’s programs and its environment. The goal of the 
policy evaluation which follows in Part Two is to provide 
this broader view of Federal Energy Administration policy­
making .
^^See Wakefield, pp. 282-283.
^^Richard B. Mancke, Performance of the Federal 
Energy Office (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti­
tute for Public Policy Research, 1975); Paul W. MacAvoy, Bruce
E. Stangle, and Jonathan B. Tepper, "The Federal Energy Office 
as Regulator of the Energy Crisis," Technology Review 77 
(May 1975): 39-45; and Wagner, pp. 903-937.
PART TWO
AN EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE 
OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY 
ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER VI
THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF FEA DECISION-MAKERS 
Introduction
The study of the public personnel who make policy
decisions has traditionally emphasized the formalistic and
prescriptive requisites of methods of recruitment, position
classification, or other aspects of the "merit system."
According to David Rosenbloom:
The field has devoted itself almost entirely to 
attempting to discover the principles and practices 
through which public personnel systems can assure 
the highest degree of economy and efficiency in an 
apolitical sense, and it has almost completely 
ignored the impact of these principles and practices 
on'such politically relevant factors as bureaucratic 
representativeness and individual, group, and organ­
izational political behavior.^
Rosenbloom recommends that political scientists, in 
order to escape this narrow scope, "adopt a perspective 
which is more analytic of political relationships and polit­
ical behavior" by moving beyond consideration of efficiency
David H. Rosenbloom, "Public Personnel Administra­
tion and Politics: Toward a New Public Personnel Adminis­
tration," Midwest Review of Public Administration 7 (April 
1973), p. 101 (emphasis mine).
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and effectiveness criteria to study topics having more
widespread ramifications. For Rosenbloom:
The first of these areas, and perhaps the most 
important, is that of bureaucratic representation.
In an age in which much of the policy of all gov­
ernments is formulated in public bureaucracies, the 
potential importance of their representativeness is 
hard to overestimate. It can hardly be much less 
important, and might even be more, for example, 
than the representativeness of legislatures. For 
the most part, however, public personnel adminis­
tration, which, at least in theory, has always been 
concerned with the relationship between the input 
of manpower and the quality of bureaucratic outputs, 
has in practice avoided any serious consideration of 
whether either these "inputs" or outputs do have a
relationship to one another in this regard, or
whether the outputs are related to anything other
than technical efficiency.^
This chapter is an attempt to accomplish these goals 
by applying the criterion of representativeness to the 
decision-making component of the Federal Energy Administra­
tion. After a statement of the research hypotheses for FEA
decision-maker representativeness, consideration is given
to the level and integration of bureaucratic representa­
tiveness. This is followed by an analysis of the distribu­
tion of representativeness in the agency.
Research Hypotheses 
Existing studies of the regulatory activities of 
the FEA provide almost no data regarding the agency's per­
sonnel characteristics; other than a few biographical
2
Rosenbloom, p. 105.
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sketches of the organization's highest leadership, little 
information of this nature has been made available. How­
ever, some clues can be found for developing research 
hypotheses for FEA decision-maker representativeness. Most 
significantly, several analysts have focused upon the agen­
cy's staffing problems which resulted from the crisis situa­
tion into which the FEO was thrust, the temporary agency 
mandate, and the technical nature of much of the energy 
expertise which was needed.  ^ From these factors the follow­
ing hypothesis can be formulated:
Hypothesis 1: The emergency policy environment in
which the FEA was created severely constrained the 
overall level of agency representativeness.
In addition to these environmental limitations, the 
FEA's mission itself can be hypothesized as a constraint upon 
the achievement of bureaucratic representativeness.
Research has demonstrated that federal agency integration 
is related to two types of bureaucratic missions: those
which stress a commitment to equality or helping the dis­
advantaged (such as the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, for exaunple), and those which engage in "factory 
type" operations (as with the Government Printing
See Richard B. Mancke, Performance of the Federal 
Energy Office (Washington, B.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), pp. 22-23.
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office). The FEA performs neither of these functions.
Thus:
Hypothesis 2: The regulatory activities undertaken
by the FEA limit the integration of FEA representa­
tiveness.
Finally, some structural characteristics of the FEA
give hints as to how minorities will be represented:
Hypothesis 3: The youth, small size, and rapid
growth of the FEA will facilitate the distribution 
of agency representativeness.
Thus, the research hypotheses for this chapter posit 
relatively low. levels and integration of FEA representatives 
but relatively even distribution of FEA minorities.
Level of FEA Representativeness 
In order to determine the overall level of repre­
sentativeness of the FEA, comparisons must be drawn between 
the proportion of all members of the general population who 
fall into specific social categories and the proportion of 
FEA personnel who also fall into the same categories. The 
index of representativeness (I), which measures the dimen­
sion of "level-of-representativeness" is calculated as
I = Percent in the bureaucracy with characteristic 
Percent in the society with characteristic X
Peter N. Grabosky and David H. Rosenbloom, "Racial 
and Ethnic Integration in the Federal Service," Social 
Science Quarterly 56 (June 1975): 81-82.
^David Nachmias and David H. Rosenbloom, "Measuring 
Bureaucratic Representation and Integration," Public 
Administration Review 33 (November 1973): 591.
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Table 2 illustrates the racial and sexual percentages 
for the FEA for the period since the agency's establishment 
(1973-1975), and Table 3 outlines the 1975 level of repre­
sentativeness for the FEA and the entire federal service.
As Table 2 indicates, the early, emergency (EPO and 
FEO) stages of the FEA's development were characterized by 
extremely low minority group representation in the agency.
As was hypothesized, representativeness was apparently not 
a major consideration in building the FEA bureaucracy during 
the energy crisis. In fact, it is only in the most recent 
data (October-December 1975) that substantial progress 
toward increasing minority group representation in the 
agency is reflected. This slow incorporation of minority 
interests has not characterized female representation, how­
ever. Table 2 points out the fact that the proportion of 
female employees of the FEA has been maintained near the 40 
percent level for at least the last twelve months. Addi­
tional data suggests that female representation in the 
agency was over 40 percent for the year 1974 as well.®
The indices of level-of-representativeness (I) in 
Table 3 illustrate the degree to which the recent increases 
in the number of minority group personnel in the FEA have 
brought the agency to a situation of parity with the overall
Bureau of Manpower Information Systems, U.S. Civil 
Service Commission, Occupations of Federal White-Collar 
Workers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
October 31, 1974), Table A-1.
TABLE 2
FEA PERSONNEL BY RACE AND SEX, 1973-1975 *
Period Social Category
Black 
N %
Span.' 
N % N
Ind.
%
Orient. 
N %
Female 
N %
Non-
N
•Min.
%
Total
N
November 30, 
1973® 1 5.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 unknown 17 94.4 18
May 31, 
1974“ 23 1.3 0 0 0 0 3 0.2 unknown 1803 98.6 1829
May 31, 
1975“ 150 3.6 17 0.5 5 0.1 10 0.3 1323 40.4 3123 95.5 3271
December 31, 
1975 522 15.1 60 1.7 16 0.5 40 1.1 1329 38.4 2826 81.6 3464
Data for the Energy Policy Office. SOURCE: U.S. Civil Service Commission,
Minority Group Employment in the Federal Government (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Civil
Service Commission, November 30, 1973), p. 39l
^Data for the Federal Energy Office. SOURCE: U.S. Civil Service Commission,
Minority Group Employment in the Federal Government (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Civil
Service Commission, May 31, 1974), p. 24.
*^SOURCE: Bureau of Manpower Information Systems, U.S. Civil Service
Commission, Central Personnel Data File (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Civil Service
Commission, May 31, 1975), pp. 36.lA to 36.2C.
*Other characteristics of FEA personnel (occupation, pay grade, etc.) are 
outlined in the discussions of integration and distribution of agency representative­
ness which follow.
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TABLE 3
LEVEL OF REPRESENTATIVENESS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
AND THE FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION,
BY RACE AND SEX, 1975*
Social
Category
1970 General 
Population^
%
1975 Federal 
Government^
%  Index
1975 Federal 
Energy Admin.^
% Index
Total
Female 36.4 30.6 0.84 38.4 1.05
Total
Minority® 16.9 20.1 1.19 18.4 1.09
Total
Black 11.0 15.0 1.36 15.1 1.37
Total
Spanish 5.0 3.2 0.64 1.7 0.34
Total
Indian 0.4 0.9 2.25 0.5 1.25
Total
Oriental 0.5 0.9 1.80 1.1 2.20
★note : %  = Percentage of Total N; Index = index of
Representation.
^SOURCE: Harry Kranz, "How Representative Is the
Public Service?" Public Personnel Management 2 (July/ 
August 1973): 245.
^SOURCE: Bureau of Manpower Information Systems,
U.S. Civil Service Commission, Central Personnel Data File 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Civil Service Commission, May 31,
1975), pp. I.IA to I.IB.
^SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, "Ecpial
Opportunity Quarterly Work Force Survey Results: Final
Quarter (October-December) of 1975," February 10, 1976 
(mimeographed), pp. 2 and 5.
^Female percentage is percentage of worlc force, not 
population
^Includes total Black, Spanish, Indian and Oriental.
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federal government in terms of representativeness. Although 
the FEA's slight "over-representation" of total minorities 
(I = 1.09) is not as high as that of the government as a 
whole (I = 1.19), the agency closely parallels the general 
public service's level of over-representativeness for the 
largest and most significant category of minority personnel 
— Blacks are represented at levels of 1.36 and 1.37, 
respectively. The FEA, like the federal government, also 
over-represents Indian and Oriental groups in the 1975 data. 
Indians as a group are only slightly over-represented in 
the FEA (I = 1.25), while their national representation is 
much higher (mostly as a result of Interior Department hir­
ing) . It is only in the category of Spanish-surnamed per­
sonnel that both the FEA and the federal government under­
represent a particular minority group (I = 0.34 and 0.64). 
Finally, it must be noted that the FEA represents women 
better than does the federal public service overall, 
although the FEA's over-representation of females is very 
slight.
Integration of FEA Representatives 
The more sophisticated measure of agency integration 
of representatives is designed to move beyond consideration 
of the level of representation of a specific group in a 
bureaucracy to focus upon the degree of social mix of all
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groups within the organization as a whole unit. The index 
of integration (V) is calculated as follows:
y _ Total observed differences 
Maximum possible differences
where Total observed differences = Zf^^ f^, i^j
Les
2)
where f = the number of i^^ social characteristic
and where Maximum possible differences = ^ J
where n = the number of social characteristics 
and f = total frequency.^
The degree of social integration for the FEA and 19 
other federal agencies is outlined in Table 4. As is shown 
by that table, the FEA has achieved only a moderate degree 
of integration of its personnel (V = .39) when compared to 
other selected agencies. Thus, the FEA ranks twelfth of the 
twenty agencies for which 1974-1975 data were available. 
Moreover, the FEA's index of integration is lower than the 
measure for the entire federal service (V = .44) and lower 
than at least two organizations which perform similar, 
energy-related, functions (the Interior Department and the 
Federal Power Commission). This is largely due to the fact 
that the bulk of the FEA's minority personnel are grouped 
in a single category; Black bureaucrats account for over
Nachmias and Rosenbloom, pp. 592-593. See also 
Grabosky and Rosenbloom, pp. 77-81, for an example of the 
use of this standard.
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TABLE 4
SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY 
ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER SELECTED 
FEDERAL AGENCIES, BY RACE, 
1974-1975*
Agency
Pet.
Black
Pet.
Span.
Pet.
Ind.
Pet.
Orient.
Pet.
Other
Total
N
V
GSA 36.5 3.0 0.3 1.1 59.1 36,758 .65
HEW 23.8 2.7 3.3 0.9 69.3 125,430 .58
Labor Dept. 27.4 2. 3 0.4 0.9 69.0 12,715 .56
VA 25.7 2.6 0.2 0.8 70.6 179,157 .54
ICC 19.4 1.1 0.8 4.3 74.4 1,955 .51
Interior 4.5 2.1 17.1 0.6 75.7 64,948 .50
HUD 22.3 1.9 0.4 1.0 74.4 16,441 .49
Postal Svc. 20.7 2.9 0.2 0.7 75.5 557,580 .48
FPC 21.3 0.7 0.3 1.8 75.9 1,2]3 .47
Commerce 18.1 1.3 0.1 1.1 79.3 30,335 .42
Treasury 15.1 2.6 0.2 1.0 81.2 108,356 .40
FEA 15.1 1.7 0.5 1.1 81.6 3,464 .39
State Dept. 14.8 2.4 0.1 0.8 81.8 16,800 .39
Defense 11.6 4.5 0.3 1.1 82.5 940,280 .38
Justice 11.7 3.3 0.2 0.5 84.3 47,821 .34
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TABLE 4, continued
Agency
Pet.
Black
Pet.
Span.
Pet.
Ind.
Pet.
Orient.
Pet.
Other
Total
N V
AEC 7.0 5.1 0.3 1.0 86.7 7,345 .30
EPA 8.6 1.2 0.2 0.8 89.2 9,091 .25
DOT 8.0 1.6 0.6 0.7 89.0 67,424 .25
Agriculture 6.9 2.2 0.4 .05 90.1 84,254 .23
TVA 7.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 92.1 25,749 .18
*NOTE: V = Index of Integration. Data for the Federal
Energy Administration is for the period October-December, 1975. 
Data for the FPC, ICC, AEG, and EPA is for May 31, 1974. All 
other agency data is for November 31, 1974. Data for the FPC, 
ICC, AEC, and EPA includes personnel from GS only— all other 
data includes personnel from all pay plans.
SOURCES: Bureau of Manpower Information Systems, U.S.
Civil Service Commission, Federal Civilian Manpower Statistics: 
Monthly Release (Washington^ D.C. : U.S. Civil Service Commis-
sion, December 1975), pp. 44-46, and January 1976, p. 41; and 
Federal Energy Administration, "Equal Opportunity Quarterly 
Work Force Survey Results: Final Quarter (October-December) of
1975," February 10, 1976 (mimeographed), pp. 2 and 5.
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80 percent of the FEA's total minority representation. 
Nevertheless, the FEA's index of integration is higher than 
that for the society as a whole (V = .30) and several energy- 
related regulatory organizations are less integrated than the 
FEA (the old AEC, the Environmental Protection Agency, and 
the Tennessee Valley Authority).
Distribution of FEA Representativeness 
While there is utility in determining both the level 
and the integration of a bureaucracy's representativeness, 
neither of these evaluative dimensions has a great deal of 
meaning to the policy analyst if those positions occupied 
by various interest group representatives in an organization 
are maldistributed. That is, as Earl Reeves has observed:
In the final analysis, a genuinely repre­
sentative bureaucracy must be representative in its 
own internal composition. And this representative­
ness must extend through all levels of the hierarchy. 
This requires an opportunity for blacks and other 
minorities to pursue a career with real opportun­
ities for advancement to positions of decision­
making, even if this requires the use of quotas and 
compensatory hiring, training and promotion pro­
grams . 8
Thus, measures of level and integration must be utilized in 
conjunction with measures of inequality in order to evaluate 
the distributional characteristics of agency representative­
ness. The Gini Index of concentration serves this purpose.
p
Earl J. Reeves, "Equal Employment and the Concept 
of the Bureaucracy as a Representative Institution,"
Midwest Review of Public Administration 6 (February 1972) :
13.
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as does the Lorenz Curve of inequality. The Gini Index is 
calculated in the following manner:
g _ Area of inequality
where Area of inequality = curve of perfect 
equality minus the curve of actual distribution.^
The Lorenz Curve provides a graphical presentation of the 
area of inequality between perfect and actual representa­
tiveness. As background data for the computation of these 
measures of inequality. Tables 5 through 8 describe the FEA's 
distribution of personnel by functional office, geographi­
cal location, pay grade, and occupation.
A check of Tables 7 and 8 reveals possible maldis­
tributions of FEA personnel both in terms of absolute num­
bers (total N) and proportions of minority group represen­
tation for both occupation and pay grade. The computation 
of Gini Indices comparing the FEA to the overall federal 
government, illustrated in Figure 13, confirms the "unrepre­
sentativeness" of the FEA’s General Schedule (GS) pay struc­
ture (G = .32), but shows the agency's occupational struc­
ture to be highly representative of the general public
Q
See Kenneth J. Meier, "Representative Bureaucracy: 
An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review 
69 (June 1975): 530-531.
FEA PERSONNEL,
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TABLE 5 
BY OFFICE, RACE , AND SEX, 1975
Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. Total
Office Female Black Span. Ind. Orient. N
Mgmt. & 
Admin. 52.7 33.0 1.2 0 0.9 330
General
Counsel 45.4 21.6 0 0 0 88
Nuclear
Affairs 50.0 0 0 0 0 12
Regulatory
Programs 40.3 19.7 0.6 0 0 310
Policy & 
Analysis 37.6 12.4 0.8 0 0.2 394
Cong.
Affairs 57.1 11.9 4.8 0 0 42
Energy Res. 
Development 40.6 16.1 0 0 0.5 192
Conserv. & 
Environment - 50.0 17.8 - 1.0 0 1.0 208
Intl.
Affairs 37.8 4.4 0 0 0 45
Pr. Griev. 
& Redress 31.9 17.0 0 0 2.1 47
Comm. & 
Pub. Aff. 52.8 21.9 1.6 0 0 123
Int., Reg.
& Sp. Pgms. 54.5 18.2 0 0 0 33
Regional
Offices 31.4 10.2 2.7 1.0 1.9 1640
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, "Equal Oppor­
tunity Quarterly Work Force Survey Results: Final Quarter
(October-December) of 1975," February 10, 1976 (mimeographed), 
pp. 3 and 8-19.
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TABLE 6
FEA PERSONNEL, BY LOCATION, RACE, AND SEX, 1975
Location
Pet.
Female
Pet.
Black
Pet.
Span.
Pet.
Ind.
Pet.
Orient.
Total
N
Region I 
Boston 36.4 7.9 2.3 1.1 0 88
Region II 
New York 34.4 18.5 2.0 0 2.0 151
Region III 
Philadelphia 32.9 16.1 0.6 0.6 0 161
Region IV 
Atlanta 37.6 13.2 3.3 0 0 181
Region V 
Chicago 28.8 16.9 0.4 0 1.4 219
Region VI 
Dallas 24.1 3.0 4.7 0.7 1.0 295
Region VII 
Kansas City 32.7 8.6 1.8 5.5 0 162
Region VIII 
Denver 30.3 1.5 3.8 1.5 3.0 132
Region IX 
San Fran. 30.4 8.8 4.7 0.6 9.3 171
Region X 
Seattle 38.7 7.5 2.5 0 3.7 80
HQ
Washington 44.6 19.4 0.8 0 0.4 1824
SOURCE : Federal, Energy Administration , "Equal Oppor-
tunity Quarterly Work Force Survey Results: Final Quarter
(October-December) of 1975," February 10, 1976 (mimeographed), 
pp. 20-29.
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TABLE 7
FEA PERSONNEL, BY PAY GRADE, RACE;, AND SEX, 1975
Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. Total
Grade Female Black Span. Ind. Orient. N
Sched. C 0 0 0 0 0 2
Ex. Lv. 0 0 0 0 0 17
Exp./Con. 4.9 0 0 0 2.3 41
GS 18 0 0 0 0 0 3
17 0 0 0 0 0 14
16 4.2 4.2 2.1 0 0 48
15 .3.7 2.1 0.4 0 0.8 240
14 6.7 3.7 1.0 0 0.7 298
13 11. 0 4.2 2.8 0.9 0.2 456
12 20.3 8.2 1.6 0.4 2.0 439
11 26.8 8.4 2.2 0.5 1.5 403
ID 85.7 28.6 7.1 0 0 14
9 40.8 14.8 0 0.5 1.1 365
8 95.0 23.8 1.0 0 1.0 101
7 70.2 22.8 2.9 0.3 0.9 346
6 93.5 37.7 " 1.9 0 1.3 154
5 77.3 33.1 2.8 0.8 2.8 251
4 85.6 29.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 167
3 84.6 52.3 0 0 0 65
2 38.5 53.8 0 0 0 13
1 62.5 100.0 0 0 0 8
WG 6.7 100.0 0 0 0 15
Student 100.0 50.0 0 0 0 2
Fellow 0 0 0 0 0 1
FSO 0 0 0 0 0 1
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, "Equal Oppor­
tunity Quarterly Work Force Survey Results: Final Quarter
(October-December) of 1975," February 10, 1976 (mimeographed), 
p. 5-
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TABLE 8
FEA WHITE-COLLAR PERSONNEL, 
BY OCCUPATION AND SEX, 1974*
Occupation
Category
Male 
N %
Female 
N %
Total
N
Professional 551 92.3 46 7.7 597
Administrative 919 81.5 209 18.5 1128
Technical 11 52.4 10 47.6 21
Clerical 611 33.2 1229 66.8 1840
Other 4 30.8 9 69.2 13
Unspecified 19 86.4 3 13.6 22
*NOTE: White-collar occupations include all General
Schedule (GS) and other non-wage system personnel. For the 
FEA, this includes over 99 percent of total personnel.
SOURCE: Bureau of Manpower Information Systems,
U.S. Civil Service Commission, Occupations of Federal White- 
Collar Workers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, October 31, 1974), Table A.
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FIGURE 13
DISTRIBUTION OF FEA PERSONNEL: 
OCCUPATION ORDERED BY STATUS, 
AND PAY GRADE, 19 74-1975
Occupation: G = .01 
Pay Grade: G = .32
U1o >
^  &
50%
Federal Government
SOURCES: Federal Energy Administration, "Equal Oppor­
tunity Quarterly Work Force Survey Results: Final Quarter
(October-December) of 1975," February 10, 1976 (mimeographed) 
p. 5; Bureau of Manpower Information Systems, U.S. Civil 
Service Commission, Occupations of Federal WTiite-Collar 
Workers (Washington, D .c " . : Government Printing Office,
October 31, 1974), Tables A and A-1; and Bureau of Manpower 
Information Services, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Central 
Personnel Data File (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Civil Service
Commission, May 31, 1975), p. I.IA.
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(G = .01).^^ As the Lorenz Curve in Figure 13 points out, 
the occupations of FEA policy-makers are distributed in 
almost exactly the same proportions as is the case for the 
entire federal government (which is, in turn, highly 
representative of the general population in terms of occupa­
tional variable indicators)However, the FEA's pay 
grade distribution significantly under-represents the lower 
levels (GS 1-4) and over-represents the higher decision­
making positions (GS 14-18). Thus, the agency is "top- 
heavy" when compared to a public service which itself does 
not represent the population in terms of income levels.
Regarding the distribution of minorities within the 
FEA's pay and occupational structures, calculating an index 
of integration for each of the 18 GS grades reveals that, 
as Nachmias and Rosenbloom discovered for the federal ser­
vices as a whole, "the degree of social integration in 
General Schedule grades is highest in the lower grades and 
lowest in the higher g r a d e s . W h e n  these indices are 
correlated with an index of income for each of the pay 
grades, the inverse relationship is found to be strong
For the purposes of this study, a Gini Index of 
less than .25 was taken to be evidence of a representative 
bureaucracy. See Meier, p. 531, for a discussion of the 
use of this standard.
^^Meier, p. 531.
^^Meier, p. 532.
^^Nachmias and Rosenbloom, p. 593.
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(r = -.76, see Table 9). Thus, the FEA, like the entire 
federal bureaucracy, under-represents minorities at the 
upper, appointive, levels of the agency, while it over­
represents them at the low, entry, levels. Although data 
categorizing minority groups by occupation are not avail­
able for the FEA, Table 8 does provide information regard­
ing the proportion of males and females in each occupation 
category. This table demonstrates an obvious maldistribu­
tion of females into the lower status occupations (clerical, 
technical, and "other"). For example, the level of female 
professionals in the FEA (7.7 percent) is less than half 
the average for the entire federal government (19.4 percent 
in 1974), while the proportion of women employed in the 
clerical category for the agency (66.8 percent) is much 
higher than the public service average (48.6 percent).
These figures seem to indicate that the FEA's degree of 
"stratification" (clustering minority representatives into 
low grade, pay, and responsibility positions) is relatively 
high. In terms of structural "segmentation" (isolating 
minorities in certain offices or programs), however, Tables 
10 and 11 show that although there is some relationship 
between the two best indicators of office importance (size 
and budget) and degree of integration of representativeness
14Bureau of Manpower Information Systems, U.S. Civil 
Service Commission, Federal Civilian Manpower Statistics: 
Monthly Release (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Civil Service
Commission, December 1975), p. 37.
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TABLE 9
SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF FEA PERSONNEL, 
BY PAY GRADE, 1975
Grade Average Income Income Index* V
GS 18 $37,800 2.01 .00
17 37,800 2.01 .00
16 37,397 1.99 .15
15 33,734 1.79 .07
14 28,645 1.52 .14
13 24,323 1.29 .19
12 20,376 1.08 .28
11 17,086 0.91 .29
10 16,265 0.86 .63
9 14,026 0.74 .35
8 13,640 0.72 .46
7 11,788 0.63 .51
6 10,663 0.56 .63
5 9,551 0.51 .65
4 8,538 0.45 .61
3 7,450 0.40 .62
2 6,315 0.33 .62
1 5,559 0.30 .00
r = -.76
 _ Average Grade Income
Average Agency Income
SOURCE: Federal Energy Agministration, "Summary
of Pay Plans and Salaries," March 12, 1976 (mimeographed),
p. 1.
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TABLE 10
SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF FEA PERSONNEL, 
BY OFFICE SIZE, 1975
Office Total N V
Policy and Analysis 394 .37
Management and Administration 330 .59
Regulatory Programs 310 .41
Region VI, Dallas 295 .22
Region V, Chicago 219 .39
Conservation and Environment 208 .40
Energy Resource Development 192 .35
Region IV, Atlanta 181 .35
Region IX, San Francisco 171 .49
Region VII, Kansas City 162 .35
Region III, Philadelphia 161 .36
Region II, New York 151 .45
Region VIII, Denver 132 .23
Communications and P.A. 123 .46
General Counsel 88 .42
Region I, Boston 88 .26
Region X, Seattle 80 .31
Private Grievances & Redress 47 .39
International Energy Affairs 45 .12
Congressional Affairs 42 .36
Intergovernmental R&SP 33 .37
Nuclear Affairs 12 .00
rs = .35
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, "Equal
Opportunity Quarterly Work Force Survey Results: Final
Quarter (October-December) of 1975," February 10, 1976 
(mimeographed) , pp. 8-29.
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TABLE 11
SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF FEA PERSONNEL, 
BY OFFICE FUNDING, 1975
Office Budget V
Regulatory Programs * $32,964,000 .36
Policy and Analysis 21,769,000 .37
Conservation and Environment 18,225,000 .40
Management and Administration 16,326,000 .59
Energy Resource Development 13,767,000 .35
Communications & P.A. 2,550,000 .46
General Counsel 1,723,000 .42
International Affairs 1,291,000 .12
Private Grievances & Redress 832,000 .39
Intergovernmental R&SP 828,000 .37
Congressional Affairs 736,000 .36
r = .15 
s
♦Includes Regional Offices.
SOURCE: U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropria­
tions, Part 5 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1975), pp. 2741-2784.
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(Tg = .35 and .15), this relationship is not a strong one. 
Thus, the FEA does not appear to segment its minority repre­
sentatives into less significant functional offices.
If these two characteristics of FEA "differential 
incorporation" of minorities— high stratification and low 
segmentation— are combined, the agency can be categorized 
according to Charles Levine's four cell typology of ideal 
majority/minority representation patterns shown in Figure
14. In this typology, the FEA would be characterized as a 
"stratified" bureaucracy. According to Levine:
The stratified bureaucracy is the most 
common form of unrepresentative bureaucracy in the 
United States. Organizations of this type evidence 
substantial aggregate pay, grade, status, responsi­
bility, and authority differentials between white 
males and minority group employees in the same work 
units. Ifhether discrimination stems from the prac­
tices of personnel administrators, line managers, 
or the composition of the existing minority man­
power pool, in stratified bureaucracies minorities 
almost always occupy subordinate positions to
their white male c o w o r k e r . 15
A representational model of a stratified bureaucracy is 
illustrated in Figure 15, along with similar graphic repre­
sentations of each of the other three differential incorpor­
ation modes.
Conclusion
As was hypothesized, the FEA has only recently 
reached the level of bureaucratic representativeness of the
Charles E. Levine, "Unrepresentative Bureaucracy: 
Or Knowing What You Look Like Tells You Who You Are (And 
Maybe What To Do About It)," Bureaucrat (April 1975): 94.
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FIGURE 14
A TYPOLOGY OF DIFFERENTIAL INCORPORATION 
IN BUREAUCRACY
High
CONSOClATIONAL 
BUREAUCRACY
APARTHEID
BUREAUCRACY
DEGREE OF
SEGMENTATION
Low REPRESENTATIVEBUREAUCRACY
STRATIFIED
BUREAUCRACY
Low High
DEGREE OF 
STRATIFICATION
SOURCE: Charles E. Levine, "Unrepresentative
Bureaucracy: Or Knowing What You Look Like Tells You
Who You Are (And Maybe What To Do About It)," Bureaucrat 
4 (April 1975) , p. 93.
189
FIGURE 15
REPRESENTATIONAL I-IODELS OF DIFFERENTIAL 
INCORPORATION IN BUREAUCRACY
CONSOCIATIONAL BUREAUCRACY APARTHEID BUREAUCRACY
REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY STRATIFIED BUREAUCRACY
SOURCE: Charles E. Levine, "Unrepresentative
Bureaucracy: Or Knowing What You Look Like Tells You
Who You Are (And Maybe What To Do About I t ) Bureaucrat 
4 (April 1975), p. 93.
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government as a whole and has been slower integrating its 
minorities than most federal agencies. Moreover, the FEA 
is typical of the federal bureaucracy in its maldistribution 
of minority representatives into the lower strata of the 
organization. These findings have broad implications for 
energy policy-making in general, and the implementation of 
specific programs such as the fuel allocation and pricing 
regulations in particular. In a period in which the number 
of participants in the energy policy system has undergone 
rapid expansion, there are still segments of the society 
which do not have equal access to the major energy institu­
tions. Especially relevant among the many issues of social 
equity which result from this disparity in accessibility 
are such things as the need for federal agencies to "help 
lower-income families cope with shortages and sharp price 
increases" in e n e r g y . I f  the assumptions of passive 
representativeness hold, the implementation of allocation 
and pricing policies responsive to and responsible for the 
interests of minorities is facilitated by the presence of 
their representatives in the FEA.
In addition to increasing bureaucratic responsive­
ness and responsibility by reducing the discretionary 
authority of unrepresentative policy-makers and aiding in 
agency understanding of a wider range of group interests.
^^Energy Policy Project, Ford Foundation, A Time 
to Choose (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishers, 1974), p. 334.
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representativeness also affects organizational efficiency, 
equity, and effectiveness. According to Harry Kranz, a 
more representative public service would: (1) reduce
adherence to bureaucratic rules and regulations and increase 
reliance upon equity and individual human factors in admin­
istration; (2) speed up decision-making; and (3) promote 
"fairer" and "better" d e c i s i o n s . I t  is the issues of 
efficiency, equity, and effectiveness upon which the next 
two chapters of this study are focused.
Harry Kranz, "Government By All the People: The
Why and How of a More Representative Public Service,"
Good Government 89 (Fall 1972): 4.
CHAPTER VII 
THE EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY OF FEA OUTPUTS 
Introduction
Because almost all policy processes are characterized
by and defined in terms of the allocation of scarce resources,
criteria incorporating standards of "economizing" public
organizational actions are among the most widely utilized in
the policy evaluation literature. Included in the general
concept of economy in public behavior are the dual criteria
of efficiency and effectiveness,^  usually associated with
the evaluation of policy outputs and outcomes, respectively.
A large segment of this research has focused upon the "gross
inefficiencies" of bureaus. As Lewis Mainzer puts it:
One set of critics charges that governmental bureau­
cracy is incompetent. They view it as a kind of 
social machine, a means to achieve goals established 
by those external to the bureaucracy, a blunt and _ 
rusty tool, an engine full of friction and inertia.
Robert J. Dworak, "Economizing in Public Organiza­
tion," Public Administration Review 35 (March/April 1975), 
p. 158.
^Lewis Mainzer, Political Bureaucracy (Glenview, 
111. : Scott, Foresman, 1973), pp. 1-2.
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Much of the harshest criticism has been reserved for 
public economic regulatory agencies, which stand accused of 
constantly expanding their regulatory reach, resisting deregu­
lation, corrupting and bureaucratizing private organizations, 
and responding slowly to change.^ In short, these bureau­
cracies are attacked for their failure to provide adequate 
compensating benefits for the costs which are imposed by 
regulations which set prices, allocate goods, and control 
economic activities. It is the purpose of this chapter to 
evaluate the Federal Energy Administration's regulatory 
performance by applying a criterion of efficiency which is 
based on the concept of bureaucratic effort at the government- 
community interface. In addition, the distributional char­
acteristics of this effort will be assessed through the use 
of the criterion of output equity.
For the FEA's fuel allocation program, the two major 
areas of government-community interface are the compliance 
and enforcement efforts of the Office of Regulatory Programs 
(GRP) and the exceptions, appeals, and redress activities of 
the Office of Private Grievances and Redress (PGR). However, 
since the activities of the ORP are generally agency- 
initiated outputs while the efforts of the PGR are for the 
most part client-initiated feedback, only the compliance and 
enforcement program is considered in this chapter. The
^James Q. Wilson, "The Rise of the Bureaucratic 
State," Public Interest 41 (Fall 1975): 77-103.
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analysis of FEA exceptions, appeals, and redress are discussed 
below (in Chapter IX) as part of the evaluation of the 
agency's responsiveness.
The ORP is charged with the development, planning, 
and direction of FEA efforts to insure that allocation and 
pricing regulations are implemented in an equitable and 
efficient manner. The national compliance office has over­
all responsibility for program management while the ten 
regional compliance offices apply the FEA's regulations and 
procedures. Formal administrative enforcement actions 
available to these offices in cases of rule violation include 
seeking voluntc.ri'' compliance, usually in the form of price 
rollbacks and refunds of overcharges, issuing a "notice of 
probable violation" (NOPV) in cases where FEA investigators 
believe a violation has occurred or is about to occur (the 
firm has ten days to respond), or issuing a "remedial order" 
(RO) in cases where the certainty of violations has been 
established (with a 30 day response period).^
FEA enforcement activities have been directed through 
six major compliance audit programs. These include the 
Refinery Audit and Review Program (RARP), the Crude Oil 
Producers Program, the Utilities Investigation, the Propane 
Project, the Wholesalers/Resellers Program, and the
Federal Energy Administration, "Fact Sheet on 
Federal Energy Administration Compliance Activities," April 
9, 1975 (mimeographed), p. 1.
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Retailers Program. ^  For the purposes of this study, the 
efficiency of these compliance and enforcement programs 
will be evaluated by comparing indicators of allocative 
inputs (manpower expenditures) with effort indicators such 
as number and type of voluntary compliances, NOPVs, ROs, and 
dollar amounts of potential and actual violations. Since 
efficiency has been defined as a ratio between expenditures 
and effort, the comparisons will seek to determine the 
degree to which FEA program efforts are a function of pro­
gram expenditures. That is, the efficient organization, for 
this study, would produce high efforts from high expendi­
tures and vice versa. First, however, three other dimen­
sions must be investigated. There is a need to determine the 
actual level and pattern of expenditures in the total com­
pliance and enforcement (C&E) program to determine whether 
resource allocations have themselves been a constraint on 
efficient policy-making. Then, the client community for 
each FEA program must be described— in terms, for example, 
of the number and type of firms and the characteristics of 
industry sectors within various FEA regions— as an indicator 
of what would be optimal resource levels and patterns. Fin­
ally, analysis will focus upon whether FEA offices and
U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcom­
mittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, The Federal 
Energy Administration: Enforcement of Petroleum Price
Regulations ; Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1975), pp. 7-8.
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programs do in fact achieve policy outputs efficiently given 
resource levels and community characteristics.
The equity of FEA compliance and enforcement actions 
will be analyzed according to the distribution of these 
input and output indicators within the client community of 
the agency (the energy industry). But first, it is necessary 
to state explicitly the research hypotheses for the evalua­
tion of FEA output efficiency and equity.
Research Hypotheses
The two major analyses of the regulatory activities
of the FEO are in agreement that the allocation and pricing
actions of the new agency met neither the criteria of equity
nor efficiency. For example, Richard Mancke concludes that:
The policies of the FEO did not achieve a just and 
efficient petroleum allocation among products, 
regions, refiners or time periods.&
MacAvoy, Stangle and Tepper carry this conclusion even fur­
ther, giving the FEO "credit" for having created the energy 
crisis by its "typical" bureaucratic behavior. That is:
Theories of bureaucratic action point to general 
patterns of response which the FEO clearly followed. 
On being presented with critical choices, bureau­
cracies will adopt a set of highly constrained goals, 
invoke standard operating procedures, and generally 
act so as to avoid default at all costs.^
Richard B. Mancke, Performance of the Federal Energy 
Office (Washington, B.C.: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 16.
7
Paul W. MacAvoy, Bruce E. Stangle, and Jonathan B. 
Tepper, "The Federal Energy Office as Regulator of the Energy 
Crisis," Technology Review 77 (May 1975): 44.
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These general comments, although derived from a different
concept of organizational efficiency, suggest the following
research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The inflexibility introduced by tra­
ditional modes of incremental bureaucratic action 
will lead to an inefficient ratio between FEA 
expenditures and effort.
In addition, one aspect of this traditional bureau­
cratic behavior— focusing upon "catastrophic" policy conse­
quences in crisis situations— leads to some observations 
regarding the equity of FEA policy outputs :
Hypothesis 2: The tendency to adopt pessimistic,
"worst possible" views of the future will limit FEA 
policy alternatives and result in maldistributions 
of agency efforts.
Efficiency of FEA Compliance and 
Enforcement Efforts
As is the case with any regulatory agency, compliance 
and enforcement programs are a central element in the man­
date of the FEA. This fact is illustrated by both budgetary 
data and manpower statistics. Table 1 (see Chapter IV) 
indicated that the overall regulatory function of the agency 
consumed approximately 41 percent of the positions and man- 
years and 26 percent of the funding for the entire organiza­
tion, for 1975, with estimates for 1976 only slightly lower. 
This makes the regulatory activities the largest component 
of the agency by far. Of those resources devoted to the 
Office of Regulatory Programs and the Office of Private 
Grievances and Redress (the two components within the
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regulatory budget activity), the compliance program of the 
ORP is allocated over 62 percent of the positions, 64 percent 
of the man-years, and 63 percent of the funding, as shown in 
Table 12. This is equal to 26 percent of the total agency 
positions, 26 percent of the man-years, and 17 percent of 
the funding, for fiscal 1975. The figures for fiscal 1976 
are similar with the exception of agency funding, but that 
percentage is artificially lower due to the large increase 
in funding for the Office of Conservation and Environment.
Despite the importance which these budget figures 
obviously attach to the FEA's compliance and enforcement 
effort, the crisis environment within which the agency was 
created provided a number of significant administrative 
obstacles to the development of an efficient program. Among 
the most serious of these constraints were: (1) the neces­
sity of developing, over a short period of time, a compre­
hensive set of enforcement priorities and goals; (2) the 
formulation of compliance procedures and guidelines; (3) the 
delineation of clear internal lines of authority and commun­
ication, particularly between the national and regional com­
pliance offices; and (4) the creation of an overall case 
control and management system. Moreover, these administra­
tive programs were complicated by what FEA enforcement per­
sonnel termed a "policy of deregulation" which emphasized 
the temporary nature of many of the compliance efforts. As
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TABLE 12
REGULATORY ACTIVITY BUDGET, BY OFFICE AND PROGRAM, 
ACTUAL 1975 AND 1976 ESTIMATES
Of f ice/Program
Positions 
FY75 FY76
Man-
FY75
Years
FY76
Amount^ 
FY75 FY76
Office of Reg. 
Programs 1287 1125 1290 1245 32.1 30.9
Compliance 840 1039 858 1044 20.9 24.8
Allocation 323 0 318 115 8.8 2.9
Oil Imports 21 21 21 21 0.4 0.4
Contingency
Planning 0 24 0 24 0.0 1.8
Regulation
Development 71 10 64 10 1.4 0.4
Admin. 32 31 29 31 0.6 0.7
Office of Priv. 
Griev. & Red. 51 54 48 54 0.8 1.2
Total 1338 1179 1338 1299 33.0 32.0
In $ millions.
SOURCE: U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropria­
tions for Fiscal Year 1976 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1975), pp. 2765-2766.
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Gorman Smith, then Acting Assistant Administrator for
Operations, Regulations and Compliance, stated in early 1975:
For some time— ever since late spring 1974— the 
Federal Energy Administration has been schizophrenic 
about its regulatory programs. The Administration's 
policy has been that we would deregulate the petro­
leum industry as soon as Congress would let us . . . 
In fact, we have added to our regulatory programs.^
As a result of these problems, questions have been raised as 
to the adequacy of FEA auditing procedures, the time delays 
in investigative efforts, the guidance available for com­
panies on how to comply with complex regulations, and the
remedies available to consumers to complain about violations
g
and collect overcharges. Underlying all these issues is 
the central efficiency question which focuses upon the allo­
cation of compliance manpower and the uniformity of enforce­
ment among FEA regions and programs which results from this 
allocation.
From the very first days of the Federal Energy Admin­
istration, resource expenditures in terms of manpower for the 
compliance program have been a policy issue. Initially, the 
primary difficulty was in accumulating the necessary per­
sonnel to undertake the congressional mandate, included in
O
U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommit­
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Federal Energy 
Administration: Enforcement of Petroleum Price Regulations:
Hearings (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975), p. 122.
g
General Accounting Office, Problems in the Federal 
Energy Administration's Compliance and Enforcement Effort 
(Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1974), pp. 1-4.
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the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, to: (1) promote
stability in energy prices to the consumer; (2) promote free 
and open competition; and (3) prevent unreasonable profits. 
Until July 1, 1974, enforcement of petroleum allocation and 
pricing regulations was performed by the Internal Revenue 
Service (1RS) under an agreement with the FEA. While per­
sonnel were being hired and trained for the FEA, the 1RS 
assigned 300 investigators to the compliance program. By 
July 1, when the FEA assumed full control, 850 employees had 
been assigned to compliance activities.Figure 16 illus­
trates the manpower levels for this early period as well as 
the authorized and actual regional compliance and enforcement 
levels in the ensuing two-year period. As this figure shows, 
since December 31, 1974, the C&E program has operated at 
between 90 and 95 percent of authorized strength. Although 
these levels are greater than the FEA's original plans—  
Frank Zarb had vetoed a proposed reduction of C&E authoriza­
tions to 711 persons by June 30, 1975 when he came to the 
agency in December 1974— they remain significantly below 
estimates of the numbers needed. For example, when the 
regional offices were surveyed in June 1975 as to their 
manpower requirements for an enforcement effort in which all
U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 
Subcommittee on Reorganization, Research, and International 
Organizations, Enforcement and Compliance of FEA Oil Price 
Regulations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975) , p. 5.
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FIGURE 16
AUTHORIZED AND ACTUAL REGIONAL COMPLIANCE 
AND ENFORCEMENT MANPOlfER LEVELS,
1974 AND 1975
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SOURCE : U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcom­
mittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, The Federal Energy 
Administration: Enforcement of Petroleum Price Regulations:
Report (Washington, D.C. 
pp. 11-13.
Government Printing Office, 1975),
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audits would be completed in a one year period, the responses
indicated that 9,047 personnel would be required. ORP's
evaluation of this survey concluded that 2,021 personnel—
over twice the existing level— were n e e d e d . T h u s ,  the
level of manpower resources devoted to C&E efforts can be
characterized as inadequate and a barrier to efficient agency
policy-making. As important as the very real constraints
which resource shortages place on C&E efforts, however, are
the symbolic aspects of manpower levels. According to Paul
Maloy, Region I C&E Direction in late 1974:
At the proposed level of compliance staffing for 
this region we would be unable to maintain visi­
bility as a symbol of agency intentions and objec­
tives because we would be unable to respond to 
complaints by the public.
Not only has the level of C&E manpower been insuf­
ficient, but the manner in which it has been allocated among 
regions and programs has had adverse consequences for agency 
efficiency and effectiveness. Table 13, which outlines the 
manpower authorizations and allocations to FEA regions for 
1975, shows that there have been significant differences 
between regional office strengths. At the beginning of 1975,
\j.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommit­
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Report, p. 13. 
It should also be noted that the FEA has experienced man­
power shortages in its national compliance office. As of 
September 30, 1975, the headquarters component was authorized 
93 C&E personnel, but had only 54 on board.
12U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommit­
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Hearings, pp. 
162-163.
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TABLE 13
REGIONAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT STAFFING, 1975
Region
1975
Authorized
Dec. 31, 1974 
Actual % Auth.
May 29 
Actual
, 1975 
% Auth.
I-Boston 35 65 185.7 34 91.2
II-N.Y. 72 117 162.5 79 148.1
Ill-Phila. 74 96 129.7 71 95.9
IV-Atlanta 80 101 126.2 75 93.7
V-chicago 109 109 100.0 100 91.7
VI-Dallas 206 97 47.1 192 93.2
VII-K.C. 79 47 59.5 77 97.5
VIII-Denver 39 31 79.5 33 84.6
IX-S.F. 70 72 102.8 46 65.7
X-Seattle 20 23 115.0 20 100.0
Total 784 758 96.7 727 92.7
SOURCE: U.S. Senate, Coironittee on the Judiciary, Sub­
committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Federal 
Energy Administration: Enforcement of Petroleum Price Regula­
tion: Hearings (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975), p. 188.
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the range between Region I, the most overallocated office, 
and Region IV, the most underallocated, was 138.6 percent.
By May, significant improvements had been made in equalizing 
expenditures but the agency as a whole was even further 
below authorization. Moreover, those regions with the lowest 
actual-to-authorized manpower ratios were ones which had 
authority over major sectors of the energy industry. A com­
parison of the manpower allocations in Table 13 with the 
characterization of the various industry sectors by FEA 
region, in Table 14, illustrates the point. For example. 
Regions VI, VII, and VIII (Dallas, Kansas City, and Denver) 
which were severely underallocated in December 1974, and 
still under authorized strength five months later, had com­
pliance and enforcement authority for 81.1 percent of U.S. 
crude production, 50.5 percent of crude refinery capacity, 
and 89 percent of propane production. This misallocation of 
expenditures is explained by the FEA's early emphasis on 
identifying violations at the retail level. Former FEA 
Administrator Sawhill testified before Congress in 1974 that:
Initially the retail sector was the source of the 
overwhelming majority of the complaints received by 
the agency. We felt a clear responsibility to be 
responsive to those complaints, not only as a direct 
service to the public, but also because in a tight 
market situation such as prevailed during the first 
part of this year, the opportunity for price gouging 
at the retail level was perhaps the greatest.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 
Subcommittee on Reorganization, Research, and International 
Organizations, p. 27.
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TABLE 14
CHARACTERISTICS OF PETROLEUM INDUSTRY SECTORS 
WITHIN FEA REGIONS, 1967-1975
Region
Crude
Production
Refining
Capacity"
Retail Sales 
Gas. Fuel Oil
Utility,
Supplier
I 0.0% 0.0% 5.2% 19.1% 14.6%
II 0.0 4.3 9.3 24.7 24.2
III 0.2 6.6 9.8 12.8 15.0
IV 3.6 4.1 15.1 11.9 16.7
V 2.2 18.2 23.3 14.5 5.7
VI 70.4 42.7 10.3 4.9 4.9
VII 2.2 3.7 6.9 4.4 0.8
VIII 8.5 4.1 3.3 1.7 0.0
IX 10.6 13.3 13.2 2.0 17.7
X 2.3 3.0 3.5 3.9 0.3
^in barrels per day, 1975 
^in barrels per day, 197 5
^in sales of retail fuel oil, LPG, and gasoline, 1967
*^ in sales of all fuel oils to utilities, 1973
SOURCES: "Drilling to Remain High in U.S. As Oil Demand
Climbs in 1976," Oil and Gas Journal 74 (January 26, 1976):
106; Leo R. Aalund, "Wide Variety of World Crudes Gives 
Refiners Range of Charge Stocks," Oil and Gas Journal 74 
(March 29, 1976): 129; U.S. House, Committee on Science and 
Technology, Subcommittee on Energy Research, Development, and 
Demonstration, Energy Facts II (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1975), p. 349; and American Petroleum Insti­
tute, Petroleum Facts and Figures (Washington,
D.C.: American Petroleum Institute, 1971), pp. 160, 295,
and 296.
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Also, retail investigators required less training than was 
the case for other industry sectors and the violations in the 
retail markets were easier to detect and correct.
Thus, immediately following the creation of the new 
agency, C&E expenditures were concentrated in the Eastern 
regions where most of the 225,000 wholesale and retail firms 
were located. At the same time, widespread violations in the 
pricing of propane, which was in extremely short supply, led 
to the initiation of a special audit of propane wholesalers. 
"Project Speculator," or the "Propane Project," as this 
investigation was termed, was followed by the "First Audit 
Cycle" of petroleum refineries (RARP) in January 1974.
Figure 17 outlines the manner in which the FEA manpower 
expenditures were allocated in 1974 and 1975, including the 
Utilities Investigation, begun in December 1974, and "Project 
Producer," initiated one month earlier. This figure graphi­
cally points out the emphasis placed on the retail/wholesale 
program, primarily the retail sector, throughout 1974 and 
1975— an emphasis perhaps warranted by the number of firms 
involved and the political pressures brought to bear against 
the agency, but one not warranted by the nature of the petro­
leum industry or the goals and objectives of the petroleum 
allocation and pricing programs. As the figure also illus­
trates, the retail/wholesale investigations have received 
proportionately less support since the last quarter of 1974, 
as more manpower has been diverted away from retail audits
208
FIGURE 17
ALLOCATION OF FEA COMPLIANCE MANPOWER, 
BY PROGRAM, 1974-1975
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SOURCES; U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Op­
erations, Subcommittee on Reorganization, Research and 
International Organizations, Enforcement and Compliance 
of FEA Oil Price Regulations (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 197 5), pp. 3-9 and 22-32; U.S. House, 
committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee 
on Oversight and investigations, FEA Enforcement Policies 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp.
402-416; U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Sub­
committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, The 
Federal Energy Administration: Enforcement of Petroleum
Price Regulations: Report (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1975), pp. 10-14; U.S. Senate, Committee 
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice 
and Procedure, Federal Energy Administration: Enforcement
of Petroleum Price Regulations : Hearings (Washington, D.C.
Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 159-194; General 
Accounting Office, Problems in the Federal Energy Admin­
istration's Compliance and Enforcement Effort (Washington, 
D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1974), pp. 5-9; General
Accounting Office, Federal Energy Administration's Effort 
to Audit Domestic Crude Oil Producers (Washington, D.C.: 
General Accounting Office, 1975), pp. 5-8; General Ac­
counting Office, Problems in the Federal Energy Office's 
Implementation of Emergency Petroleum Allocation Programs 
at Regional and State Levels (Washington, D.C.: General
Accounting Office, 1974), pp. 6-9; "Statement of Phillip 
S. Hughes, Assistant Comptroller General of the United 
States on the Federal Energy Administration's Compliance 
and Enforcement Processes," before the Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure, Committee on the 
Judiciary, United States Senate, June 19, 1975 (mimeo­
graphed) ; Correspondence between Phillip S. Hughes, As­
sistant Comptroller General, and Abraham A. Ribicoff, 
Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 
re "Problems in the FEA's Compliance and Enforcement Ef­
fort," dated March 31, 1975; Federal Energy Administration, 
"Fact Sheet on Federal Energy Administration Compliance 
Activities," April 9, 1975 (mimeographed), pp. 6-15; and 
Federal Energy Administration, Reoort to Congress on the 
Economic impact of Energy Actions (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 70-74.
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and toward specialized wholesale enforcement programs 
(propane and utility suppliers) and the 19,000 domestic 
crude oil producers and 250 refiners. The major reason for 
this change in focus was that while the retail/wholesale 
program had uncovered substantial violations, mostly at the 
retail level, these infractions were in no way comparable 
to those estimates of overcharges by certain wholesalers, 
petroleum producers and refiners. Although as of September 
1974, the FEA had made over 80,000 investigations of retail 
and wholesale firms, had found 18,000 vilations, and had 
refunded $51 million, as the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
found :
Pricing investigations were concentrated at 
the retail level and the vast majority of violations 
were in amounts ranging from $500 to $1,500. While 
there appeared to be a large number of these viola­
tions, the total dollar value appears insignificant 
in relation to the potential violations at the 
refinery and primary wholesale l e v e l s .
In fact, as Table 15 indicates, these estimates of larger 
wholesaler, producer, and refiner violations proved to be 
accurate. The Refinery Audit and Review Program alone, with 
less than 25 percent of the allocated manpower of the retail 
program, recovered over five times the refunds to the market­
place. Moreover, the potential impact of unresolved cases
General Accounting Office, Problems in the Federal 
Energy Office's Implementation of Emergency Petroleum Alloca­
tion Programs at Regional and State Levels (Washington, D.C.: 
General Accounting Office, 1974), p. 8.
TABLE 15
UTILITY, PRODUCER, AND REFINER VIOLATIONS, 1975*
Violations No
Utilities
Amount
Producers 
No. Amount No.
Refiners
Amount
Resolved 17 4.69 22 0.96 75 267.15
Unresolved 30 46.60 43 8.12 140 459.57
Total, Resolved 
and Unresolved 47 51.29 65 9.08 215 726.72
*as of June 2, 1975 
®in $ million
SOURCE: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure, The Federal Energy Administration: 
Enforcement of Petroleum Price Regulations: Report (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 24l
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was even greater, totalling in excess of $700 million. 
However, despite GAO recommendations that the FEA further 
redirect its C&E effort toward RARP and Project Producer, 
the agency instead moved in late 1975 to rapidly increase 
the manpower committed to the utilities supplier program 
through "Project Escalator." As a result, a Senate Judiciary 
Committee subcommittee concluded:
Despite the overall increase in manpower 
assigned to the enforcement effort, the subcommittee 
still seriously questions the adequacy and efficiency 
of FEA's current allocation of enforcement manpower. 
Due to the fact that virtually the entire increase 
in the regional compliance staff has been assigned 
to the utilities program, the total number of per­
sons working on programs other than utilities has
not increased. In fact, the number of personnel
assigned to some key programs has actually decreased 
since the time of the subcommittee h e a r i n g s . 16
Finally, there appears to have been little relation­
ship between expenditure levels for the FEA regional com­
pliance and enforcement offices and effort levels within 
various programs. For example. Table 16, which compares 
manpower allocations and community characteristics for the 
ten FEA regions with caseloads, ROs and NOPVs, and refunds 
and penalties, for the Crude Oil Producer Program, shows no
apparent relationship. That is, most of the refunds and
penalties from the producers were outputs from regional
^^U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommit­
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Report, p. 24.
^^U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommit­
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Report, p. 13.
TABLE 16
CRUDE OIL PRODUCER PROGRAM, 1975*
Reg ion % Manpower % Industry Cases ROs & NOPVs Refunds Penalties
I 0.0 0.0 0 0 $ 0 $ 0
II 9.5 0.0 4 0 0 0
III 6.4 0.2 8 2 24,300 1,700
IV 7.9 3.6 6 0 0 0
V 20.6 2.2 27 0 0 0
VI 25.3 70.4 105 8 0 0
VII 6.3 2.2 24 0 499,763 32,700
VIII 15.9 8.5 20 6 158,698 0
IX 6.4 10.6 11 0 110,849 7,258
X 1.6 2.3 1 JL 0 0
Total 206 17 $793,610 $46,658
*as of April 4, 1975
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, "Fact Sheet on Federal Energy
Administration Compliance Activities," April 9, 1975 (mimeographed), pp. 16-17.
ro
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offices which had neither high manpower allocations nor high 
concentrations of the production industry within their 
boundaries (Regions VII, VIII, and IX, in particular).
While Region VI (Dallas) did handle a large proportion of 
the caseload, ROs, and MOPVs, it collected no penalties or 
refunds from producers despite having responsibility for 
over 70 percent of domestic crude oil production. The same 
can be said for the Utilities Investigation, where only two 
regions (IV and VIII) have negotiated agreed settlements of 
violations as of April 1975.^^ The primary cause of this 
uneven enforcement effort has been a lack of uniform operat­
ing procedures in each of the FEA's regions. In effect, 
each regional office established its own interpretation of 
whether a violation was subject to penalty. There were 
inadequate or nonexistent guidelines regarding the conduct 
of audits, the determination of the intent of violations,
and the collection of penalties until at least September 
181975. Not only has this non-uniformity caused efficiency 
problems within programs, it has led to difficulties in the 
equitable enforcement between different programs. The fol­
lowing discussion focuses on this and other equity issues.
17Federal Energy Administration, p. 9.
18U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcom­
mittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Report, 
pp. 9-10.
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Equity of FEA Compliance and Enforcement Efforts
Two issues dominate the evaluation of FEA's 
compliance and enforcement effort according to the criterion 
of equity. The first, as mentioned above, concerns the 
degree to which the non-uniformity in FEA regional enforce­
ment has led to different sectors of the oil industry being 
treated differently by the agency. The second focuses upon 
the amount of discriminatory FEA enforcement which has 
existed— the degree to which, for example, the agency has 
shown a pattern of more extensive enforcement against small 
firms rather than large oil companies.
In terms of the impact of the non-uniformity of 
enforcement upon equitable FEA policy outputs, the point has 
already been made that the agency's early emphasis upon 
investigating retail and wholesale firms preempted wide­
spread audits of other sectors of the oil industry. As 
Table 17 illustrates, this concentration of expenditures 
and effort in one industry sector has meant that by far the 
largest number of investigations, over 50 percent of the 
refunds, and almost all the penalties have been assessed 
against retailers and wholesalers. Moreover, in the one 
exception to this retail/wholesale enforcement emphasis—  
the discovery of violations in the RARP totalling over $400 
million— the refineries were not assessed penalties nor were 
they required to make any refunds. Instead, these companies 
are allowed, by FEA regulations, to write off the value of
TABLE 17
SUMMARY OF FEA COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS,
BY PROGRAM, 1975*
Program
Investigations 
Total Violations Refunds
"Bank"
Adjustments
Unresolved Cases 
No. Amount
Penalties 
No. Amount
RARP Unknown $ 74,800 $418,200 18 $148,600 0 0
Propane 45 22 4,038 NA 13 29,983 2 23
Utility 18 2 494 NA 1 710 0 0
Producers 48 11 794 NA 2 Unknown 8 47
Retail/
Wholesale Over 90,000 80,484 NA Unknown 144 864
Total Over 90,000 $160,610 $418,200 34 $179,293 154 $934
to
H*
0>
*as of April 9, 1975, and $ values in thousands
SOURCE; This is an update of the "Recap of FEA Compliance and Enforcement Efforts 
by Program," in U.S. House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, FEA Enforcement Policies (Washington, D.C.; Government 
Printing Office, 1975), p. 201.
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these violations against "banked costs"— potential legal
price increases which the market cannot yet absorb. Since
the total banks accumulated by the industry were in excess
of two billion dollars by the end of 1974, the writeoff of
19these violations was easily accomplished. Thus, while the 
FEA collected over $60,000 in penalties from crude producers 
and propane marketers for violations involving approximately 
one million dollars, the agency did not penalize refiners at 
all for violations of almost half a billion dollars. Al­
though the actual monetary value of these penalties is not 
perhaps significant, the symbolic value of this policy has 
not been lost upon either the industry or FEA's own enforce­
ment personnel. One unfortunate result of this inequitable 
situation is that, combined with the general lack of ade­
quate enforcement guidelines and operating procedures, many 
regional compliance and enforcement offices chose not to 
force rules upon sectors of the industry they perceived as 
being singled out for regulatory sanctions. Maloy, testify­
ing before Congress in June 1975, said that:
There are no written guidelines on when to 
seek penalties. There has been no delegation of 
authority to the regions to go out and compromise 
penalties. In the data that has been furnished by 
the national office of statistical types of reports.
19U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommit­
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Hearings, 
pp. 47-48. "Banked costs" are defined as "potential legal 
price increases which, in the judgment of the company, the 
market would not absorb," and under FEA regulations they 
would be saved against the possibility of future price adjust­
ment.
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we have never seen penalties asserted against the 
larger refineries, and we made our own decision in 
the region that we were not going to assess penalties 
on small firms when the large, major firms were not 
being penalized by the refinery audits.20
Similarly, Donald Mitchell, a former FEA auditor of crude
oil producers in Region VI, said:
We had no guidelines from the national office 
as far as penalties were concerned. I, myself, never 
advanced any penalties. I was specifically told the 
penalties were the sole determination of counsel, 
and they were the only ones that could mitigate pen­
alties, or assess if you will, penalties, and that 
the auditors had nothing to do with them. Then 
again, I felt, that if a major refinery were going 
penalty free, I thought it not quite right to penal­
ize some oil producer out there in west Texas.
These comments raise the second issue of FEA output 
equity— discrimination against smaller, independent firms 
and in favor of the larger, integrated major petroleum com­
panies. Not only did the FEA's program emphasis on retail 
investigations discriminate against small firms, by defini­
tion, but the entire crude oil producer program has focused 
upon independents. According to Smith, major producers were 
not monitored because the agency had the capability to track 
any "massive" violations by the big oil companies through 
the analysis of the national old-to-new oil ratio. However, 
this procedure does not enable the determination of individ­
ual company violations and does not negate the fact that the
^^D.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommit­
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Hearings, p. 64.
21U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommit­
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Hearings, pp. 
64-67.
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FEA concentrated its compliance effort on those companies 
which produced only 30 percent of domestic crude oil.
Although the 30 largest petroleum refiners, produc­
ers of 85 percent of domestic refined products, were the 
focus of the entire first cycle and most of the second cycle 
of RARP, as has been noted, most of the major company viola­
tions discovered were written off against "banked costs."
In addition, the manpower allocated to the audit of major 
refineries was consistently below authorized levels (94 of 
an authorized 104 in June 1975) and there were never more 
than four auditors assigned to any large refinery. In fact,
during three months of 1975, only one auditor was assigned
22to Exxon and five other majors.
While these program practices have had the effect of 
providing a pattern of more sanctions being directed against 
smaller firms, other factors have also influenced this situa­
tion. Most importantly, the complexity of the FEA regula­
tions has guaranteed that the company with the largest legal 
staff has the greatest potential for successful compliance.
As an FEA representative analyzed the absence of sanctions 
against companies such as Exxon, Gulf, and Texaco:
It's not a question of more honest; its a 
question of more capable. They have more qualified 
lawyers who spend their time analyzing every line 
and phrase in our regulations. They have the
2 n
U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommit­
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Hearings, 
pp. 64-67.
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highpowered auditors who have access to the numbers 
and the computerized capabilities, so that they have 
a greater capability to understand, interpret and 
comply with our regulations than does the small inde­
pendent crude producer, who's running his records 
out of a log book kept in the back of a pickup
truck.23
The long-term impacts of this regulatory advantage enjoyed 
by the majors are uncertain, but it would appear as if the 
potential exists for increasing the concentration of the 
petroleum industry by driving smaller, less legally compe­
tent, companies from the market as the FEA's rules and regu­
lations become increasingly complicated. Such a result, of 
course, would directly contradict the congressional mandate 
of the FEA, which emphasized the need for government action 
to insure continued participation in the energy policy sys­
tem by independent oil companies.
Conclusion
At the major point of FEA-industry interface, the 
compliance and enforcement effort, the agency's policy out­
puts have been both inefficient and inequitable. Although 
efficiency problems associated with low levels of resource 
expenditures, primarily across-the-board under-allocation of 
manpower to the C&E program, are not entirely the agency's 
responsibility, the FEA was responsible for the inadequate 
and inefficient manner in which the available personnel were
23U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcom­
mittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Hearings, 
p. 13.
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allocated among the regional offices. Particularly damaging 
were the manpower shortages in Regions VI and VII, the area 
responsible for a large portion of the production and refin­
ing sectors of the oil industry. An equal contributor to 
output inefficiency was the ad hoc allocation of manpower 
expenditures among the various C&E programs. Early emphasis 
on retail and wholesale investigations was "nickel-and-dime" 
enforcement when compared to the potential for violations in 
other industry sectors, most critically the production and 
refining activities of major firms.
Even with this rapidly changing and misallocated 
compliance and enforcement program status, the FEA's outputs 
would probably have sufficed if there had been some demon­
strable relationship between resource expenditures and pol­
icy efforts within regions. However, an examination of all 
the major FEA activities indicates no such relationship, 
with the possible exception of the propane marketers investi­
gations, where almost the entire industry is concentrated 
in one region.
Adding to these difficulties is the fact that FEA 
outputs have been distributed across the client industry in 
a non-uniform, discriminatory manner which has had the effect, 
even if not the intent, of favoring larger oil companies over 
smaller firms. The agency has been slow in implementing com­
prehensive operating procedures and guidelines for its 
regional offices, has had a whole range of intra-agency
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communication problems, and has often proceeded on the 
assumption that fuel allocation and pricing regulations, as 
temporary phenomena, were not worthy of the time involved 
in operationalizing detailed case control techniques. This 
confused situation has served neither the industry nor the 
public interest. Disorganization within the agency has made 
adequate industry compliance difficult at best and often 
impossible. As a result, case resolution has been delayed, 
cases have been lost, and the consumer, who is supposed to 
be the beneficiary of these activities in the first place, 
may have no access to the process nor any redress for his 
problem. Ultimately, as this chapter has implied but not 
investigated, these output deficiencies influence the degree 
to which the agency is able to achieve its goals and objec­
tives. It is to this question of impact and effect upon 
the FEA's environment that the following chapter is addressed.
CHAPTER VIII 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEA OUTCOMES 
Introduction
In Chapter II, three complementary and overlapping 
models of policy analysis were introduced— the system model 
of process, the economic model of product, and the impact 
model of effect (see Figure 3). The discussion and evalua­
tion of the Federal Energy Administration's output effic­
iency and equity in the previous chapter focused upon a 
modification of the economic model of product which defined 
public services in terms of "efforts" at the point of 
government-community interface. It is the purpose of this 
chapter to go beyond consideration of whether policies are 
efficient or equitable in terms of outputs to an analysis 
of whether they are effective in accomplishing desired out­
comes. This will be done by examining the degree to which 
the FEA's public services (outputs of the economic model of 
process, inputs to the impact model of effort) are trans­
formed into effects which achieve or promote the achievement 
of the agency's goals. That is, "(t)he impact of govern­
mental effort is assessed relative to the degree to which it
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causes changes in the social conditions which serve as 
goals for the agency.
The FEA has operated under three distinct sets of
objectives. At the executive level. Project Independence
and other programs emphasized: (1) increasing domestic
production of all forms of energy; (2) reducing reliance
upon insecure foreign imports of oil; and (3) providing
2
products at the lowest possible prices.
A different focus was taken by the congressional 
mandate to the FEA. As outlined in the Emergency Petroleum 
Allocation Act of 1973, the agency was assigned the follow­
ing objectives :
-Preservation of an economically sound and competi­
tive petroleum industry; including the priority 
needs to restore and foster competition in the pro­
ducing, refining, distribution, marketing, and 
petrochemical sectors of such industry, and to 
preserve the competitive viability of independent 
refiners, nonbranded independent marketers, and 
branded independent marketers.
-The allocation of suitable types, grades, and qual­
ity of crude oil to refineries in the United States 
to permit such refineries to operate at full capa­
city.
Bryan D. Jones, "Distributional Considerations in 
Models of Government Service Provision," a paper prepared 
for delivery at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Southwest 
Political Science Association, Dallas, April 7-10, 1976,
p. 6.
^See Rogers C. B. Morton, "The Nixon Administration 
Energy Policy," Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 410 (November 1973) : 66-67.
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-Equitable distribution of crude oil, residual 
fuel oil, and refined petroleum products at 
equitable prices among all regions and areas of 
the United States and sectors of the petroleum 
industry, including independent refiners, small 
refiners, nonbranded independent marketers, branded 
independent marketers, and among all users.3
Finally, the FEA has pursued its own informal goals, 
with the primary importance attached to organizational sur­
vival. Other major bureaucratic objectives have included 
the acquisition of resources, the coordination of subunits, 
responding to economic and technological changes, and defend­
ing the agency's functions from encroachment. In addition, 
at least from the point of view of the agency's critics, the 
FEA has tended to broaden its regulatory reach, resist 
deregulation, bureaucratize private organizations with whom 
it interacts, and stimulate corruption through its rule- 
making and rule-adjudication functions.^
U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Emergency Petroleum Allocation Extension Act of 
1974 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975),
pp. 4-5. The act also provided more general goals relating 
to the protection of the public health, safety and welfare, 
the maintenance of public services, the maintenance of agri­
cultural operations, and the allocation of fuels for explora­
tion and transportation functions related to energy produc­
tion and distribution activities, in addition to calling 
for economic efficiency and the preservation of market mech­
anisms. The overall purpose of the act was to "minimize 
the adverse impacts of such shortages or dislocations on the 
ATiierican people and the domestic econony."
^See Karen E. House, "Getting Entrenched: Energy
Agency Spends Much Energy to Insure a Long Life, Foes Say," 
Wall Street Journal 57 (March 9, 1976): 1; and Edward Cowan, 
"Who Needs the Energy Agency?" New York Times 125 (May 30, 
1975): F-1.
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It is these three sets of objectives— executive, 
legislative, and bureaucratic— which form the basis for 
the analysis of FEA goal attainment in this chapter.
Research Hypotheses 
While analyses of the regulatory activities of the 
Federal Energy Office have tended to emphasize the ineffic­
iency and inequity of that temporary organization's policy 
outputs,^ studies of the FEA since 1974 have often instead 
focused upon the agency's ineffectiveness in attaining pol­
icy objectives. A typical evaluation of the FEA's goal 
attainment is the following:
. . . FEA's allocation program may not be the 
appropriate method of securing these high-priority 
objectives . . . the allocation program might be 
justified only as an experimental solution for 
present energy problems, problems which may demand 
further complex federal efforts to attain signifi­
cant goals.6
A reason often cited by observers for this policy ineffec­
tiveness is the general and comprehensive nature of national 
energy goals. Thus, the following research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: National energy objectives, because
of their requirement for policy actions which extend 
beyond the scope of any single agency, will be dif­
ficult for the FEA to attain.
See Richard B. Mancke, Performance of the Federal 
Energy Office (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1974); and Paul W. MacAvoy, Bruce E. 
Stangle, and Jonathan B. Tepper, "The Federal Energy Office 
as Regulator of the Energy Crisis," Technology Review 77 
(May 1975): 39-45.
^Craig A. Wagner, "National Energy Goals and FEA's 
Mandatory Crude Oil Allocation Program," Virginia Law Review 
61 (May 1975): 937.
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Moreover, analysts have long noted the tendency for 
legislatures to create public agencies with statutes which 
provide only vague and undefined authority and responsibil­
ity for the new organization. This leads to a second tenta­
tive assumption:
Hypothesis 2 : Typically vague authority and impre­
cise policy objectives included in the legislation 
creating the FEA will limit agency outcome effec­
tiveness.
The third hypothesis is related to the tendency for 
public organizations to pursue goals other than those man­
dated from external sources :
Hypothesis 3: The achievement of all other FEA
goals will be subordinated to the need for bureau­
cratic survival and organizational viability.
FEA Attainment of Executive Energy Goals 
The most significant energy policy objective advanced 
by the executive, through Project Independence, was to 
increase domestic production of all forms of energy. In 
particular, for the short-term, this goal focused upon the 
increased production of crude oil, since most other energy 
policy objectives (e.g., decreasing reliance upon foreign 
oil imports) depend at least in part upon the attainment of 
this end.
The two-tier pricing system for old and new oil orig­
inally developed by the Cost of Living Council but enforced 
by the FEA since 1974 (see Chapter V) was designed to be cm 
incentive for increasing production in three ways. First,
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the market price was to be allowed to apply to the amount 
of oil produced and sold in excess of the amount produced 
and sold in the corresponding month of 1972. Thus, it was 
hoped that the uncontrolled nature of this excess, or new 
oil, would provide an incentive to increase exploratory and 
production activities (old oil was regulated at a national 
average price of $5.25 per barrel). Second, as an additional 
motive toward increased production, a volume of old oil, 
equal to the amount of new oil produced (termed released 
oil), would be allowed to rise to its market level. Finally, 
in order to discourage the closing of marginally productive 
wells, all wells producing less than 10 barrels per day 
were permitted to remain uncontrolled.^
However, there were a number of disincentives to 
increased production which were built into the regulatory 
system. Two of the most important factors working against 
the FEA's objectives were the restrictions placed upon the 
availability of investment capital and the political uncer­
tainty which the federal energy regulatory policy fostered 
within the petroleum industry. Capital availability prob­
lems centered upon the fact that:
Mandated sales of oil to refiner-buyers at less 
than market price and the large cash payments ordered 
under the entitlements plan reduce substantially the
7
See Federal Energy Administration, Annual Report, 
1974-1975 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975), pp. 3-5.
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capital that refiner-sellers can invest in 
exploration and production.
Further, the allocation schemes deprive 
refiner-sellers of much of the benefit of their 
production . . . weighted average pricing for allo­
cations forces refiner-sellers to incur higher costs 
for replacement crude. And the compelled purchase of 
entitlements of old oil results in a higher average 
cost of crude to refiner-sellers who had developed 
large amounts of domestic oil, distributing the 
benefits of the refiner-seller*s development to 
other companies. Where the benefits of exploration 
and development diminish, there is less incentive 
to increase investment.8
In addition, inflation has severely limited produc­
tion efforts; the FEA's price ceilings are established in 
terms of a fixed dollar amount which has decreased in real 
value over time. As a result, such production techniques 
for old oil as tertiary recovery, which are expensive to
9
begin with, have less appeal as time passes.
As has been noted, the instability of energy policy­
making has increased uncertainty and conflict at every level 
of government and industry (see Chapter III). Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in the oil industry's reaction to 
production incentives. Not only have companies been reluc­
tant to invest capital when the future federal regulatory 
structures and processes were in doubt— the debate over the 
extension of the EPAA and the FEA is only one example— but a
®Wagner, p. 931.
Q
U.S. House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, President's 
Decontrol Proposals (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1975), p. 579.
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deterrent to domestic crude oil production has undoubtedly 
come from the belief by oil firms that the price of domes­
tic crude will rise substantially in the future.
The impact of these factors has been mixed. Although, 
as Table 18 illustrates, exploratory efforts for both oil 
and gas have increased since the introduction of controls 
(there had been, by December 1975, a 30 percent increase in 
the monthly average of rotary rigs in operation, the number 
of oil wells drilled had more than doubled, and total foot­
age drilled was up more than 68 percent), Figure 18 shows 
that crude oil production has nevertheless steadily decreased 
since early 19 73. Moreover, Table 19 demonstrates the con­
tinued reliance upon old, controlled oil rather than the 
development of new, released, or stripper sources of produc­
tion; the ratio between controlled and uncontrolled sources 
was slightly more unfavorable in May 19 75 (62 percent to 38 
percent) than it had been 17 months earlier (when the ratio 
was 60-40).
Production of refined petroleum products has also 
decreased in the case of distillate fuel oil and natural 
gas liquids, but residual fuel oil, motor gasoline and jet 
fuel production was slightly higher ,in November 1975 than 
it had been at the time of the OPEC embargo (see Table 20).
The inability of the FEA's pricing and allocation 
controls to provide enough incentives to markedly increase 
crude production can be attributed to other factors than
TABLE 18
OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION, 197 4-1975
Period
Rotary Rigs 
in Operation
Wells Drilled 
oil Gas Dry
Total
Footage
Seismic
Crews
Jan 74 1,372 763 577 803 10,392 NA
Feb 1,355 901 600 816 12,160 NA
Mar 1,367 936 638 1,003 12,844 NA
Apr 1,381 947 700 945 13,349 NA
May 1,412 957 520 870 11,460 313
Jun 1,432 1,238 586 982 12,976 317
Jul 1,480 1,008 461 884 11,802 334
Aug 1,518 1,210 555 968 12,410 321
Sep 1,527 1,200 600 1,091 12,676 321
Oct 1,584 1,131 551 1,241 14,081 320
Nov 1,596 1,088 626 1,053 11,795 306
Dec 1,643 1,339 791 1,274 15,707 300
Jan 75 1,615 1,299 655 1,040 13,189 301
Feb 1,611 1,097 458 933 12,071 302
Mar 1,651 1,341 658 1,091 15,472 299
Apr 1,604 1,181 506 1,071 13,545 283
May 1,592 1,100 451 891 12,054 286
Jun 1,613 1,246 509 1,022 13,540 289
Jul 1,616 1,229 557 920 12,545 286
Aug 1,645 1,272 587 1,122 14,221 289
Sep 1,699 1,504 831 1,165 15,636 274
Oct 1,716 1,633 682 1,310 16,689 270
Nov 1,757 1,619 776 1,270 15,788 265
Dec 1,793 1,817 832 1,424 17,556 259
ro
w
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, Monthly Energy Review (March, 1976):
60-62.
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TABLE 19
SOURCES OF CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, 
1974-1975
Period Old Oil New Oil
Released
Oil
Stripper
Oil
Jan 74 60% 17% 10% 13%
Feb 62 15 10 13
Mar 60 16 11 13
Apr 60 16 11 13
May 62 15 10 13
Jun 63 15 9 13
Jul 64 15 9 12
Aug 66 14 8 12
Sep 67 13 8 12
Oct 66 14 8 12
Nov 67 13 8 12
Dec 66 14 8 12
Jan 75 58 19 10 12
Feb 61 17 9 12
Mar 60 18 10 12
Apr 61 17 9 12
May 62 17 8 13
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, Monthly
Energy Review (March, 1976): 71.
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TABLE 20
PRODUCTION OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS*
Refined Products
December
1973
December
1974
November
1975
Distillate Fuel 
Oil 2,938 3,028 2,851
Residual Fuel Oil 1,158 1,350 1,230
Motor Gasoline 6,099 6,419 6,599
Jet Fuel 830 861 859
Natural Gas 
Liquids 2,113 2,076 1,945
*in thousands of barrels per day.
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, Monthly
Energy Review (January, 1976): 24-31.
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the disincentives built into the regulations themselves.
At least as important as the limitations placed upon invest­
ment capital and the system instability generated by these 
controls were the competing goals around which the program 
was designed. For example, the new and stripper oil provis­
ions were promulgated as much as a mechanism whereby the 
FEA could gradually decontrol crude oil as for their value 
in increasing production. In addition, factors outside the 
FEA's controls which led to this production situation include 
schedule delays in the leasing of Outer Continental Shelf 
lands and the development of Alaska's North Slope, and 
decreases in oil reserves (which were revised downward by 
both the FEA and the U.S. Geological Survey). However, the 
most important variable other than pricing and allocation 
controls shaping domestic oil supply since the 1950s has 
been the increasing reliance of the U.S. upon oil imports 
to make up the difference between declining domestic produc­
tion and rising demand. This brings us to the executive 
goal of decreasing American dependence upon foreign sources 
of crude oil and refined petroleum products.
The large amounts of cheap foreign crude oil avail­
able for import into the U.S. from the immediate post World 
War II period until the early 1970s initially caused the 
federal government to respond by attempting to protect 
American markets through such devices as the Mandatory Oil 
Import Program's import quotas (see Chapter V). However,
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by 1973, the growth in domestic demand for petroleum had so
outstripped domestic production that these quotas were
lifted to prevent shortages. The import fee system which
followed (1973 to 1975) was designed to allow levels of
imports over and above the earlier quotas for the short
term, while limiting the long-term reliance upon foreign
sources by attaching an accelerating cost to imported oil.
This incentive was established as follows:
Importers were granted fee-free licenses for a 
specified percentage of their imports based on 
the importers' refinery capacity and also in con­
sideration of the old quota levels. The percentage 
of these fee-free allocations relative to 1973 
levels are decreasing in yearly stages so that the 
percentage will reach zero by 1980.10
The OPEC embargo during the winter of 1973-1974 
caused the price of imported oil to increase approximately 
300 percent, resulting in additional pressures on U.S. domes­
tic markets and the imposition of supplemental fees ($1 per 
barrel) on all imported crude.
The lack of effectiveness of these measures is 
reflected in Figure 19 and Tables 21 and 22. Figure 19, 
which shows the level of imports of crude oil and refined 
producted from 1973 to 1975, points out the fact that, 
despite the introduction of supplemental import fees, the 
nation imported even more petroleum in mid-1975 than it had 
prior to the energy crisis of 1973. This is not to say that
p. 14.
^^Federal Energy Administration, Annual Report,
FIGURE 19
IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, 1973-1975
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SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, "The Effects of Decontrol," August
18, 1975 (mimeographed). Chart 1.
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TABLE 21
PETROLEUM IMPORTS, BY TYPE, 
1974-1975*
Period
Crude
Imports
Percent 
of Total
Refined
Imports
Percent 
of Total
Jan 74 2,382 44.5 2,973 55.5
Feb 2,248 43.1 2,973 56.9
Mar 2,462 47.2 2,753 52.8
Apr 3,267 54.7 2,703 45.3
May 3,748 60.4 2,454 39.6
Jun 3,957 64.1 2,218 35.9
Jul 4,167 66.1 2,140 33.9
Aug 3,851 62.8 2,281 37.2
Sep 3,758 63.3 2,180 36.7
Oct 3,936 62.5 2,361 37.5
Nov 3,997 60.8 2,638 39.2
Dec 3,979 60.1 2,638 39.9
Jan 75 3,964 61.5 2,484 38.5
Feb 4,061 65.5 2,138 34.5
Mar 3,853 65.7 1,920 34.3
Apr 3,416 65.4 1,810 34.6
May 3,493 66.3 1,776 33.7
Jun 3,907 70.9 1,602 29.1
Jul 4,337 69.8 1,875 30.2
Aug 4,661 71.4 1,870 28.6
Sep 4,664 68.5 2,144 31.5
Oct 4,416 72.3 1,696 27.7
Nov 4,634 74.3 1,605 25.7
Dec 4,496 72.8 1,678 27.2
*in thousands of barrels per day.
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, Monthly
Energy Review (March, 1976): 16-18.
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TABLE 22
IMPACT OF OIL IMPORTS ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS*
Year
Oil
Exports
Oil
Imports
Net Deficit 
Balance
1965 $0.4 $2.1 $1.7
1966 0.4 2.1 1.7
1967 0.5 2.1 1.6
1968 0.5 2.3 1.8
1969 0.4 2.6 2.2
1970 0.5 2.8 2.3
1971 0.5 3.3 2.8
1972 0.4 4.3 3.9
1973 0.5 7.6 7.1
1974 0.8 24.2 23.4
1975 (1st 
Quarter) 0.2 6.4 6.2
*in billions of dollars.
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, Report to
Congress on the Economic Impact of Energy Actions (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 50.
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the oil import regulations had no effect. The imposition 
of the supplemental fee by President Ford in February 1975 
caused imports for the first quarter of that year to decrease 
rapidly. However, this impact was only temporary— by the 
second quarter, total imports had resumed their previous 
level.
The second significant conclusion which can be 
reached from the data displayed in Figure 19 is that the 
United States has failed not only in its policy of reducing 
imports, but that it has failed to develop alternative import 
sources to the OPEC. As of mid-1973, the U.S. received 49.7 
percent of its total imported oil from the cartel; by early 
1975, the proportion received from OPEC had risen to 65.8 
and was still rising. The insecure nature of U.S. imports 
is given greater emphasis by Table 21, which points out the 
gradual shift in the makeup of imports. Beginning in early 
1974, the U.S. began importing a larger proportion of crude 
and fewer petroleum products, reversing a trend which had 
started in the late 1960s as a result of the environmental 
movement (which demanded low sulfur fuels). This shift neces­
sitated an increasing dependence upon the cartel, which had 
huge crude production capabilities, but little refinery capac­
ity, and reduced the role of the more dependable Western 
Hemisphere suppliers of refined petroleum products.
At least two aspects of the FEA's fuel allocation 
programs can be cited as having contributed to the failure to
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decrease petroleum import levels. The first is the 
provision which allows the "first sale" of imported crude 
into the U.S. to be exempt from price ceilings. The second 
is the regulation providing for a dollar-for-dollar pass­
through of increased costs at each level of the fuel distri­
bution chain. Both of these provisions were designed to 
allow small, independent refiners or resellers access to 
the price-controlled U.S. crude oil, but, according to FEA 
Administrator Frank Zarb, they also:
. . . must to some degree have the undesirable effect 
of encouraging imports, since the burden of their 
higher cost is not borne solely by the importer, 
but shared with his competitors.
Ultimately, the ineffectiveness of U.S. import poli­
cies has appeared in the unfavorable balance of payments 
statistics which are shown in Table 22. After having re­
mained at a fairly moderate level for the previous decade, 
the balance of payments deficits for petroleum and its pro­
ducts nearly doubled in 1973 and more than tripled in 1974. 
Through the first quarter of 1975, this trend had continued. 
The FEA has estimated that the cost of imported oil to the
American consumer in 1975 was approximately $125 per person,
12as compared to $15 per person in 1970. This remarkable
"Statement of Frank G. Zarb, Administrator, Federal 
Energy Administration," before the Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, Unired States Senate, May 19, 1975 (mimeo­
graphed) , p. 78.
12Federal Energy Administration, National Energy 
Outlook, 1976 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1976), p. xxiii.
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turn of events has been a direct consequence of the 
increase in the price of imported oil. The posted price of 
crude oil from the Persian Gulf increased from $1.80 per 
barrel in January 1970, to $11.65 per barrel by October 
1 9 7 3 . Since that time, imported oil has become even more 
expensive— a barrel today costs more than $12, excluding any 
additional import fees. Thus, the third executive energy 
goal, that of providing petroleum products at the lowest 
possible price, must be examined.
The oil pricing goal is stated most succinctly by 
Craig Wagner:
Fear that the independents will be driven out of the 
market has inspired government programs like the 
crude oil allocation plan. The rationale behind 
these programs is evidently that the continued via­
bility of the independents is necessary to keep oil 
prices at a reasonable level. Independents continue 
to urge that a program allocating crude oil supplies 
is essential to preserve the competition necessary 
for reasonable p r i c e s . 14
Thus, the FEA's focus has been upon securing the 
highest possible level of industry competition in order to 
hold down domestic prices. However, at least three elements 
of the pricing and allocation rules appear to have operated
S. David Freeman, Energy: The New Era (New York:
Random House, 1974), p. 138. See also U.S. House, Committee 
on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Energy Research, 
Development, and Demonstration, Energy Facts II (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 345-352.
^^Wagner, p. 935.
243
as constraints on such competition: the fixed nature of the
supplier/purchaser relationships, the cost disparities 
resulting from the two-tier pricing system, and the restric­
tions placed upon ease of entry into the industry by the 
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act ( E P A A ) F i x i n g  
supplier/producer relationships on a 1972 base period has 
reduced competitive bidding for fuel procurements, thus 
raising fuel costs to many consumers. Likewise, the two- 
tier system allows firms with low base period costs to main­
tain artificial profit margins regardless of their competi­
tive nature. Finally, FEA control of the movement of all 
domestic crude has resulted in barriers to new plant con­
struction or investment by new firms.
Figure 20 shows that the efforts of the FEA to hold 
down domestic crude prices have not been particularly suc­
cessful. Between October 1973, and December 1974, the aver­
age wellhead price of domestic crude oil went from $4.47 per 
barrel to $7.23 per barrel. As Table 23 indicates, this 
increase resulted from the rise in the price of uncontrolled 
crude from $5.62 to $11.08 per barrel during the same period. 
The data from the same table show what this has meant to 
U.S. refiners who have purchased domestic crude— the refiner 
acquisition cost has almost doubled in the period between 
November 1973 and March 1975. Since the refiner is allowed
Statement of Frank G. Zarb," pp. 79-80.
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FIGURE 20
AVERAGE WELLHEAD PRICE OF U.S. CRUDE
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SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, National
Energy Outlook, 1976 (Washington, D.C. 
ing Office, 1976), p. 51.
Government Print-
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TABLE 23 
CRUDE OIL PRICES, 1973-1975*
Period
Wellhead Cost 
Controlled Uncontrolled
Refiner 
Acquisition Cost 
Domestic
Nov 73 $4.25 $8.50 $5.00
Dec 5.25 9.51 5.95
Jan 74 5.25 9.82 6.72
Feb 5.25 9.87 7.08
Mar 5.25 9.88 7.05
Apr 5.25 9.88 7.21
May 5.25 9.95 7.26
Jun 5.25 9.95 7.20
Jul 5.25 9.95 7.19
Aug 5.25 9.98 7.20
Sep 5.25 10.10 7.18
Oct 5.25 10.74 7.26
Nov 5.25 10.83 7.24
Dec 5.25 11.08 7.39
Jan 75 5.25 11.28 7.78
Feb 5.25 11.39 8.29
Mar 5.25 11.43 8.29
*in dollars per barrel.
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, "The Price
of Crude Oil," Monthly Energy Review (June, 1975): 1-10.
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to pass such costs through to the consumer, the prices of 
almost all refined products have continued their upward 
spiral. For example, between the 1973 energy crisis and 
January 1976, the average selling price for motor gasoline 
increased 31 percent and residential heating oil increased 
22 p e r c e n t . T h e  effect of these outputs on the American 
public has been substantial. The Ford Foundation has esti­
mated that in 1973 the average family spent six percent of 
its income on energy e x p e n s e s . S i n c e  that time, according 
to Labor Department data, this expenditure has exceeded nine 
percent (see Table 24). Equally significant is the fact that 
energy price increases have resulted in different relative 
and absolute costs to various income groups. An FEA report 
concluded:
Prior to the oil embargo, upper income families 
spent about three times more money for energy than 
did lower income families, yet the lower income 
group was spending about 18 percent of their income 
on energy compared with only about 4.4 percent for 
the upper income group. By December 1974, low income 
groups spent about 25 percent of their income on 
energy, while upper income groups were spending 
only 5.9 percent. This disparity increased in the 
first quarter of 1 9 7 5.iS
^^Federal Energy Administration, Monthly Energy 
Review (March 1976): 64-68.
^^Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, A 
Time To Choose (Cambridge; Ballinger Publishers, 1974), 
p. 115.
18Federal Energy Administration, Report to Congress 
on the Economic Impact of Energy Actions (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 27.
TABLE 24
IMPACT OF ENERGY PRICES ON AN AVERAGE AMERICAN FAMILY
Income: Dollar
6/73
Expenditures 
12/74 3/75
Percent of : 
6/73 12/74
Income
3/75
Total Energy 
Expenses $684 $907 $928 6.71 8.90 9.11
Gasoline 343 456 463 3.36 4.47 4.45
Electricity 189 239 248 1.85 2.35 2.43
Natural Gas 102 124 130 1.00 1.22 1.28
Other Fuels 50 87 85 .49 .85 .83
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, Report to Congress on
the Economic Impact of Energy Actions (Washington, D.C.; Government 
Printing Office, 1975), p. 28.
to
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Almost all economic analyses of the short-term future 
(until 1985) agree that the rise in costs and prices for 
domestic energy will continue. This prospect gives even 
more significance to the difficulties involved in securing 
private enterprise which is responsive to and representative 
of the public interest. Of the two alternative mechanisms 
available to government to achieve these ends through pric­
ing and allocation controls— direct manipulation of produc­
tion factors such as costs, and indirect influence upon mar­
ket forces— the first, as the analysis above has illustrated, 
has proven to be of only limited effectiveness. The follow­
ing discussion will consider the impacts resulting from the 
attempt, through the legislative mandate of the EPAA, to 
manipulate the competitive conditions under which the energy 
industry operates.
FEA Attainment of Legislative Energy Goals
The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act provided that
mandatory pricing and allocation regulations should allow the
independent sectors of the oil industry access to controlled
crude oil supplies. As developed by the FEA, these rules
attempted to secure industry competition by protecting two
sectors which, in 1973, seemed to be particularly threatened
with extinction— the independent retail gasoline marketer
and the independent refiner. At the retail level:
Administration allocation regulations provided that 
dealers receive the amount of petroleum products
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they received in 1972 after certain adjustments 
for growth in business or their prorated share if 
supplies were below 1972 levels. The regulations 
also required that suppliers of retail dealers not 
impose more stringent credit terms and prohibited 
suppliers from discriminating among customers within 
the same class or charging prices higher than allowed 
by pricing regulations.19
Refinery competition was to be assured through three 
programs. First, the freeze on supplier/purchaser relation­
ships existing in December 1973 (see Chapter V) attempted to 
guarantee a continuing supply of crude to small and indepen­
dent refiners. However, as early as February 1974 it had 
become apparent that the major oil refineries (the largest 
15 companies) were using their greater access to low price 
domestic crude to operate at a higher percent of refining 
capacity than either the large or small independent refin­
eries. By April 1974, the majors' advantage resulted in the 
implementation of the buy/sell list which allowed refiner- 
buyers (the small and independent firms) to purchase crude 
from the larger refiner/sellers according to a set formula. 
Although this program increased refinery operating capacity 
for all sectors, it still left the majors with a substantial 
refining capacity advantage and a corresponding competitive 
edge in the price paid for the crude oil they processed.
Thus, the old oil entitlements program, which allowed all
19General Accounting Office, Problems of Independent 
Refiners and Gasoline Retailers (Washington, D.C.: General
Accounting Office, 1975), p. 4.
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refiners access to low priced, controlled oil, was
implemented in November 1974.
The effect of these programs on the competitiveness
of small refiners and large independents is shown in Figures 
2121 and 22. Figure 21, which compares the average cost of 
crude oil purchased by the majors, the large independents, 
and the small refiners for the ten months prior to the imple­
mentation of the entitlements program demonstrates the cost 
advantages enjoyed by the major oil companies. On the aver­
age, crude oil costs for the majors were $1.72 less than 
those of the large independents and 30 cents less than those 
of the small refiners. Figure 22, showing the effectiveness 
of the entitlements program in equalizing these costs, indi­
cates that the FEA has, in fact, improved the competitive 
postions of the small and independent refiners. This pro­
gram has had its costs, however. First, through its incen­
tives designed to minimize old oil receipts by refiners, the
entitlements program has contributed to increased crude 
22costs. Second, the program involves the addition of
Federal Energy Administration, Annual Report, pp. 
22-24; Federal Energy Administration, Report to Congress, 
p. 59, and General Accounting Office, pp. 5-7.
21According to the EPAA, an independent refiner is 
defined as one which produces 30 percent or less of the crude 
it refines and a small refiner (which may also be an inde­
pendent) is defined as one whose refining capacity does not 
exceed 175,000 barrels per day.
22See Federal Energy Administration, Report to 
Congress, pp. 60-61.
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FIGURE 21
AVERAGE COST OF CRUDE PURCHASED BY REFINERS, 
NOVEMBER 1973 TO SEPTEMBER 1974
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SOURCE: General Accounting Office, Problems of
Independent Refiners and Gasoline Retailers (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 8.
FIGURE 22
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ENTITLEMENTS PROGRAM IN CRUDE OIL COST
EQUALIZATION FOR REFINERS. NOVEI^ER 1974 TO APRIL 1975
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another layer of complex federal regulations and requires 
substantial compliance and enforcement to encourage success­
ful program implementation.
Another indicator of the increased competitive via­
bility of the small and independent sector is that during 
the period between January 1974 and June 1975:
. . . while two small companies stopped refining and 
another closed a refinery, 11 new refineries began 
operating and that segment as a group expanded its 
capacity more than 750,000 barrels per day.
This expansion of refining capacity raised 
the small and independent's share of the U.S. total 
from 20 to 32 percent. Crude oil for these new 
refiners, and to a large extent for the expansion 
of existing small plants has come from the Buy/Sell 
Program.23
Independent retail gasoline dealers were having prob­
lems competing with the major oil companies well before the 
1973 energy crisis. By 1972, nonbranded independent 
retailers^^ had become heavily dependent upon surplus fuel 
from the majors. As of May 30, 1973, 1,200 gas stations had
been closed due to lack of product; most of these closings 
involved independents.^^ With the tightening of available 
supplies after the 1973 embargo, independent retailers were
23Federal Energy Administration, Report to Congress,
p. 66.
^^The EPAA defines a branded independent as a retailer 
which distributes refined products under a refiner's symbol or 
control. A nonbranded independent is not affiliated with a 
refiner except through a supply contract.
25Federal Trade Commission, Preliminary Staff Report 
on Its Investigation of the Petroleum Industry (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 1.
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placed at an even greater competitive disadvantage. Although 
the available data on the number and relative market shares 
of various industry sectors is confusing— the FEA's reporting 
system was not completed as of mid-1975 and there are at 
least six conflicting sources for existing information—  
enough is known to give some indication of the effectiveness 
of the agency's efforts to preserve retailer competition.
Table 25, which gives the total market share of non­
branded retailers from 1972 until the end of 1974, indicates 
that these independents lost a significant share of gasoline 
sales before the embargo and have yet to regain these losses, 
despite some limited gains under FEA regulations. Using the 
market share during 1972 as a base period, the nonbranded 
independents continued to hold 85.9 percent of this base
during 1973, but only 81.2 percent of the base period during 
2 61974. This trend is also reflected in the total numbers
of independent retail establishments over the same period.
According to the General Accounting Office:
Audit and Surveys, Inc., an independent surveying 
firm, reported a 20,000 drop in the total number of 
service stations operating nationwide between 1973 
and 1974. Also, the Administration's March 1975 
report to Congress on retail gasoline market shares 
stated that its November 1974 estimate of the number 
of stations was about 26,000 or more than 10 percent 
less than the number of stations in 1972.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Oversight— Federal Energy Administration Programs 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975),
p. 158.
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Information furnished to us by the American 
Petroleum Institute showed a slight increase in the 
number of company-owned stations as of June 30,
1974, compared to December 31, 1973. Since the 
number of company-owned stations has increased, the 
overall decrease in gasoline stations had to come 
from the ranks of the independent d e a l e r s . 27
Of the more than 1600 independent retailers surveyed 
by the General Accounting Office in 1974 who did go out of 
business during this period, 35 percent cited "other business 
or personal reasons" as the principal cause for closing. 
However, the other 65 percent gave as causes factors assoc­
iated with the competitiveness issue (e.g. shortages of gaso­
line, lease terminations,- lower sales, and loss of supply 
28contracts). Another important factor in this issue, at
least from the viewpoint of many independent retailers, is
a perception that the FEA's entitlements program has bene-
fitted only refiners and not marketers. As the President
of the Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers, Newell
Baker, told Congress:
The two-tiered pricing system of domestic crude oil 
resulted in drastic price disparities among refiners. 
The FEA was unconscionably slow in implementing the 
Entitlements Program which was designed to relieve 
this problem. Now it appears that the value derived 
by refiners from the sale of entitlements has been 
put in their pockets rather than passed on to whole­
sale buyers or the consuming p u b l i c . 2 9
27General Accounting Office, pp. 11-12.
28General Accounting Office, pp. 12-14.
29U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Oversight, p. 138.
TABLE 25
RETAIL MARKET SHARE OF NONDRANDED 
INDEPENDENTS, 1972-1974
Period
Total Industry 
Sales^
Total Nonbranded. 
Independent Sales
Nonbranded 
Market Pet.
1st Qtr '72 22.16 .48 2.17
2nd Qtr 24.66 .55 2.22
3rd Qtr 25.41 .55 2.18
4th Qtr 23.78 .56 2.34
1st Qtr '73 23.57 .55 2.34
2nd Qtr 25.66 .49 1.90
3rd Qtr 26.68 .46 1.73
4th Qtr 25.12 .43 1.73
1st Qtr '74 22.00 .40 1.82
2nd Qtr 26.10 .45 1.68
3rd Qtr 27.42 .48 1.76
4th Qtr 25.85 .51 1.98
a .in billions of gallons.
^in billions of gallons.
SOURCE: U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Oversight— Federal Energy Administration Programs (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 159.
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The second major legislative goal for the FEA—  
enabling refineries to operate at full capacity— is one which 
has been modified by the related objective of expanding 
refinery capacity. The buy/sell list and the entitlements 
program were both responses to the overall goal of maintain­
ing operating capacity percentages while encouraging capac­
ity expansions. Since the regulations supply refiner-buyers 
with allocations for every increase in capacity and deter­
mine refiner-sellers' allocation obligations on the basis of 
capacity, there are incentives for the attainment of these 
goals.
In fact, as Table 26 indicates, these regulations 
have made only a slight impact on the percentage of refinery 
capacity at which the industry has operated since the energy 
crisis. Although there was an overall increase in utilized 
capacity from 1974 to 1975, the 83.6 level achieved remains 
far below the pre-embargo level of 1972 (87.2 percent).
In terms of the effect these programs have had upon 
refinery capacity. Table 27 illustrates that while total 
capacity has grown every year since the energy crisis, each 
year's increase has been smaller than the previous year's.
In fact, the increase for 1975 (1.5 percent) was the smallest 
year-to-year capacity gain in a decade. While larger capacity 
gains have been predicted for 1976, this table demonstrates
^®See Wagner, pp. 932-933.
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TABLE 26
PERCENT OF REFINERY CAPACITY UTILIZED, 
1972-1975*
Petroleum Administration 
for Defense Districts
Pet.
1972
of Capacity Used 
1974 1975
Total District 1 82.2 80.2 83.2
East Coast 82.0 80.7 84.8
Appalachian 83.5 76.9 72.2
Total District 2 91.1 84.3 84.8
Appalachian 103.5 90.6 89.1
111., Ind., Ky. 89.9 83.6 83.7
Minn., Wis., Dak. 86.5 73.2 77.8
Okla., Kan., Mo. 94.5 88.8 88.5
Total District 3 86.5 83.4 83.8
Texas Inland 94.5 81.5 80.9
Texas Gulf 83.4 83.5 86.8
Louisiana Gulf 91.0 85.9 86.8
N. La., Ark. 73.7 72.3 69.2
New Mexico 98.0 66.3 73.8
Total District 4 90.1 76.4 78.4
Total District 5 85.3 77.8 81.3
Total United States 87.2 82.1 83.6
*1973 data not available.
SOURCES: "Forecast/Review: Supply-Demand
Race Continues," Oil and Gas Journal 71 (January 29, 
1973): 105; "Forecast/Review: Uncertainties Plague
'75 Outlook for Oil," Oil and Gas Journal 73 (January 
27, 1975): 113; and "Forecast/Review: Drilling to
Remain High in U.S. as Oil Demand Climbs in 1976," Oil 
and Gas Journal 74 (January 26, 1976): 113.
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TABLE 27
INCREASES IN REFINERY CAPACITY,
1973-1976*
Year
Total Refinery 
Capacity
Increase from 
Previous Year
Percent
Increase
1973 14.21 .80 5.6
1974 14.84 .63 4.2
1975 15.07 .23 1.5
1976 est. 15.93 .86 5.7
*in millions of barrels per day.
SOURCE: Leo R. Aalund, "U.S. Refining Capacity
to Score Biggest Gain in '76," Oil and Gas Journal 74 
(March 29, 1976): 55-57.
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the limited impact which FEA's efforts have had to date.
As was discussed above, the gains in capacity which have
been made in the 1974-1975 period have been in the small
refiner sector. For example, of the total increase of
230,000 barrels per day recorded in 1975, small refiners
accounted for approximately 89 percent.
In the past, the slowdown in capacity increases
can be attributed to the close relationship between refining
capacity and crude production. Wagner has observed this
interdependency in his analysis as follows:
. . .  an increase in refining capacity— for both 
refiner-buyers and refiner-sellers— depends on 
increased production and is always contingent upon 
securing a reliable source of supply of crude oil 
for that additional capacity . . .  It follows that 
FEA's failure to spur domestic production inhibits 
substantial increases in refinery capacity.32
The equitable distribution of fuels, both in terms 
of quantities and prices, among regions and industry sectors, 
is the third FEA objective mandated by the EPAA. Much of the 
discussion above has focused upon equity issues among sectors 
of the petroleum industry (refiners and retailers in partic­
ular) but the question of interregional allocation of fuels 
has not been raised. Richard Mancke's evaluation of the 
allocation of gasoline among regions in early 1974 was
^^Leo R. Aalund, "U.S. Refining Capacity to Score 
Biggest Gain in '76," Oil and Gas Journal 74 (March 29, 
1976): 55.
32Wagner, p. 933.
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highly critical of the inequity in the amounts distributed
to various states (there was a range of 63 to 122 percent
of projected needs between New Hampshire and Wyoming, for 
33example), but this problem apparently has been resolved 
by a combination of increased imports, relatively warm win­
ters, and lowered domestic demand. Thus, while the issue 
of interregional amouts of crude and refined products has 
been at least temporarily resolved, the question of inter­
regional pricing for these fuels remains.
The data in Table 28 show that the FEA has had mixed 
success in equitably distributing prices for gasoline and 
heating oil among regions. In the case of gasoline, while 
the price has escalated steadily since 1974 (the national 
average has increased more than 36 percent in the two year 
period), the range between the highest and the lowest 
regional prices has decreased each year. However, this is 
not the case for the allocation of heating oil, where sub­
stantial fluctuations in the interregional pricing distribu­
tions have accompanied overall price increases.
FEA Attainment of Bureaucratic Energy Goals 
Because the FEA was established as a "temporary" 
agency, the issue of its attempts to maintain itself as an 
organizational unit have been controversial. A constant
^^Mancke, pp. 10-14.
TABLE 28
INTERREGIONAL PRICING OF FUELS, 1974-1976
Gasolinea Heating Oil^
Region 1974 1975 1976 Region 1974 1975 1976
Northeast 21.4 27.8 33.3 New England 31.9 40.2 41.3
Mid-Atlantic 21.4 27.8 33.9 Mid-Atlantic 31.6 38.9 40.6
Southeast 21.1 27.4 33.2 Southeast 30.8 36.5 39.9
Central 21.3 28.2 34.0 East No. Ct. 30.3 33.2 38.6
Western 22.2 28.5 33.2 East So. Ct. 29.8 34.7 NA
Southwest 20.1 27.2 33.1 West No. Ct. 31.3 34.0 39.0
Pacific 21.0 27.8 33.5 West So. Ct. NA NA NA
Mountain 30.4 37.5 40.2
West Coast 30.5 38.0 42.0
Range 2.1 1.3 0.9 Range 2.1 7 . 0 3.4
^jobber prices for regular gasoline sold by 21 leading refiners, in cents
per gallon, for January of each year.
residential heating oil prices, in cents per gallon, for January of each
year.
to
o>
to
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, Monthly Energy Review (April 1976):
57 and 59.
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theme in the literature of organization theory and the 
analysis of bureaucracy has been the counterproductive 
nature of agency survival and growth. More specifically, a 
number of typical "dangers" associated with federal economic 
regulation agency maintenance and survival have been enu­
merated, including tendencies to broaden the scope of regu­
latory activities, respond slowly to technical and economic 
change, resist deregulation, bureaucratize private organiza­
tions, and stimulate c o r r u p t i o n . T h e  following analysis 
focuses upon the degree to which the FEA has attempted to 
undertake these types of system maintenance activities.
A common aspect of the criticism of the bureaucratic 
drive for power is the inherent tendency for economic regu­
latory agencies to expand their scope of activities regard­
less of the actual social needs for the services offered. 
Although, as has been pointed out, there was considerable 
pressure, both within and without the FEO, to expand the 
regulatory scope of the new agency in its first months of 
existence (see Chapter IV), the FEA's activities have re­
mained remarkably similar to its original functions. This 
is not to say that some expansionary attempts have not been 
made. In early January 1974, a proposal was put forward by 
John Dunlop, Chairman of the Cost of Living Council, to
See James Q. Wilson, "The Dead Hand of Regulation," 
Public Interest 25 (Fall, 1971): 39-58; and James Q. Wilson,
"The Rise of the Bureaucratic State," Public Interest 41 
(Fall, 1975): 56-76.
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place the FEA in charge of allocating scarce building 
materials through an Office of Construction. That same 
month, the agency attempted to secure a future R&D function 
by establishing an Energy Research and Development Office. 
And in late 1975, the FEA sought to gain access to the 
nuclear energy policy arena through the creation of an 
Office of Nuclear Affairs. None of these structural exten­
sions has proven to be permanent, however.
One of the major ironies of regulatory agencies is 
that many of the same organizations which were created in 
response to sudden social and technological changes are 
then unable to effectively respond to continuing changes 
once they have been established. As was noted above, 
bureaucratic inflexibility has been one of the most often 
cited weaknesses of the FEO in its initial fuel allocation 
efforts. However, since many of the early personnel and 
program difficulties have been resolved, these factors are 
not as significant. While it is still true that FEA pric­
ing and allocation rules are tied to base periods which 
may have little relevance to contemporary economic and tech­
nical conditions, the agency has made a concerted effort 
to secure feedback in the form of public comment on each of 
its allocation decisions (see Chapter IX). The result has
Anthony M. DiLeo, "An Introduction to the Manda­
tory Petroleum Allocation Regulations," Louisiana Bar 
Journal 22 (September 1974): 107-110.
265
been at least three major revisions of the crude allocation 
program and over 20 sets of amendments to the rules.
Almost every study of federal regulatory bodies has 
pointed out the tendency of these organizations to preserve 
the status quo and oppose any attempts to strip them of 
their basic functions. In at least one major policy area, 
however, the FEA has actually proposed the elimination of 
its own regulatory authority. Since June 1974, the FEA has 
pressured Congress to allow the EPAA to expire. However, 
the allocation system has been extended four times, despite 
FEA opposition, the last of which was the 40-month phaseout 
under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.
There is substantial evidence that regulatory agen­
cies have contributed to the "bureaucratization" of those 
private organizations with whom they interact. This has 
probably also been the case with the FEA's implementation 
of the mandatory petroleum allocation regulations. Most 
significant have been the personnel burdens placed on the 
oil industry by the FEA's standards. As Frank Ikard, Presi- 
sent of the American Petroleum Institute, has noted, the 
allocation and pricing rules require "a whole new cadre of 
career specialists in petroleum regulation" which number 
several times as many as the total government personnel 
assigned to implement the EPAA.
Part of the criticism of bureaucratic "amorality" 
rests on the assumption that "regulations make us dishonest
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people." More than one political analyst, for example, has 
commented on the pattern of clientele reaction to regulations 
in terms of first trying to influence the rule-making process 
and then attempting to avoid compliance with unfavorable 
requirements. Regarding federal economic regulation agen­
cies, analysts have asserted that controlling entry, fixing 
prices, and affecting profitability of private organizations 
stimulates corruption. Although a causal link in this rela­
tionship is difficult to demonstrate, the analysis in Chapter 
VII indicated that the pricing and allocation regulations 
were widely violated.
Thus, a good case can be made that the FEA has main­
tained itself without generating many of the harmful effects 
associated with federal economic regulatory agencies. The 
FEA has been conservative in its limited attempts to broaden 
its regulatory authority, most of which took place at any rate 
during the first, confused days of the FEO's authority over 
energy policy-making. The agency has responded, although 
not always successfully, to economic and technological 
changes with often limited personnel and expertise. And, 
most significantly, the new organization has encouraged, not 
resisted, some deregulation.
It is only in those areas pertaining to the FEA's 
relationships with the oil industry that some regulatory 
"dangers" seem to have been realized; there probably has 
been some bureaucratization of the controlled industry, and
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there may be some corrupting influence of the agency's rules 
and regulations. However, both these points require serious 
caveats. The petroleum industry was already highly regulated 
prior to the creation of the FEA, and, as the 1972 campaign 
contribution scandals have demonstrated, the oil industry's 
corruption certainly did not begin with the coming of the 
FEA.
Conclusion
Two conclusions can be drawn from this chapter.
First, the effectiveness of the FEA's fuel allocation poli­
cies has been mixed. While the agency has achieved many of 
the goals outlined in the EPAA's mandate, especially the 
maintenance of the competitiveness of independent refiners 
and the equitable distribution of gasoline among regions, 
as well as the more basic bureaucratic goal of survival, it 
has been markedly less effective in the attainment of the 
more broadly defined executive goals. Second, the major 
cause for this variation in outcome effectiveness lies in 
the fact that the FEA is a classic example of the regulatory 
agency which was not established solely to allocate resources 
effectively, but to remedy a broad range of social prob­
lems.^® As a result, the agency has been beset with a
36gee Kenneth J. Meier and John P. Plumlee, "Regula­
tory Administration and Organizational Rigidity," a paper 
prepared for delivery at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the 
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 29- 
May 1, 1976, p. 1.
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combination of vague, symbolic, and conflicting policy 
objectives. Not only are there serious ambiguities contained 
in almost all the tasks assigned the agency, there are a num­
ber of direct conflicts between different goals and within 
others. For example, the executive objective of increasing 
production of crude oil is somewhat frustrated by the legis­
lative goal of insuring competition in the refiner sector of 
the oil industry, since the introduction of the entitlements 
program to enable independent refiner-buyers to gain access 
to old oil also has the effect of depriving large refiner- 
sellers of the capital needed to invest in exploration and 
production activities. Moreover, while the entitlements 
program has the desired effect of increasing competitiveness 
for the refiner sector of the industry, it has the internal 
contradiction of constraining competitiveness in the retail 
sector. With such incompatibility in policy objectives, it 
is no surprise that the FEA has been able to demonstrate 
only a limited level of outcome effectiveness.
One of the ways all large organizations determine 
the degree to which their conflicting goals are being real­
ized and the priorities which should be attached to these 
objectives is through the establishment of monitoring or 
feedback mechanisms. The responsiveness of FEA feedback is 
the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER IX 
THE RESPONSIVENESS OF FEA FEEDBACK 
Introduction
Bureaucratic responsiveness is an attempt by public 
agencies to match their decisions to constituency prefer­
ences. These preferences are manifested through two modes 
of feedback: unarticulated, individualized expressions of
public opinion, and articulated group demands from organized 
interests. This chapter is first concerned with the degree 
to which the Federal Energy Administration's programs have 
been sensitive to shifts in public opinion, as revealed in 
national surveys. Since there is no simple test for respon­
siveness, the focus will be upon answering the following 
questions :
-Does the agency follow public opinion, try to dis­
cover public preferences, and do its best to inform 
the public about policy alternatives?
-Is there much opposition to, and criticism of, 
agency performance?
-Does the agency respond to criticism? Does it 
change its behavior to answer criticism?^
^Robert C. Fried, Performance in American Bureau­
cracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 55.
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Although a variety of national opinion surveys will 
be utilized in this chapter, a great deal of emphasis will 
be placed upon a series of monthly public opinion polls on 
energy issues which were contracted by the FEA, beginning 
in September 1974 and running for a twenty-month period.^
A second major focus for this section is the answer 
to the question: Responsiveness to whom? Here the emphasis
is upon a determination of the manner in which the FEA 
responds to organized interest groups (primarily the oil 
industry) which aggregate and articulate demands and sup­
ports for the agency. The exceptions and appeals program—  
the major government-community interface where the FEA is 
able to respond to industry-initiated requests— will be the 
activity subjected to analysis. Responsiveness at this 
point is important not only because it is at the interface 
with industry that the FEA accommodates competing values and 
demands, but because it is the exceptions and appeals pro­
cess which gives these groups cues as to what types of 
demands will be accepted by the agency and what supports are 
needed.
Research Hypotheses 
Public administration theory suggests that the 
responsiveness of regulatory agencies is significantly
2
Opinion Research Corporation, General Public Atti­
tudes and Behavior Toward Energy Saving, Report Volumes I- 
XVI (September 1974 to January 1976).
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affected by their level of "bureaucratization." That is, 
as an agency progresses through its "life cycle" and becomes 
increasingly structured, its responses to constituency pre­
ferences varies. At the point of agency creation, the gen­
eral public is more attentive and the underdeveloped organi­
zation has established fewer obstacles to responsiveness. 
Thus :
Hypothesis 1: The combination of a crisis environ­
ment, attentive publics, and evolving agency rules 
and procedures will provide an initial period of 
high FEA responsiveness to public opinion.
However, as public agencies have become more rigidly
organized, and as general public attention has eroded with
time, there has been a tendency for such organizations to
turn to organized "clients" for support. This leads to a
second hypothesis;
Hypothesis 2: Increased emphasis on task speciali­
zation, professionalism, impersonality, and hierar­
chy will decrease the FEA's responsiveness to public 
opinion and increase its responsiveness to group 
demands.
FEA Responsiveness to Public Opinion 
A chronic problem for any agency seeking to deter­
mine the public's reaction to government programs is the 
limited attention people give to most administrative poli­
tics. Francis Rourke has observed that:
Actually, only a comparatively few agencies carry on 
functions that have a high degree of visibility for 
the general public. An agency like the FBI, which 
has been performing a draimatic role in American life 
for several decades, does command a broad pattern of
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public support that stretches throughout all strata 
of society . . . But the power of publicity, even 
in America, is not boundless, and an agency whose 
activities do not match the FBI's in intrinsic dra­
matic appeal will not equal it in public esteem no 
matter how assiduously it carries on public rela­
tions activity.3
For a time, during the height of the energy crisis, the FEA 
did manage to capture the national political limelight. 
However, as Tables 29, 30, and 31 show, an extensive FEA 
public never really developed. While there was initially 
some growth in the public's awareness that the federal gov­
ernment had established an agency responsible for energy 
policy (Table 29), especially among higher-income and 
college-educated segments of the population (Table 30), this 
trend peaked in late 1974 and has decreased in the months 
since. In addition, even among those who are aware of the 
existence of a federal energy agency, the number who are 
able to cite the FEA has never been more than six percent 
(Table 31). Moreover, specific FEA public relations pro­
grams, such as the attempts to encourage energy conservation 
through advertising slogans ("Don't Be Fuelish," etc.) have 
achieved only moderately high recognition levels among the
4
general public.
These data suggest that any analysis of the relation­
ship between overall energy policy and public opinion
^Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public 
Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 13.
4
Opinion Research Corporation, Highlight Report 
Volume IX, pp. 25-27.
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TABLE 29
PUBLIC AWARENESS OF A FEDERAL ENERGY AGENCY,
1974-1975
Period
An Agency 
Has Been 
Established
No Agency 
Has Been 
Established
Don't 
Know
Aug. 21 - 
Sep. 15, 1974 34% 20% 46%
Sep. 30 - 
Oct. 13, 1974 42 10 28
Oct. 28 - 
Nov. 10, 1974 35 21 44
Feb. 10 - 
Mar. 9, 1975 31 28 41
Mar. 10 - 
Apr. 6, 1975 24 29 47
SOURCE : 
Public Attitudes
Opinion Research Corporation, General 
and Behavior Regarding Energy Saving,
Highlight Report Volume X, p. 8.
274
TABLE 30
AWARENESS OF A FEDERAL ENERGY AGENCY, 
BY SUBGROUPS, 1975
An Agency No Agency
Has Been Has Been Don't
Subgroup Established Established Know
Total Public 24% 29% 47%
Men 32 30 38
Women 16 29 55
Less Than High
School € 38 56
High School 24 38 48
Some College 46 22 32
Income Under
$10,000 14 30 56
$10,000-$15,000 29 30 41
Over $15,000 39 28 33
SOURCE : Opinion Research Corporation, General
Public Attitudes and Behavior Regarding Energy Saving,
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TABLE 31
PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE FEA,
1974-1975
Period
Percent
Asked*
Cited
FEA
Cited
Other
Don't
Know
Aug. 21 - 
Sep. 15, 1974 34% 6% 3% 24%
Sep. 30 - 
Oct. 13, 1974 42 6 3 33
Feb. 10 - 
Mar. 9, 1975 31 3 3 25
Mar. 10 - 
Apr. 6, 1975 24 5 2 16
*Asked only of those who responded that the 
federal governnent had established an agency responsible 
for energy policy (see Tables 29 and 30).
SOURCE: Opinion Research Corporation, General
Public Attitudes and Behavior Regarding Energy Saving, 
Highlight Report Volume X, p. 9. ^
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probably cannot be attributed to the FEA. That is, 
generalizing from the public's concern with energy as a 
policy issue or its rating of an Administration's handling 
of energy problems does not necessarily reflect parallel 
opinions of the FEA, given the low recognition factors cited 
above. Thus, polls which show increasing distrust of the 
federal government in energy policy and decreasing satisfac­
tion with steps taken to achieve energy self-sufficiency, 
for example, cannot be attributed to any one agency.
Despite these limitations, there are a number of specific 
policy areas where opinion data is available in which only 
the FEA has administrative authority. These include such 
key issues as the deregulation of price controls, the regu­
lation of production and utilization sectors of energy pol­
icy, the regulation of corporate profits, import controls, 
competition in the energy industry, and the regional distri­
bution of fuels. These policy issues form the basis for the 
analysis of FEA responsiveness to public opinion in the dis­
cussion below.
At first, the public's attitudes toward price con­
trols on petroleum and its products were fairly accurately 
reflected in FEO/FEA policies. Immediately following the 
1973 energy crisis, public opinion generally supported the 
existing federal controls. A nationwide Gallup survey in 
November-December 1973, for example, found that 49 percent 
of the public said the regulations were "about right,"
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while 39 percent thought the rules should be made stricter
and only six percent responded that they were too strict.
As Gallup concluded:
The willingness of many Americans to comply with 
the proposed controls set forth by President Nixon 
in his late November speech to the nation is con­
sistent with earlier findings which have shown the 
public to be willing to make sacrifices for the 
national good in times of crisis.^
Although a standby gasoline rationing plan was 
announced by the FEO in early 1974, Gallup polls in both 
January and February of that year found sizable majorities 
opposing rationing as a method of distributing supplies.
FEO chief William Simon reflected this view, saying that 
rationing would not work and would "put a great many rigid­
ities in a very complex economy."^
However, by mid-1974, when the FEA began to move 
toward advocacy of a decontrol policy, the agency's actions 
increasingly deviated from the dominant public opinion.
For example, during the period when the FEA was attempting 
to incrementally exempt fuels from the existing regulations 
(July-September 1974), a Harris survey found only 28 per­
cent of the public in favor of deregulation of oil (42
"Few Find Energy Controls Too Strict; Wide Com­
pliance Found," Gallup Opinion Index 103 (January 1974): 8.
See also "Public Spreads Blame for Current Energy Shortages,' 
Gallup Opinion Index 104 (February 1974): 4-5.
^"Americans Would Reject Gas Rationing Legislation," 
Gallup Opinion Index 105 (March 1974): 9-10.
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percent opposed such a policy and 30 percent were "not 
sure").^ Even more striking was the August 1974 survey con­
ducted by Cambridge Survey Research which showed 71 percent 
holding the view that there should be no price increase to
p
encourage domestic exploration and production. This ran 
absolutely counter to FEA officials' statements before Con­
gress during the hearings on extending the Emergency Petro­
leum Allocation Act (see Chapter V).
As the impact of the energy crisis faded and the 
Administration (and the FEA) pressed for an end to the emer­
gency controls in late 1974, public opinion continued to 
resist the return of petroleum or its products to "free 
market" conditions. Opinion Research Corporation, in Octo­
ber 1974, wrote that:
Generally, the public are opposed to increasing the 
price of anything. They do not see the pricing 
mechanism as a rationing mechanism, and they appar­
ently would rather be coerced to save energy in 
other ways (rationing) rather than to be coerced by 
higher prices.9
Tables 32 and 33 reflect the continuing preference by a
large portion of the American public for energy policies
^Richar# Corrigan, "The Public Attitude Toward 
Price Controls," National Journal Reports 7 (August 30, 
1975): 1250. ----
O
"Energy No Longer Viewed as Nation's Top Problem,' 
National Journal Reports 8 (April 3, 1976): 443.
9
Opinion Research Corporation, Highlight Report 
Volume V, p. 20.
TABLE 32
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD GASOLINE PRICING POLICY, 1974-1975
Preferred Way To Deal With Shortages
Subgroup
Substantially 
Higher 
Prices, But 
Unlimited 
Availability
Maintain 
Ga s 
Prices, But 
Rationing
Somewhat 
Higher 
Gas Prices, 
But Limited 
Availability
No
Answer
Oct.
1974
Jan.
1975
Oct.
1974
Jan.
1975
Oct.
1974
Jan.
1975
Oct.
1974
Jan.
1975
Total Public 15% 17% 45% 47% 24% 25% 16% 11%
Less Than 
High School 16 13 42 56 14 17 28 14
High School 16 25 47 40 28 26 9 9
Some College 13 20 47 36 33 41 7 3
Income Under 
$10,000 16 NA 44 NA 19 NA 21 NA
$10,000-$15,000 16 NA 56 NA 21 NA 7 NA
Over $15,000 11 NA 40 NA 39 NA 10 NA
SOURCE; Opinion Research Corporation, General Public Attitudes and 
Behavior Regarding Energy Saving, Highlight Report Volume V, p. 20; Volume 
VI, p. 5, and Volume VII, p. 21.
ts>
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TABLE 33
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD GASOLINE RATIONING, 1975
Most Effective Way To Solve The Energy Problem
Subgroup Rationing
Raising
Prices Other
No
Answer
Jan. Feb. Jan. Feb. Jan. Feb. Jan. Feb.
Total Public 58% 51% 27% 32% 8% 7% 7% 10%
Income Under 
$10,000 60 51 25 29 7 6 8 14
$10,000-$15,000 54 56 30 31 10 9 6 4
Over $15,000 56 49 30 40 10 5 4 6
SOURCE; Opinion Research Corporation, General Public Attitudes and 
Behavior Regarding Energy Saving, Highlight Report Volume VIII, p. 5.; and 
Volume IX, p. 15.
ro
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other than price increases. When asked what way they would 
choose to deal with future severe energy shortages, fully 
45 percent responded in favor of rationing as early as 
October 1974. Three months later, this portion had in­
creased slightly (Table 32). Even stronger preferences in 
favor of rationing were found when the question was framed 
in terms of finding the most effective solution to the 
energy problem. Table 33 shows that rationing was favored 
by clear majorities in both January and February 1975, 
although there was some increase in those supporting price 
increases in the latter survey. This data also reveals the 
fact that opposition to the FEA's stance at this time came 
increasingly from the lower-educated and lower-income seg­
ments of the public.
Opinion on pricing policy began to change signifi­
cantly in mid-1975, as is demonstrated by Table 34. Accord­
ing to the Roper Public Opinion Research Center:
The American public has been leaning in favor of 
gasoline rationing as a conservation measure, but 
when it comes down to either paying 10 cents more 
per gallon or being limited to 10 gallons a week, 
opinion shifts in favor of paying more per gallon.
Thus, by a margin of 48 percent to 37 percent (with 10 per­
cent choosing "neither" alternative and five percent
"Moderate Price Boost Preferred Over Gas Ration­
ing," Current Opinion 3 (May 1975): 41.
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TABLE 34
PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING 
GASOLINE PRICING, 1975
Way to Reduce Gasoline Consumption
Price No
Subgroup Rationing Increase Neither Opinion
National 37% 48% 10% 5%
Male 38 48 10 4
Female 36 48 10 6
White 39 47 10 4
Non-White 29 53 9 9
East 44 43 9 4
Midwest 35 51 10 4
South 34 49 10 7
West 38 50 8 4
SOURCE : "Moderate Price Boost Preferred Over
Gas Rationing," Current Opinion 3 (May 1975): 41.
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registering "no opinion"), the public favored the FEA's 
solution to the fuel distribution dilemma. Significantly, 
the "non-white" sector of the population accounted for much 
of the shift toward the pricing option.
Finally, in August 1975, public support for deregu­
lation of all oil produced domestically underwent a complete 
turnaround from its position twelve months before. A Harris 
poll, shown in Table 35, found a 54 percent majority in 
favor of deregulation if it would encourage domestic oil 
production. According to the Harris organization:
Close to two in every 10 people admit that they have 
changed their minds on the energy decontrol issue. 
They give three major reasons:
-Deregulation will bring in more production at home 
and eventually bring prices down.
-With decontrol we will encourage rather than dis­
courage exploration for new oil and natural gas.
-By encouraging exploration at home we can move 
toward less dependence on Middle East Oil.
Although these results lead to the conclusion that
the FEA has successfully influenced public opinion on the
pricing/deregulation issue of the last two years, there is
doubt among some observers of the validity of this data. As
S. David Freeman, former Director of the Ford Foundation's
Energy Policy Project, concluded of the Harris poll:
That's kind of a slanted question. I'm sure that 
you can frame a slightly different question and get 
the answer going the other w a y . 12
^^"Public Favors Deregulation of Oil," Current 
Opinion 3 (September 1975) : 82.
^^Corrigan, p. 1250.
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TABLE 35
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD 
OIL DEREGULATION, 1975
Period
Favor
Deregulation
Oppose
Deregulation
Not
Sure
July 1974 28% 42% 30%
April 1975 46 31 23
July 1975 54 22 24
SOURCE: "Public Favors Deregulation of Oil,"
Current Opinion 3 (September 1975): 82.
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Regardless of the problems with this particular poll, 
however, it does appear as if on the issue of oil pricing 
the FEA has not exhibited a high degree of responsiveness 
to public opinion. Instead, the agency has apparently had 
a role in shaping the attitudes to which it is supposed to 
be responsive.
Public opinion regarding the more general FEA regu­
latory activities— control of imports, production, and pro­
fits, for example— has been mixed. While there has been 
widespread support for the FEA's overall goal of reducing 
U.S. dependence on foreign oil— in January 1975, a Gallup 
poll found 74 percent of the people in favor of trying to 
become energy self-sufficient^^— the public has nevertheless 
been divided on the issue of using imports as solutions to 
shortages. For example, in September 1974, a majority (58 
percent) of those surveyed approved of imports as supply 
sources. As Opinion Research Corporation analyzed these 
results;
There is general public support for virtually any 
method of increasing supply when the method is 
stated without any accompanying negative effect such 
as more pollution or higher prices.^4
Richard Corrigan, "A Decision at the Polls May Not 
Hinge on the Price at the Pump," National Journal Reports 8 
(April 3, 1976): 443. An Opinion Research Corporation poll
in late 1974 had found 64 percent of the public expressing a 
belief that the U.S. could become energy self-sufficient.
See Highlight Report Volume VI, p. 12.
14Opinion Research Corporation, Highlight Report 
Volume I, p. 14.
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By January 1975, however, the public had begun to turn 
against the policy of allowing more imports into the country 
through the import fee system than the oil import quotas had 
permitted. Table 36 shows that 50 percent of those polled 
did not think that more oil should be brought in to allevi­
ate energy shortages. Administration policy soon reflected 
an identical perception and position— in February 1975, the 
first supplemental fee was imposed on foreign imports (see 
Chapter V). Thus, FEA actions in the petroleum import pol­
icy area appear to have generally been responsive to unar­
ticulated public opinion.
The information in Table 36 also indicates, however, 
that public attitudes toward greater federal intervention 
into traditionally private decisionmaking spheres went far 
beyond the FEA's existing roles. Clear majorities favored 
federal regulation of production and greater federal involve­
ment in oil exploration activities, for example. Moreover, 
almost half those surveyed supported federal regulation of 
energy use. Toward these attitudes the FEA has not been 
responsive. In fact, rather than expanding its regulatory 
reach over the oil industry, the agency, in mid-1975, pro­
posed the implementation of a more limited, standby alloca­
tion program to replace the existing system. According to 
FEA Administrator Zarb, such a program would more adequately
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TABLE 36
PUBLIC OPINION 
TO ENERGY
REGARDING 
SHORTAGES,
SOLUTIONS
1975
Solution to Shortage Favor Oppose
No
Opinion
The Federal Government 
should become involved 
in exploration for oil. 66% 26% 8%
The Federal Government 
should regulate energy 
production. 55 36 9
The Federal Government 
should regulate energy 
use. 48 45 7
More oil should be 
imported from foreign 
countries. 43 50 7
SOURCE: Opinion Research Corporation, 
Public Attitudes and Behavior Regarding Energy
General
Saving,
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respond to an economy which was no longer handicapped by 
energy shortages.
One exception to this trend away from broadening 
the scope of its regulatory authority over the private sec­
tor has been the FEA's willingness to go along with the 
strong public opinion favoring government control of cor­
porate profits. In the very first days of the EEC, Assis­
tant Administrator John Sawhill noted that while the agency 
favored higher prices for certain fuels in order to reduce 
demand, the FEO was committed to guard against windfall pro­
fits by energy corporations.*® Even before the FEA came to 
advocate the decontrol of all crude prices in conjunction 
with a windfall profits tax (in mid-1974), the agency had 
given as a primary rationale for the crude oil entitlements 
program the fact that requiring refiners to run proportion­
ately equal shares of controlled crude would equalize costs 
without increasing company profits. FEA advocacy of a wind­
fall profits tax solidified in 1975, so that Deputy Admin­
istrator John Hill could tell Congress:
Our analysis, confirmed with a number of small and 
independent refiners, indicates that rapid enactment 
of a windfall profits tax would be enough to assure 
the competitive viability of efficient small and
See "Statement of Frank G. Zarb, Administrator, 
Federal Energy Administration," before the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, May 19, 
1975 (mimeographed), pp. 1-7.
^®See "The Energy Czars Test Their Muscle," Business 
Week, December 15, 1975, p. 21.
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independent refiners. This in itself would go far 
to assure continued supplies of product to indepen­
dent marketers since they get much of their supply 
from small and independent refiners.
This position is compatible with the data presented in 
Tables 37 and 38, which illustrate public support for gov­
ernmental control of company profits in general, and oil 
company profits in specific, across political party lines. 
According to Opinion Research Corporation:
. . . there is majority support for a government 
ceiling on profits. Data from other ORC surveys 
indicate that the vote in favor of Government con­
trol of profits has risen dramatically over the 
last few years . . . The call for restriction of 
oil company profits is even more widespread. As has 
been the case since Wave 5 (May 1974) when this 
question was first posed, over seven people in ten 
favor restriction of oil company p r o f i t s . 18
Chapters VII and VIII pointed out the difficulties the FEA 
has experienced in administering pricing and allocation pro­
grams equitably across geographical regions. Not only have 
there been problems in the distribution of FEA compliance 
and enforcement personnel among the various regions, but the 
agency has had only limited success in equitably distribut­
ing different fuels. Initially, most of the complaints 
received by FEO regional offices were from the retail sector 
of the petroleum industry, primarily in the East Coast
"Statement of John A. Hill, Deputy Administrator, 
Federal Energy Administration," before the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, September 
4, 1975 (mimeographed), pp. 16-17.
18
Opinion Research Corporation, Highlight Report 
Volume IX, pp. 5-6.
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TABLE 37
PUBLIC OPINION ON GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
OF COMPANY PROFITS, 1975
Response
Total
Public Republicans Democrats
Government should
limit profits 55% 52% 61%
Companies should 
be allowed to 
make all they 
can. 36 44 31
No opinion 9 4 8
SOURCE: 
Public Attitudes
Opinion Research Corporation, General 
and Behavior Regarding Energy Saving,
Highlight Report Volume IX, p. 5.
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TABLE 38
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD OIL 
COMPANY PROFITS, 1975
Response
Total
Public Republicans Democrats
Federal Government 
should limit oil 
company profits 
during an energy 
shortage. 72% 66% 78%
Oil Companies 
should be allowed 
to make all the 
profit they can 
to encourage 
increased oil 
production. 19 26 16
No opinion. 9 8 6
SOURCE: Opinion Research Corporation, General
Public Attitudes and Behavior Regarding Energy Saving, 
Highlight Report Volume IX, p. SI
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States. The agency's response to demands from both the 
public and industry to "do something" about gasoline short­
ages in early 1974 was to issue emergency allocations to
those states with the worst ratios of supplies to projected 
19needs. In all, 37 states received additional supplies in 
March 1974, raising national gasoline supplies to 89.6 per­
cent of projected demand. Without this FEO action, only 
84.6 percent of demand would have been met.^® However, 
even with the emergency allocations, five eastern states 
(New Hampshire, New Jersey, Vermont, Virginia, and West
Virginia) had only 73 percent of their projected needs in
21February and 85 percent in March. To the protests from
the National Governor's Conference, FED Administrator Simon
responded that the gasoline shortages had been exacerbated
by FEO orders to refiners to focus production efforts on
middle distillates. As Richard Mancke said;
Because, during winter, adequate home heating is 
obviously much more important to human life than 
most automobile travel, the FEO concluded that Amer­
icans would find it least disruptive to reduce their 
consumption of gasoline proportionately more than 
their consumption of distillate fuel o i l s . 22
1 9 See "Long Lines, Short Tempers," Newsweek 83 
(March 4, 1974): 65-66.
^^Timothy B. Clark, "Gasoline Allocation Plans Create 
Political Pressures," National Journal Reports 6 (March 16, 
1974): 397-401. '
22Richard Mancke, Performance of the Federal Energy 
Office (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 8.
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While Mancke is critical of this policy because it did not 
take into account such things as the life style changes which 
reductions in automobile travel meant, the data in Table 39 
shows that the response by the FEO to Eastern and Midwestern 
interests was well founded. Oil heat users in those two 
regions were found more likely to feel that the energy short­
ages had affected them personally and they were also more 
likely to favor government regulation of energy use. Thus, 
the FEO appears to have been responding to some very real 
political considerations in its interregional and interfuel
allocations even if those allocations did not totally resolve
23fuel distribution issues.
FEA Responsiveness to Interest Group Demands
The legislation establishing the FEA made provision 
for the implementation of agency programs "so as to mini­
mize hardship and inequity while assuring that the priority 
needs of the nation arc met." The agency was structured 
to respond to all parties affected by its activities through 
three separate components: the Oil Import Appeals Board
(OIAB), the Office of Special Redress Relief (OSRR), and the 
Office of Exceptions and Appeals (OEA). These three ele­
ments have been oraanized under the Office of Private
23See Victor Cohn, "The Washington Energy Show," 
Technology Review 77 (January 1975): 8 and 68.
24"Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974," Public 
Law 93-275, 15 USC 761, 88 Stat. 96, Section 5(b)(6).
TABLE 39
REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF IMPACTS OF FUEL SHORTAGES 
AND ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
OF ENERGY USE, 1975
Affected by energy Government should
shortages regulate energy use
Great Only a Strongly Strongly
Région deal/some little/None Favor Oppose
Total Public 45% 55% 21% 30%
Midwest, East
Oil heat 53 47 39 20
Electric heat 40 60 23 15
Gas heat 34 66 18 31
South, West
Oil heat 50 50 NA NA
Electric heat 46 54 NA NA
Gas heat 50 50 NA NA
^This is a partial table: "mildly favor," "mildly opposed," and "no
opinion" were omitted.
SOURCE ; Opinion Research Corporation, General Public Attitudes and
Behavior Regarding Energy Saving, Highlight Report Volume VII, pp. 29-30 •
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Grievances and Redress (PGR) in order to combine all
agency "due process" mechanisms under a single administra­
is
tive framework.
The Oil Import Appeals Board analyzes and acts upon 
appeals related to the Mandatory Oil Import Program. Be­
tween April and December 1975, the OIAB decided 73 cases,
24 of vhich were approved (an approval rate of slightly 
less than 33 percent). In each of those cases where an 
appeal was granted, petitioner was an independent firm (no 
major oil company decisions were reported by the OIAB dur­
ing this period). Although data were not available for all 
24 cases regarding business type, product line, and request 
type, the available information suggests that the OIAB, as 
would be expected by its mandate, was responsive to a 
fairly narrow cross-section of the independent petroleum 
industry. Most approved appeals, for example, were awarded 
to resellers of gasoline or crude oil. There was diversity 
among the requests for specific action by the OIAB, however. 
Most successful petitions could not be classified as requests 
for either price or allocation relief— they were often
As of August 1975, the OIAB ceased to be a separate 
entity— its functions were combined with the Office of Excep­
tions and Appeals.
^^Federal Energy Administration, "Public Docket Room 
Listing of Petitions Filed With the Office of Exceptions and 
Appeals, Cumulative to March 12, 1976," pp. 56-57.
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appeals for interim relief pending fee-free import 
27authority.
The Office of Special Redress Relief was intended to 
function as an "extraordinary assistance" mechanism for the 
agency by receiving and responding to grievances related to 
matters under the FEA's jurisdiction for which no other ave­
nues of access were available. As the FEA defines its 
requirements for the OSRR:
. . . the Office of Special Redress Relief does not 
become involved in regulatory case analysis and does 
not serve as a further avenue of appeal from deter­
minations made by the Office of Exceptions and 
Appeals or the Oil Import Appeals Board. It does, 
however, perform a general ombudsman function with­
in FEA, handling those matters for which an appro­
priate regulatory process does not exist and those 
matters in which the regulatory process has failed 
to operate as envisioned by the Federal Energy 
Administration Act of 1974.28
Despite the availability of this broadly-conceived 
feedback mechanism, the OSRR has not been utilized to any 
great extent. Only 15 cases were filed with the OSRR in 
1975, and only five more grievances were processed during 
the first two months of 1976. Most of these cases involved 
requests by independent firms, often resellers of gasoline
See, for example, cases FPI0037 and FPI0038, 
involving Marine Petroleum Company and Power Test Corpora­
tion, in August 1975, in Federal Energy Administration, 
Quarterly Reoort on Private Grievances and Redress. July 1, 
1975 to September 30, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Federal
Energy Administration, 1975), p. 138.
28Federal Energy Administration, Quarterly Report 
on Private Grievances and Redress, July 1, 1974 to September 
30, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Federal Energy Administration,
1974), p. 3.
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or crude oil, for agency réévaluation of specific provisions 
of its regulations. Although only one of the requests for 
special redress was approved, many cases were denied or dis­
missed on the basis that the firms had not yet exhausted the
alternative remedies which were available under the manda-
29tory petroleum allocation and pricing regulations.
The most significant feedback mechanism in the FEA 
is the Office of Exceptions and Appeals. The OEA receives, 
evaluates, and decides "all requests for exception, exemp­
tion, and all appeals filed with the FEA from any regulatory 
or other mandatory requirement administered by the agency 
other than the Mandatory Oil Import P r o g r a m . W i l l i a m  
Cockrell, a former attorney in the OEA, describes the 
rationale behind the exceptions and appeals procedures as 
follows :
Because application of any general regulatory provi­
sion would not yield equitable results in all situ­
ations, an effective and fair regulatory program 
should include a process which provides for excep­
tions to regulatory provisions in appropriate cir­
cumstances. (An exception allows an entity to 
ignore the requirements of a particular regulatory 
provision in particular circumstances). The Office 
of Exceptions and Appeals of the Federal Energy 
Administration . . . has been the primary body per­
forming the functions of considering applications
29See cases FSG002 and FSG003, in which Asiatic 
Petroleum Corporation and Basin, Incorporated were ordered 
to seek other redress.
^^Federal Energy Administration, Organizational 
Structure, January 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1975), p. 2.
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for exception to federal energy regulations 
(involving petroleum products) and making recom­
mendations for Agency action.31
The exceptions and appeals process has proven to be 
important in at least three areas of FEA policymaking:
(1) in reconciling conflicting objectives and procedures in 
the requirements of the crude oil entitlements program;
(2) in reconciling congressional goals in such legislation
as the Small Business act and the energy goals of the EPAA;
and (3) in reconciling the goals of expanding refinery capa-
32city with the goals of crude oil allocation program.
Usually, exceptions relief has been granted only in 
cases of "serious hardship" or "gross inequity." Serious 
hardships have generally been based on the "viability" of a 
firm, using such indicators as competitive pricing, profits, 
revenues, and product costs. Gross inequity, on the other 
hand, is measured more broadly, by the degree to which a 
firm is "uniquely affected" by experiencing a "dispropor­
tionate burden" as a result of the regulation, the degree to 
which regulatory purposes would be distorted by strict 
application of a rule, or the degree to which the rule frus­
trates the attainment of a national policy objective.
William F. Cockrell, Jr., "Exceptions to Federal 
Regulations for Management of the Energy Crisis : The Emerg­
ing Agency Case Law," Oklahoma Lav; Review 28 (Summer 1975): 
530.
^^illiam F. Cockrell, Jr. , "Federal Regulation of 
Energy: Evolution of the Exceptions Process," Administra-
tive Law Review 27 (Fall 1975): 238.
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All OEA determinations, other than dismissals, 
summary denials, and requests for stays, are reviewed by 
the Exceptions and Appeals Review Committee, composed of 
Assistant Administrators and Office Directors. This commit­
tee's decision is the final FEA ruling, from which an appli­
cant can then seek judicial review.
Of the more than 2,700 petitions which have been
filed with the OEA since its establishment, about half
(1,361) were filed in 1975. Almost 59 percent of the 1975
cases were requests for exceptions, and another 28 percent 
34were appeals. Tables 40 and 41 show the distribution of 
successful requests for exceptions and appeals across sec­
tors of the petroleum industry. As these tables illustrate, 
a wide variety of firms had access to the response mechan­
isms of the FEA during 19 75. In the area of responses to 
exceptions requests, the OEA approved 204 of the 801 cases 
filed in 1975 (an approval rate of over 25 percent). Of 
those cases approved. Table 40 demonstrates the attention 
the agency gave to the troubled refinery sector of the 
industry, but retailers, resellers, and other business types
33See Stephen A. Wakefield, "Allocation, Price Con­
trol and the FEA" Regulatory Policy and Practice in the 
Political Arena," Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 21 
(1975): 278-283.
34The other 13 percent of the cases was divided as 
follows: stays (4%); extensions (2%); oil import appeals
(5%); and special grievances (1%). No requests for tempor­
ary stays were filed in 1975.
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TABLE 40 
APPROVED EXCEPTIONS CASES, 1975
Business Type
Product Producers Refiners Retailers Resellers Others
Crude
Oil 8 94 0 3 1
Heating
Oil 0 1 1 16 17
Gasoline 0 0 6 4 2
Diesel
Fuel 0 0 0 0 0
Natural
Gas 0 5 0 1 6
Propane 0 0 5 2 3
Aviation
Fuel 0 0 10 0 1
Rental
Price 0 0 7 1 0
Other 1 2 1 5 1
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, "Public
Docket Room Listing of Petitions Filed With the Office of 
Exceptions and Appeals, Cumulative to March 12, 1976," 
pp. 16-46.
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TABLE 41 
APPROVED APPEALS CASES, 1975
Business Type
Product Producers Refiners Retailers Resellers Others
Crude
Oil 2 26 0 1 0
Heating
Oil 0 0 0 3 2
Gasoline 0 0 4 11 0
Diesel
Fuel 0 0 0 4 0
Natural
Gas 0 2 0 1 6
Propane 0 0 1 3 0
Aviation
Fuel 0 0 4 1 3
Rental
Price 0 0 0 0 0
Other 1 3 2 5 14
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, "Public
Docket Room Listing of Petitions Filed With the Office of 
Exceptions and Appeals, Cumulative to March 12, 1976," 
pp. 1-15.
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were also successful in making their demands upon the OEA.
Moreover, almost all those cases which were approved by the
agency were initiated by independents— only ten petitions
from the ten largest petroleum firms were given exceptions
in 1975.^^ This is probably due in large part to the
restrictive definition of "serious hardship" which the FEA
has applied to exceptions cases. That is, the agency has
applied a standard which requires substantial decreases in
net profits as the only criterion for granting exception
relief. Thus, Cockrell was able to conclude from the 1974
FEA decisions:
A result of the FEA's stringent conception of ser­
ious hardship has been that no major integrated oil 
company has yet received an exception based on 
serious hardship from the FEA. The major oil firms 
have made significant gains in net income in recent 
years, and the FEA has consistently rejected the 
argument sometimes made by the major integrated oil 
companies (as well as small and independent firms) 
that a serious hardship is established if a firm's 
profits would be less if exception relief were 
denied. However, the FEA has extended exception 
relief based on gross inequity considerations to 
the major firms in several instances.36
Appeals case resolution closely paralleled that of
the exceptions process. The agency approved only 99 of the
381 appeals filed in 1975 (an approval rate of 26 percent),
The firms included in the list of the ten largest 
oil companies were: Exxon, Texaco, Mobil, Gulf, Standard of
California, Standard of Indiana, Shell, Continental, Atlantic 
Richfield, and Tenneco. See John E. Gray, Energy Policy: 
Industry Perspectives (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishers, 1975),
pp. 7-8.
^^Cockrell, "Federal Regulation of Energy," p. 22.
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and most of these successful requests were from independent 
companies; the major oil firms succeeded in only 13 appeals 
efforts (an approval rate of 17 percent). Table 41 indi­
cates the response of the agency to a broad spectrum of the 
petroleum industry, but the crude oil refiners and gasoline 
resellers were particularly able to meet FEA criteria for 
the granting of appeals.
Conclusion
The Federal Energy Administration has, since its
creation, been extremely sensitive to public opinion and
industry demands. In fact, one of the major criticisms of
the agency has been that it spends too much time and effort
in self-promotion activities designed to influence both the
37general and attentive publics. However, as the discussion 
above has indicated, the FEA's attention to public relations 
activities has not obscured its efforts to secure a broad 
range of policy feedback. Because of the political visibil­
ity which the energy crisis gave to the FEO in 1973 and early 
1974, the Congress saw a need to structure the FEA with spec­
ial access points to which information could flow from the 
public. In addition, the FEA has enjoyed more freedom from 
the constraints of the Administrative Procedures Act than is 
perhaps typical of most regulatory agencies because the
^^See Karen House, "Energy Agency Spends Much Energy 
to Insure a Long Life, Foes Say," Wall Street Journal 57 
(March 9, 1976): 1.
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Congress eliminated many of the procedural safeguards
against agency abuse of due process. Moreover, the courts
have been "lenient in recognizing the nature of the agency
38and the programs it administers." All these advantages 
have strengthened the FEA's capabilities for responsiveness 
by allowing the agency a fairly broad range of discretionary 
authority within which to select the most appropriate remedy 
for any given situation. The result has been a series of 
energy policies which have generally reflected public opin­
ion on oil imports and government control of oil company 
profits and which have influenced public opinion on matters 
of deregulation of petroleum and its products. The FEA has 
provided a range of avenues for energy industry participants 
to alter energy decisions— options include the Oil Import 
Appeals Board, the Board of Special Redress Relief, and the 
Office of Exceptions and Appeals. Through these access 
points, sectors of the industry, particularly the indepen­
dent refiners and resellers, have been able to secure signif­
icant FEA policy responses. The degree to which these com­
munication patterns have functioned as controls on the FEA's 
performance, however, remains to be ascertained. The sub­
ject of the next chapter is thus the level of responsibility 
exhibited by the FEA as a result of inputs of internal (dis­
cretionary) and external (sanctioned) policy control.
^^Wakefield, p. 279.
CHAPTER X 
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF FEA INPUTS 
Introduction
The degree to which an agency's powers are limited 
by societal controls has been termed the "bureaucratic 
responsibility” criterion for the analysis of public poli­
cies.^ The input responsibility of the Federal Energy
Administration will be assessed in this chapter through the
2
use of the framework developed by Charles Gilbert and out­
lined in Figure 23. Each of the four categories of bureau­
cratic control illustrated by this figure— internal formal, 
internal informal, external formal, and external informal—  
will be applied to the FEA's policy demands and supports in 
order to determine the level of bureaucratic responsibility 
which has been attained.^
^Norman J. Powell, Responsible Public Bureaucracy 
in the United States (Boston: ' Allyn and Bacon, 1 & 6 ,  pp. 
3^ -117.------------
^Charles E. Gilbert, "The Framework of Administra­
tive Responsibility," Journal of Politics 21 (August 1959): 
p. 382.
^For an example of the use of this framework, see 
Robert W. Rycroft, "The Military Reform Movement, 1969-1972; 
The Development of a Bureaucratic Control System," Journal 
of Political and Military Sociology 3 (Fall 1975): 179-189.
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FIGURE 23
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING ADMINISTRATIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY
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SOURCE; Charles E. Gilbert, "The Frame­
work of Administrative Responsibility," Journal 
of Politics 21 (August 1959): 382.
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Research Hypotheses
The FEA's responses to controls on its bureaucratic
power and performance have been complicated by the range of
pressures placed upon the agency during its brief lifespan.
As the previous chapters have illustrated, serious conflicts
have existed between the executive and legislative demands
made on the FEA since 1973. These conflicts have been
exacerbated by the internal personnel and program problems
which have plagued the new agency. Thus, the following
hypotheses regarding bureaucratic responsibility will be
tested in this chapter;
Hypothesis 1: During a crisis situation, the dev­
elopment of internal control mechanisms (both for­
mal and informal) within the FEA will be severely 
constrained.
Hypothesis 2: In a political conflict, in which
the executive has been weakened and the legislature 
is divided, external formal control efforts over 
the FEA will focus on the judiciary.
Hypothesis 3: The early stage of development of
energy interest groups will focus external informal 
control efforts over the FEA on the energy industry.
Responsibility of Internal Informal FEA Inputs 
According to Gilbert, internal informal control 
emphasizes "the moral, representative, and professional" 
aspects of public service as sources of administrative 
responsibility. Included in this category are three sets 
of factors: (1) "moral" controls such as morale, organiza­
tional identification, and loyalty; (2) "representative" 
mirroring of the socio-political characteristics of a group;
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and (3) "functional" responsibility, which includes 
consideration for the "fellowship of science" and other pro­
fessional controls.^
Earlier (in Chapters IV and VI) it was noted that 
the FEO/FEA had suffered from serious personnel and organi­
zational problems, many of which resulted from the tempor­
ary nature of the agency and the unsettled policy situation 
into which it was thrust. A number of these factors have 
contributed to a reduction in the effectiveness of internal 
informal "moral" controls. Difficulties began at the point 
of recruitment of personnel. FEA officials have testified 
to Congress that they faced "severe problems" in recruiting 
and retaining personnel because of the uncertainty regard­
ing the duration of the agency's regulatory authority and 
of the lifespan of the agency itself.^ Retainment of per­
sonnel has proven to be even more difficult than their 
recruitment; the agency's turnover rate of 38 percent is 
one of the highest in the entire federal government.^
^Gilbert, pp. 389-395.
^U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommit­
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, The Federal 
Energy Administration; Enforcement of Petroleum Price Regu­
lations: Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1Ô75), p. 12.
Executive Budget Office Said to Seek Deep Cuts in 
FEA Personnel, Funds for New Law," Energy Users Report 136 
(March 18, 1976): A-32. See also "Bitter Sniping at Simon,"
Time 103 (March 18, 1974): 25; and U.S. Senate, Committee on 
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and 
Procedure, Federal Energy Administration: Enforcement of
Petroleum Price Regulations: Hearings (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 7.
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Morale has apparently fluctuated from a high point during 
the energy crisis, when the nation and the agency had a 
sense of danger and national purpose, to a low point immedi­
ately after the oil embargo was lifted.^
The passive, or "sociological," representativeness 
of FEA personnel was extensively analyzed in Chapter VI, 
where a strong link was hypothesized between the sources of 
origin of bureaucrats (measured by such factors as sex and 
race, for example) and bureaucratic behavior. Active, or 
"responsible," representativeness, in which an administra­
tor is expected to press for the interests of a particular
p
group, was reserved for discussion in this chapter.
From the date of its creation, the FEA has faced a 
problem in securing expertise in such complex areas as 
resource extraction, conversion, and refining while, at the 
same time, assuring administrative responsibility through
9
the strict observance of conflict of interest regulations. 
Thus, the oil industry backgrounds of FEA personnel have
^See "The New Man at FEO," Time 103 (May 6, 1974):
70; and Edward Cowan, "Who Needs the Energy Agency?" New
York Times 125 (May 30, 1976): F-6.
p
See Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public
Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968) , p. IT]
and Arthur D. Larson, "Representative Bureaucracy and Admin­
istrative Responsibility: A Reassessment," Midwest Review
of Public Administration 7 (April 1973): 79-89.
9
See "Nixon Tries Again on Energy Policy," Business 
Week, December 8, 1973, p. 34.
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been a sensitive political issue since 1973. As Richard
Mancke described the dilemma:
Even after raids on other government agencies, few 
of the important staff positions were filled with 
people versed in petroleum matters. Almost no one 
on the staff had the first-hand experience in the 
oil industry that might have prevented FEO's com­
plex pricing and allocation regulations from having 
their frequently undesirable consequences. The 
obvious way to remedy this particular staff weak­
ness would have been to hire experienced people 
from the oil industry. However, because both Con­
gress and the FEO's top leadership feared that 
such employees would unavoidably appear to have 
conflicts of interest, this alternative was not 
politically feasible.10
Eventually, through a selective hiring process and the use 
of advisory committees without "substantive authority," the 
agency was able to obtain the requisite skills to administer 
the allocation programs. But concern over possible con­
flicts of interest reached the point that the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to examine the circum­
stances under which the FEO was using a number of Presiden­
tial Executive Interchange Program. Personnel. The GAO found 
"no indication" that these executives were involved in even 
a "potential" conflict of interest situation.
From the limited data which has been made available, 
it does not appear as if the FEA has been "captured" by the
Richard B. Mancke, Performance of the Federal 
Energy Office (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise"Tnsti-
tute for Public Policy Research), 1975), p. 23.
^^General Accounting Office, Report on the Use of 
Presidential Executive Interchange Personnel With Oil Indus­
try Backgrounds by the Federal Energy Office (Washington, 
D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1974), p. 1.
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oil industry. Depending upon the source of information,
the total number of former oilmen employed by the agency in
early 1974 was between 58 and 90. Of these, approximately
12seven were located in policy-making positions. According 
to the FEO, this small number of people with oil backgrounds 
illustrated the lack of any deliberate policy of hiring pro­
fessionals from the oil industry. These data, while cer­
tainly not refuting the capture hypothesis, are consistent 
with recent research which has shown that "recruiting agency 
personnel from the industry at elite levels is a phenomenon 
that varies widely across agencies and across time within 
agencies.Nevertheless, the perception of an irrespon­
sible relationship between the FEA and the petroleum
12"FEO Reports 58 Former Oilmen Are Among Employ­
ees," Oil and Gas Journal 72 (March 11, 1974): 48; and
Correspondence between Phillip S. Hughes, Assistant Comp­
troller General and Abraham A. Ribicoff, Chairman, Commit­
tee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, re "Staffing of 
the Federal Energy Office," dated March 18, 1974. Accord­
ing to these sources, one assistant administrator, two 
deputy administrators, and four office and division direc­
tors were former oilmen. At least 14 of the former oilmen 
were located in the Office of Policy, Planning, and Regula­
tion.
^^Kenneth J. Meier and John P. Plumlee, "Regulatory 
Administration and Organizational Rigidity," A paper pre­
pared for delivery at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Mid­
west Political Science Association, April 29-May 1, 1976, 
Chicago, p. 8. These authors found that a sample of regula­
tory agencies did not rely upon the rc'ulated industry for 
their personnel as the agency aged. Some agencies, such as 
the Federal Aviation Agency and the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, relied heavily upon the industry initially, but then 
progressively decreased their reliance upon industry as 
time passed.
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industry remains. For example, in testimony before the
Senate's Interior and Insular Affairs Committee in mid-
1975, the Director of the Consumers Union of the U.S. said:
Secret, ex parte contacts with industry in connec­
tion with rulemaking proceedings is one way in 
which FEA has yielded its independence and capabil­
ity for disinterested decisionmaking. The creation 
of, and acquiescence in, apparent conflicts of 
interest is yet another. Consider the now- 
notorious "double dipping" scandal. The details of 
that sordid episode in FEA history have been fully 
laid out in the hearings held by the House Small 
Business Committee last fall, and I shall not reit­
erate them here. IVhat stands out clearly, however, 
is the striking insensitivity of the top officials 
of FEA to the gross impropriety, if not illegality, 
of permitting Mr. Bowen to play so central a role 
in the drafting of price regulations in which his 
former and perhaps future employer, Phillips Petro­
leum, had so significant an economic stake. The 
nominations of Andrew Gibson and Melvin Conant to 
top FEA jobs despite their continuing financial 
interest in the prosperity of the oil industry, 
indicate that FEA has learned little from the 
"double dipping" fiasco. FEA needs the expertise 
that experienced industry hands possess, but there 
are other ways to obtain that expertise without 
building potential conflicts of interest into the 
top decisionmaking levels of the a g e n c y . 14
Thus, the focus of the continuing debate over FEA internal
informal responsibility is intimately tied to the internal
formal controls associated with Presidential appointments
and management.
Responsibility of Internal Formal FEA Inputs
Internal formal inputs stress "direction and con­
trol by the President and via such hierarchical methods as
14U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Oversight— Federal Energy Administration Programs 
(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1975), p.
24.
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budgeting, personnel management, standards and rules of 
procedure, and the structuring and restructuring of formal 
organization."^^ In short, internal formal inputs empha­
size control by the executive through hierarchy and politi­
cal appointments.
The FEO was created during a period in which Presi­
dential politics constrained effective internal formal con­
trols. The Watergate scandal had, by late 1973, so occupied 
the attention of the White House and the entire executive 
branch that Energy Policy Office Director John Love appar­
ently succeeded in gaining access to the President only 
"four or five times" during Love's five month tenure in 
office. Love left Washington complaining bitterly that "It 
has been difficult to try to do anything meaningful and even 
to get the attention of the P r e s i d e n t . W h e n  William 
Simon was appointed FEO Administrator, some order was made 
out of the energy policy chaos, but clearly defined execu­
tive leadership was still lacking. As one unidentified 
IVhite House aide described the problem in early 1974:
Major federal reorganizations normally have taken 
strong, persistent Presidential pressure, combined 
with the backing of influential congressional
^^Gilbert, p. 383.
^^Frank V. Fowlkes and Joel Havemann, "President 
Forms Federal Energy Body With Broad Regulation, Price Con­
trol Powers," National Journal Reports 5 (December 8, 1973): 
p. 1831. See also Juan Cameron, "Reaching for an Energy 
Policy: Years of Drift, Weeks of Panic," Fortune 89
(January 1974): 158.
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leaders. But the situation that has developed in 
this case is almost unprecedented.
Watergate has resulted in an increasingly 
immobilized President, and recently the Administra­
tion has spoken with many voices about what it 
wants on energy reorganization.^^
As a result of this absence of high level supervis­
ion, hierarchical control was limited; there were few clear 
delineations of responsibilities, the delegation of author­
ity was blurred, and performance rewards and sanctions were 
uncertain. The FEO was spread too thin; it attempted to 
do too many things with too few resources. Mancke was out­
lined this early situation as follows;
In its new and still unsettled state, the agency 
especially needed strong day-to-day supervision from 
the top. Unfortunately, its two top officials—  
Administrator William Simon and Deputy Administrator 
John Sav.'hill— could not supply it because they had 
to spend most of their time testifying before con­
gressional committees, pleading with various inter­
est groups, or appealing directly to the American 
people to conserve energy. Because Simon and Saw- 
hill were nearly exhausted by these public relations 
activities, the direction of day-to-day operations 
was frequently left to seven assistant administra­
tors and the general counsel. Most of these men 
were not accustomed to exercising such significant 
power and responsibility. Several knew little about 
energy problems. In the absence of top-level lead­
ership and of established decision-making traditions.
Claude E. Barfield, "Fuel Crisis Management Pro­
duces Reorganization Debate," National Journal Reports 6 
(February 16, 1974): 229-230. See also "Getting It Under
One Roof," Time 102 (December 7, 1973): 29-30. A more
detailed account of the inability of the Nixon Administra­
tion to come to grips with the energy crisis because of 
Watergate and its related scandals is found in Theodore H. 
White, Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon (New 
York; Atheneum, 1975): pp. 352-37Ô.
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these assistants and their nascent staffs 
inevitably spent considerable time jockeying for 
internal p o w e r . 18
After Simon returned to the Treasury Department in 
April 1974 and Sawhill replaced him as "energy czar," Pres­
ident Ford faced a different administrative responsibility 
problem with the FEA: Sawhill began to take energy policy
positions at variance with those voiced by the Administra­
tion. In particular, the FEA chief pressed hard for a more 
vigorous energy conservation effort than had been proposed 
by the President. Sawhill advocated additional gasoline 
taxes c'T 10 to 30 cents per gallon as a conservation and 
anti-inflation measure, and he took his proposal to the 
public, despite orders to fall in line. In addition, the 
FEA Administrator had testified before Congress that the 
U.S. had no short-term energy policy to reduce oil prices—  
an admission that hastened his forced resignation in October 
1974.^ ^
The reassertion of executive control over the 
agency through the removal of the Administrator eventually
18Mancke, pp. 23-23 (emphasis mine). This evalua­
tion is substantiated by a number of other sources. See 
Caroline Mayer, "FEO Will Steer Different Course Under Saw­
hill," Oil and Gas Journal 72 (April 29, 1974): 16-17; and
"Energy1 A Rivalry for Power," Time 104 (September 23,
1974): 81-82.
19Richard Corrigan, "Revolving Door for Energy Czars,' 
National Journal Reports 6 (November 9, 1974): 1693, "The
Gentlemanly Sacking of Sawhill," Time 104 (November 11,
1974): 61-62; and Victor Cohn, "The Washington Energy
Show," Technology Review 77 (January 1975): 8 and 68.
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only added to the confusion, however. In part, this was 
because there was a continued struggle for energy policy 
power within the Administration between, among others. 
Interior Secretary Rogers Morton, Office of Management and 
Budget's Roy Ash, and Simon (who was Treasury Secretary by 
this time). But primarily, the attempt to implement 
internal formal controls failed because it was discovered 
that the President's first nominee to succeed Sawhill,
Andrew Gibson, could have been guilty of a serious conflict 
of interest had he become FEA head. Gibson's problem was 
a dual one. On the one hand, Gibson would have continued 
to receive severance pay— one million dollars over a ten 
year period— from his old company. Interstate Oil Transport 
Company, which he then would have been responsible for regu­
lating at the FEA. On the other, as former Maritime Admin­
istrator, Gibson was vulnerable to charges of conflict of 
interest in the awarding of tanker construction contracts 
to his old c o m p a n y . N o  sooner had the executive’s posi­
tion vis-a-vis the agency been weakened by the necessity of 
withdrawing Gibson's name in favor of the new nominee, Frank 
Zarb, than the Administration was challenged on another high 
level FEA appointment. Melvin Conant had been nominated to
Morton Will Determine Energy Policy," National 
Journal Reports 6 (November 2, 1974): 1654-1656.
^^Louis M. Kohlmeier, "Choice of Gibson Could Be 
Controversial," National Journal Reports 6 (November 9, 
1974): 1694; and "Appointments: Rushed Job," Economist
253 (November 16, 1974): 68.
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an Assistant Administrator post in the agency when it was
disclosed that he had received a $90,000 severance payment
from Exxon Corporation prior to entering government service.
Although Conant was confirmed in a close Senate vote, the
incident added to the perception of the FEA as an agency
which was "controlled not by the public but by the very
22companies that are to be regulated."
Although internal formal controls appear to have 
stabilized and become more effective since Zarb became FEA 
administrator, problems continue to exist. Foremost among 
these difficulties is the coordination bottleneck between 
the agency’s headquarters office and the regional offices, 
as described in Chapter VII. In large part, this and other 
breakdowns of organizational hierarchy, which continue to 
plague responsible energy policy administration, are the 
results of the inability of the last two Administrations to 
formulate and communicate a national energy policy to agen­
cies such as the FEA.
Responsibility of External Informal FEA Inputs
Public participation in the administrative process 
comprises what Gilbert has termed "external informal" 
efforts to assure administrative responsibility. Included 
in this category are such factors as "experiments in
22Mark Barbash, "Energy in Bondage," Progressive 39 
(April 1975); 7. -------
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interest-group representation, citizen participation, and
'grass roots democracy,' or the less planned interplay of
23organized groups and administrative agencies."
In the case of the Federal Energy Administration, 
the two primary avenues through which the public has been 
allowed to participate in decisionmaking have been by the 
indirect impact of public opinion (discussed in Chapter IX) 
and through the direct mechanism of the advisory committee.
As recently as the 1940s, the advisory board of 
committee was a rarely utilized arrangement for allowing 
consultation and communication between interest groups and 
the bureaucracy.^^ However, in recent years such organiza­
tions have flourished. According to one analyst:
The popularity of these committees or boards may lie 
in their being all things to all men. Some con­
gressmen, for example, see them as watchdogs, pro­
tecting the public's interests against the bureau­
crats . . . The administrator, on the other hand, 
has his own reasons for creating public advisory 
boards. He may regard his board as a means of win­
ning countrywide support— a built-in lobby of enor­
mous potential . . . .  The members of an advisory 
board, on their part, have reasons for wanting to 
service. It is, of course, an honor to be asked to 
advise a high government official. Many are moti­
vated by a sense of public duty. But many others 
have causes to promote and interests to pursue . . . .25
^^Gilbert, p. 384.
^^Powell, p. 126.
^^Lyle E. Schaller, "Is the Citizen Advisory Commit­
tee a Threat to Representative Government?" Public Adminis­
tration Review 24 (September 1964): 179.
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In the legislation establishing the FEA, provision
was made for the utilization of advisory committees which
were "reasonably representative of the various points of
2 6view and functions of the industry and users." The agen­
cy has in fact created a diverse range of advisory groups 
which cover almost every FEA activity. Committees have 
been formed to represent various industry types (such as 
LP gas, coal, electric utilities, or food production, for 
example). Interest groups are represented by both the Con­
sumer Affairs/Special Impact Advisory Committee and the 
Environmental Advisory Committee (EAC). State regulatory 
interests have input into FEA decisionmaking through their 
own group, as do certain regional interests (as in the North­
east Advisory Committee, which was established because of the 
unique nature of energy problems and interests in that 
area)
Ifhile these bodies have been organized in order to 
secure the broadest possible spectrum of political partici­
pation and appear to function in most cases, two fundamental 
problems have developed with this set of bureaucratic
2 6"Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974," 
Public Law 93-275, 15 USC 761, 88 Stat. 96, Section 17(a).
27See "New Energy Finance Advisory Committee To 
Hold First Meeting June 18," Federal Energy News, June 2, 
1976- p. 1; and "FEA's Consumer Affairs/Special Impact 
Advisory Committee To Meet in Dallas," Federa1 Energy News, 
July 13, 1976, p. 1, as examples of the periodic notices 
which the FEA publishes regarding advisory committee meet­
ings and participants.
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Controls. First, some interest groups have complained that 
their own limited resources constrain their ability to 
actively participate through these external formal avenues. 
The Consumers Union of the U.S. , for example, has told the 
Congress:
. . . it is important for this Committee to recog­
nize that the degree of consumer participation in 
most FEA proceedings is essentially nil, and that 
all of the FEA advisory committees, press releases, 
and good intentions cannot change that lamentable 
fact. Consumers Union, for example, is the largest 
consumer organization in the United States and yet 
its total advocacy staff consists of three lawyers 
in Washington. And FEA is only one of the numerous 
agencies with important consumer impacts whose 
activities we seek to monitor. Needless to say, 
other consumer organizations, unless they are pre­
pared to focus a substantial portion of their scant 
resources on FEA matters, will play even less of a 
role in influencing FEA p o l i c y . ^8
The second major difficulty is that even if groups 
are successful in aggregating and articulating their inter­
ests in the policy forums provided by an agency, there is 
absolutely nothing which guarantees that recommendations 
will be heeded. As an example of this limitation on exter­
nal informal bureaucratic controls, the FEA's EAC recently 
threatened a mass resignation if their policy comments con­
tinued to be ignored by the agency. In response, the FEA 
moved to assure committee members that their advice would 
become part of the agency's decisionmaking process, but the
28U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Oversight, pp. 21-22.
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incident serves to spotlight the debatable influence of
29many advisory committees.
Responsibility of External Formal FEA Inputs
The principal means to secure responsible bureau­
cracy have been the external formal emphases upon congres­
sional direction and control and the "rule of law" through 
adjudication by the courts. The legislative branch has 
input into bureaucratic policymaking because:
Through statute Congress may establish the admin­
istrative framework of an agency, including its 
organizational structure, the nature of the over­
sight to be exercised by the courts, the character 
of its personnel and material resources, and even 
build barriers to bureaucratic activities . . .30
The judiciary has a less significant, but nonethe­
less instrumental, role. Through judicial review, courts 
provide avenues for appeals of bureaucratic action. This 
is particularly the case with regard to regulatory agencies 
such as the FEA, "since their decisions may have so negative 
an effect upon the constitutionally protected rights of 
individual citizens to life, liberty, and property.
Congressional control over the FEA may be measured 
in a number of ways : growth rate in agency appropriations,
29See "Energy/Environment Advisers," Energy Today 3 
(April 29, 1976): 126-127.
^^Powell, p. 49.
^^Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and 
Public Policy (Boston: Little^ Brown, 1969), p. 141
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growth rate in agency personnel, and percent of
32appropriations requested that are received. In addition, 
the congressional votes related to agency activities pro­
vide an indicator of legislative support or opposition to 
FEA policies.
In Chapters VI and VII, it was noted that the FEA's 
budget and personnel levels have increased rapidly since the 
rgency’s creation. In terms of budget appropriations, the 
FEA has been expanded from its FY 1975 level of approxi­
mately $130 million to a current level of about $200 million 
— a growth rate of 35 percent. In addition, some analysts
have predicted a further expansion of the agency's budget,
33perhaps to as much as $440 million. Because of the uncer­
tainty surrounding the lifetime of many of the FEA's pro­
grams, not to mention that of the agency itself, the agency 
has been forced to rely upon supplementary requests for 
funds. However, in each case, the FEA has succeeded in 
gaining more funding than was initially requested. For 
example, in FY 1976, the President initially requested only 
$112 million for the FEA, based on the assumption that the 
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) would expire on 
schedule. When, in fact, the EPAA was extended, the agency 
requested an additional $148 million. Eventually, the
32See Meier and Plumlee, pp. 7-8.
^^Karen E. House, "Getting Entrenched: Energy
Agency Spends Much Energy to Insure a Long Life, Foes Say," 
Wall Street Journal 57 (March 9, 1976): 1.
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budget was expanded to the $200 million limitation 
authorized by the Federal Energy Administration Act.
The growth in the FEA’s budget is reflected in per­
sonnel statistics as well. The agency has grown from less 
than 1900 employees (during the days of the FEO) to its 
current level of over 3400 persons in two years. This is 
a growth rate of 44 percent for 1974 and almost six per­
cent for 1975.
These funding and manpower data seem to support the
generally accepted theory of the "life cycle" of political
34support for regulatory agencies. According to this theory, 
initially, in almost any agency's "youth," congressional 
support is high and appropriations are secured with minimal 
difficulties. In the case of the FEA, the emergency atmos­
phere surrounding the energy crisis and the agency's birth 
facilitated this process. Although opposition to the organ­
ization did exist and attempts were made to cut the budget 
for the FEA's regulatory programs as early as 1974, the EPAA 
extension and the large increases in spending for conserva­
tion programs more than offset any reductions in other 
areas. If the "life cycle" theory holds, however, as the 
agency ages congressional support becomes more difficult to 
maintain and budgets begin to level off or decline. Usu­
ally, this process requires four to eight years of growth.
34Meier and Plumlee, pp. 1-3.
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Since the tenure of the FEA has not been that lengthy, one 
can only hypothesize about the future of external formal 
congressional controls. However, there are indicators, in 
the votes of the Congress on key FEA-related energy legis­
lation, that the agency has been losing support in the 
legislative branch.
The act which created the FEA in May 1974 (PL 93- 
275) was passed with huge margins in both the House (353 
voting in favor, 20 voting against) and the Senate (by an 
86-2 margin). By mid-1975, however, FEA-related legisla­
tion was not attracting such widespread support. The bitter 
debate over the extension of the EPAA, documented in Chapter 
V, was only the first evidence of a reassertion of congres­
sional controls over energy regulatory policies. The Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, with its controversial 
provisions for extending price controls over a 40 month per­
iod, passed the House only by a 236-160 margin and the Sen­
ate by 58-40. Finally, the congressional debate on the 
extension of the FEA itself (HR 12169) has been so protracted 
that the agency's legislative mandate actually expired on 
July 30, 1976.^^
Judicial controls on federal administrative activi­
ties, while a "historic bulwark of the American system of 
administrative responsibility," are severely constrained
"Federal Energy Administration Reverts to Federal 
Energy Office; Conferees Accept Bill," Energy Users Report 
156 (August 5, 1976): A-5 to A-7.
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because "judicial remedies are costly and s l o w . P e r h a p s
more importantly, there is a large area of administrative
37behavior which is simply "non-reviewable." In the case 
of the FEA, this area of administrative discretion has been 
expanded beyond the usual boundaries by two events. First, 
the Congress eliminated many of the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedures Act when it created the FEA, in 
order to allow the agency to act more expeditiously and 
with greater flexibility in dealing with the national energy 
crisis. This action, however, "provided for the elimination 
of a number of the procedural requirements normally estab­
lished to provide procedural due process for parties affected
38through the action of administrative agencies." Second, 
the courts have interpreted FEA's regulatory authority very 
broadly. For example, in the case of Condor Operating Com­
pany vs. Sawhill, a temporary emergency court of appeals 
dismissed a challenge to an FEA order by ruling that:
Where the obvious intent of Congress is to give the 
President and his delegates broad power to to what 
reasonably is necessary to accomplish legitimate 
purposes rendered necessary by a recognized emer­
gency, and regulations are fashioned to implement 
the Congressional mandate, the court should not 
interfere with the prerogative of the agency to
^^Powell, p. 74.
^^See Rourke, pp. 142-143.
38Stephen A. Wakefield, "Allocation, Price Control 
and the FEA: Regulatory Policy and Practice in the Political
Arena," Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 21 (1975): 278-
279.
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select the remedy which for rational reasons is 
deemed most appropriate.39
The results of this rationale are outlined by Craig Wagner:
Courts reviewing the allocation plan exhibit an 
extreme reluctance to overturn FEA decisions. Most 
of the available decisions were rendered early in 
the development of FEA's allocation and are colored 
by this time frame. Even so, the effective stan­
dard of review of FEA actions is "whether the deci­
sion of the FEA had a rational basis, given all the 
facts." This standard is probably the least strin­
gent among current standards of judicial review of 
agency action; under it, courts have refused to 
invalidate any FEA crude oil allocation.40
Thus, it would appear as if the judiciary has not exercised
significant external formal controls over the FEA.
Conclusion
The Federal Energy Administration was created under 
circumstances which have made the attainment of bureaucratic 
responsibility extremely difficult. The temporary legisla­
tive mandate of the agency weakened internal morale, organi­
zational identity, and standards of professionalism. These 
problems were compounded by a general lack of Presidential 
direction and control; agency leadership suffered from the 
absence of effective executive management. Thus, internal
39Craig A. Wagner, "National Energy Goals and FEA's 
Mandatory Crude Oil Allocation Program," Virginia Law Review 
61 (May 1975): 928.
40Wagner, p. 927. See also Anthony M. DiLeo, "An 
Introduction to the Mandatory Petroleum Allocation Regula­
tions," Louisiana Bar Journal 22 (September 1974): 117, for
an evaluation of the standard of "rationality." Wakefield, 
pp. 282-283, also analyzes these procedures of the Economic 
Stabilization Act.
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controls on FEA actions did not assure responsible 
behavior. External controls were weakened by this same set 
of factors. In order to allow the agency the maximum dis­
cretionary authority to deal with the energy crisis, both 
the legislature and the judiciary forfeited much of their 
control capability. In this environment, the FEA's list of 
duties has rapidly expanded and many of its actions have 
been poorly bounded and have gone without adequate super­
vision.
Recent trends, however, suggest that some controls 
are being reasserted. Particularly significant have been 
the extensive congressional debates regarding the tenure of 
the FEA and its programs. In addition, the courts may be 
taking a closer look at agency decisionmaking procedures.
As Stephen Wakefield, a former FEA Assistant Administrator, 
predicts: "it is reasonable to assume that future agency
action will be required to undergo far greater inspection 
as to the methods used in arriving at decisions than may 
have occurred in the past.
^Hjakefield, p. 284.
CHAPTER XI
THE FEA IN PERSPECTIVE
This study has had two research purposes: to provide
a description of the legislative-executive policy-making pro­
cesses which led to the establishment of the Federal Energy 
Administration, and to evaluate the bureaucratic policy­
making process of the FEA from its inception until the end of 
1975. The first of these purposes, providing a descriptive 
base for the policy evaluation, was accomplished in Part One. 
Chapter III delineated the characteristics of the energy 
policy-making system; Chapter IV described the creation of 
the FEA; and Chapter V outlined the structure of the manda­
tory fuel allocation and pricing regulations. In combina­
tion, these chapters sketched the external and internal set­
tings within which the FEA must function. This "definition 
of the situation" contains a number of structural factors 
which have both enhanced and constrained the new agency's 
policy-making activities.
Part Two provides the analysis of the FEA's perform­
ance by assessing the: (1) representativeness of FEA
decision-makers (Chapter VI); (2) efficiency and equity of
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FEA policy outputs (Chapter VII); (3) effectiveness of FEA 
policy outcomes (Chapter VIII); (4) responsiveness of FEA 
feedback mechanisms (Chapter IX); and (5) responsibility of 
FEA policy inputs (Chapter X). In each evaluation chapter, 
a number of research hypotheses regarding FEA behavior were 
posited and an effort was made to construct linkages between 
the six evaluative criteria.
This chapter will attempt to give an overall assess­
ment of the FEA's regulatory activities by summarizing the 
most significant situational factors which emerged from 
Part One and by discussing their relationship to the FEA's 
performance. In addition, the most important findings from 
Part Two will be discussed, both in terms of hypotheses 
tested and the links between the various evaluative stan­
dards .
Significant Situational Factors
The setting within which the FEA was placed in 1973 
included at least four characteristics which had major 
impacts on the agency's subsequent attempts to bring coordin­
ation and consolidation to domestic energy policy-making at 
the national level. These situational factors were:
1. Resource scarcity.
2. System instability.
3. Increased participation.
4. Policy fragmentation.
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Resource Scarcity 
Ao was noted in Chapter III, at about the close of 
the 19th century there was a realization that energy 
resources were indeed finite. At that time, energy policy 
began to change from a system of governmental responses to 
individual private claimants to an increasing reliance upon 
compromises among multiple interests, usually accomplished 
through the auspices of governmental oversight. Thus, 
resource scarcity contributed to a change in government's 
basic role in energy policy-making— from a purely passive, 
reactive role to a more active, interventionist one.^
Resource scarcity in the contemporary energy system 
is both a political and a physical phenomenon. That is, it 
is the result of a combination of foreign policy and environ­
mentalism, on the one hand, and over-reliance upon petroleum 
and natural gas as energy resources, on the other. Foreign 
policy considerations, such as the oil boycott by the Organ­
ization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), brought an 
end to cheap, readily available sources of imports for the 
United States, while the environmental movement has placed 
constraints on domestic energy development through legisla-
2
tion such as the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
^Robert S. Gilmour, "Political Barriers to a National 
Policy," Academy of Political Science, Proceedings 31 (Decem­
ber 1973)1 1S6-18Ô.
2
See Frederick R. Anderson, NEPA in the Courts; A 
Legal Analysis of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
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The result has been a simultaneous reduction in those 
domestic and foreign energy resources to which the U.S. has 
easy access. At the same time, certain resources, especially 
oil and gas, have been exploited to such a degree that their 
domestic use exceeds their physical discovery.
The FEA was created to deal with the short-term 
aspects of political resource scarcity; it was designed to 
deal with the temporary dislocations in the energy supply 
system caused by the oil embargo. If the energy crisis had 
been the result of short-term political factors alone, the 
new agency's regulatory performance would perhaps have 
exceeded all expectations. However, many political situa­
tional factors have proven to be anything but temporary phen­
omena. The OPEC cartel continues to remain viable— if any­
thing, its strength has grown, rather than dissipated. And 
the oil consuming nations show little tendency to organize 
to resist further supply interruptions. Moreover, while 
weakened somewhat by the politics of resource scarcity, the 
American environmental movement shows no signs of dissolving. 
Faced with these continuing political difficulties, and with 
the increasing constraint of long-term physical resource 
scarcity, the FEA's attempts to increase domestic energy 
supplies have faltered. In short, the combination of physi­
cal and political resource scarcity have proven to be beyond 
the scope of the FEA's limited authority.
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System Instability 
The end of resource abundance has broken the 
dominance of status quo energy politics at three levels: 
the international energy system, the domestic energy policy­
making system, and the fuel policy subsystems. In interna­
tional energy policy:
. . . the rich countries are bound to use up their 
own fossil fuels and will be forced therefore, to 
rely increasingly on imports from poor countries 
which do not use their fossil fuels themselves but 
export them. This is a situation which is all too 
likely to lead to strains in the international sys­
tem, which so far we seem to have weathered success­
fully but which may have ominous implications for 
the future.3
Thusfar, the FEA's policies with regard to oil 
imports have proven generally inadequate, as Chapter VIII 
indicated. A conflict in policy goals has been evident.
The agency has been caught between the objectives of assur­
ing ample supplies, keeping prices low, and conserving domes­
tic resources (all of which point to continuing relatively 
high levels of imports), and the desire to remove a threat 
to national security and reduce balance of payments deficits 
(goals which call for reducing imports). More than two 
years after the energy crisis, this policy dilemma remains. 
The FEA has been reduced to such stopgap measures as dev­
eloping energy stockpiles as a hedge against future embar­
goes.
^Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Social System and the 
Energy Crisis," Science 184 (April 19, 1974): 255.
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Domestically, resource scarcity has altered many of 
the "rules of the game" in the national energy policy sys­
tem. No longer can either government or industry proceed 
with confidence that well established procedures or roles 
will be observed in the future. Policy alternatives which 
would have been "radical" before 1973 have become matters 
worthy of consideration in the post-boycott period. Most 
significant in this regard have been suggestions to modify 
the traditional public-private interface in energy policy.
In the U.S., the importance attached to the merits 
(both real and symbolic) of "free enterprise" makes any gov­
ernment encroachment into the private sector a fundamental 
policy issue. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
increasingly unstable energy arena. As the society has 
struggled to determine those decisions which should be left 
to market forces and those which should be undertaken by 
administrative actors, the FEA has functioned as a sort of 
"social experiment" in its attempts to allocate scarce 
resources, set energy prices, and assure competition in the 
energy industry. Each of these programs has been controver­
sial, and this controversy has severely constrained FEA per­
formance.
Finally, resource scarcity and the resulting policy 
uncertainty it has generated have contributed to further 
complicating the already complex relationships between the 
five energy policy subsystems, as was discussed in Chapter
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III. Although the policy advisory capabilities of the FEA 
have been enhanced by the breakdown of some barriers between 
subsystems, the regulatory functions of the agency have been 
made more difficult by the growth of "energy conglomerates" 
with multiple resource holdings and interests.
Increased Participation 
As the implications of energy scarcity have been 
communicated to the increasingly unstable energy policy sys­
tem, the number of new partisans demanding access to the 
levers of power has risen rapidly. The pluralism of Ameri­
can energy policy has been reflected in the addition to the 
system of environmental interest groups, a broader range of 
labor unions, and a significant number of international 
actors. This increased participation has been a major fac­
tor handicapping efforts of agencies such as the FEA to 
fully understand and control energy activities. This is 
because, as Roger Noll has determined:
. . . adding more participants to the decision­
making process probably increases resistance to 
change. First, it makes decisions more protracted 
by increasing the amount of information decision 
makers must process and by expanding the number of 
issues to be considered. This reduces the expected 
net gains accruing from a proposal (it pushes the 
benefits further into the future and increases the 
costs of participating in the process by extending 
its duration and the amount of information it 
requires) and thereby reduces the incentive to pro­
pose a change in policy. Second, it increases the 
chance that the rationale for and consequences of a 
change will be identified as uncertain, by adding
335
to the number of perspectives from which information 
supporting the change will be viewed.4
Thus, the FEA has often found itself torn between a range of
parties at interest, each of which may be pressing for the
implementation of any of the conflicting policy goals and
objectives of the executive, legislative and judicial branches
of government, not to mention the pressures exerted by other
energy agencies.
Policy Fragmentation 
Taken together, resource scarcity, system instability, 
and increased participation have produced a fragmented set of 
energy decision-making organizations. This fragmentation of 
functionally related issues and policies is reflected in the 
fact that of the more than 60 federal agencies, bureaus, and 
commissions which have been identified as having a role in 
energy policy-making, at least 40 have regulatory functions.^ 
And at least 27 congressional committees exercise some juris­
diction over energy-related issues.® Further complicating
4
Roger G. Noll, "Information, Decision-Making Proced­
ures, and Energy Policy," American Behavioral Scientist 19 
(January/February 1976): 275. '
®U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Federal Energy Organization (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 8; and William 0. Doub, 
"Federal Energy Regulation— Toward a Better Way," American 
Bar Association Journal 60 (August 1974) : 920.
®James W. Curlin, "Congressional Initiatives in 
Energy Policy," in Walter F. Scheffer, ed., Energy Impacts on 
Public Policy and Administration (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1974), p. 123.
336
this situation is the fact that most of these organizations 
have energy functions only as an integral part of a much 
broader mission. In 1974, the Federal Energy Regulation 
Study Team identified five major deficiencies which are 
associated with decision-making fragmentation: (1) tenden­
cies toward adopting narrow policy perspectives; (2) inflex­
ibility and slow response capabilities; (3) delays, conflicts 
of interest, and decision bottlenecks; (4) no coordination 
across different policy levels; and (5) incomplete, unrelia­
ble, inaccurate, or unavailable information.  ^ To this list 
can be added a tendency to generate conflicting policy goals 
and a reluctance to act at all when choices are unclear or
g
when decisions involve great risk for the decision-maker. 
These differences result, at least in part, from the absence 
at the federal level of any overall coordinating or inte­
grating mechanism which would insure consistency in national 
energy policy. In theory, the FEA could have filled this 
role. But because the President and Congress have been 
either unwilling or unable to institute comprehensive solu­
tions to policy fragmentation problems, the FEA was created
William 0. Doub, Federal Energy Regulation: An
Organizational Study (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1974), pp. 13-19.
g
Monte Canfield, Jr., and Adam E. Sieminski, "If 
You're So Smart, Why Ain't You Rich?— An Analysis of Impedi­
ments to Implementing Energy Conservation in the United 
States," Public Administration Review 35 (July/August 1975): 
324.
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with a temporary legislative mandate and with limited 
executive consolidation and integration capabilities.
Of the many situational factors which have contrib­
uted to the complex mixture of FEA achievements and omis­
sions, none has been more important than the limitation 
imposed on the FEA's ability to successfully implement the 
fuel allocation and pricing regulations by the temporary 
nature of the agency's legislative mandate. The initial 
two-year limit on the agency's tenure and the constant leg­
islative battles over its extension have caused internal 
personnel problems ranging from weakened morale to a leader­
ship which devoted too much time toward justifying agency 
actions to the Congress and the media. On the other hand, 
the FEA's uncertain tenure has been a major factor leading 
to the cautious behavior of the agency in many areas where 
economic regulatory organizations are often seen as "danger­
ous." Unlike most regulatory agencies, the FEA has, since 
1974, exhibited a remarkable pattern of restraint in its 
limited attempts to broaden its regulatory authority. In 
fact, the agency has encouraged, not resisted, deregulation 
of petroleum and its products. Overall, it appears as if 
the bureaucratic behavior of the FEA has been constrained by 
policy fragmentation. But this constraint has had both pos­
itive and negative impacts for energy policy.
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The Performance of the FEA 
The model used in this study considers the energy 
policy-making activities of the FEA as a political process 
composed of five components (decision-makers, outputs, out­
comes, feedback, and inputs) measured by six evaluative cri­
teria (representativeness, efficiency and equity, effective­
ness, responsiveness, and responsibility). Figure 24 illus­
trates the operationalization of these concepts and the 
relative performance of the FEA according to each standard. 
FEA decision-maker representativeness, defined in "passive," 
or "sociological" terms, has three dimensions in this model: 
level, integration, and distribution of minority personnel 
into the bureaucracy. The analysis in Chapter VI indicated 
that on each of these dimensions the FEA could be character­
ized as an unrepresentative agency. For the measurement of 
both outcome efficiency and equity, the model focuses upon 
the overall pattern of agency effort at the point of 
government-community interface. In Chapter VII, the ratio 
of FEA expenditures to effort was found to be inefficient and 
the distribution of effort was found to be inequitable. FEA 
outcome effectiveness evaluates agency goal-attainment accord­
ing to three dimensions based on the sources of organiza­
tional objectives: executive, legislative, and bureaucratic.
The FEA has been largely ineffective in attaining executive 
goals, moderately effective in reaching legislatively man­
dated objectives, and most effective in accomplishing its
FIGURE 24 
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own purposes (see Chapter VIII). Unarticulated public 
preferences and articulated interest group demands are the 
two dimensions evaluated within the general criterion of 
feedback responsiveness. In Chapter IX the FEA was shown to 
be responsive on both these dimensions. Finally, adequate 
bureaucratic controls on the FEA do not exist. The investi­
gation of bureaucratic responsibility in Chapter X pointed 
out the failures of controls on agency activities, regardless 
of the dimensions of form (formal, informal) or location 
(internal, external).
Thus, when a broad range of evaluative criteria are 
applied to the FEA's policies, the agency can be seen to 
have enjoyed a mixture of successes and failures. The fol­
lowing is a more detailed summary of the major conclusions 
which have emerged from the application of the policy evalua­
tion model developed for this study.
Representativeness
The FEA's decision-makers are unrepresentative of 
the general population, especially in the highest, policy­
making positions in the agency. As was hypothesized, both 
the level and the integration of representativeness of the 
FEA were seriously limited by the crisis environment within 
which early staffing efforts had to take place and by the 
conflict of interest problems inherent in the agency's regu­
latory responsibilities. With regard to the distribution of 
FEA representatives, the agency was found to be a "stratified"
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bureaucracy, evidencing some maldistributions of minority 
employees into lower income, status, and responsibility 
occupations. Such maldistributions of representatives are 
typical of the American federal bureaucracy. And they pose 
the traditional threat of an "elite" corps of policy-makers 
who may be insensitive to the problems of lower-income, 
minority groups. Thus, FEA unrepresentativeness may be 
linked to the lack of responsiveness the agency has occas­
ionally demonstrated toward public opinion from the lower- 
income and lower-educated segments of society. An example 
of such a linkage would be the agency's resistance to lower 
class attitudes favoring gasoline rationing over price 
increases.
While the FEA does not mirror the society of which 
it is part, neither, apparently, has it been "captured" by 
any interest group. The analysis of agency responsibility 
uncovered no unusual evidence of oil industry associations 
in the backgrounds of FEA bureaucrats. Therefore, a balance 
of sorts may have been reached in the agency's unrepresenta­
tiveness in both an active and a passive sense.
Efficiency and Equity
The compliance and enforcement efforts of the fuel 
allocation and pricing programs have been both inefficient 
and inequitable. Although much of the inefficiency in the 
FEA's policy outputs can be traced to chronic personnel 
shortages, the agency has been shortsighted and inflexible
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in its attempts to assure compliance with regulations. 
Resource expenditures, in terms of manpower, have been badly 
misallocated, both among regional offices and among compli­
ance programs. And this non-uniformity has led to discrim­
inatory enforcement. Especially troublesome has been the 
impact of this uneven compliance and enforcement effort on 
small, independent oil firms. The FEA's early emphasis on 
retail/wholesale investigations and the overall complexity 
of the allocation and pricing regulations have provided com­
petitive advantages for the larger, integrated "majors."
These policy outputs have combined to limit the degree to 
which the FEA can achieve the legislative goal of maintaining 
a high level of competitiveness in the oil industry. Thus, 
FEA inefficiency and inequity have contributed to constrain 
policy outcome effectiveness.
Effectiveness 
While the FEA has been highly effective in meeting 
its own internal organizational goals, such as agency sur­
vival, and has achieved some of the legislative goals man­
dated by the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, it has not 
been effective in attaining the energy policy goals promul­
gated by the executive. To a great extent, these variations 
in FEA goal-attainment can be traced to the differences in 
breadth and specificity of the energy goals developed by the 
Congress and the President (as was hypothesized). For 
example, the broadly-defined executive goal of "energy
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independence" has been entirely beyond the administrative 
authority of the FEA, while the more limited and specific 
legislative objectives such as insuring industry competition 
and increasing refinery capacity were at least within the 
regulatory scope of the agency. Other sources of variation 
in FEA outcome effectiveness have been the policy conflicts 
between executive and legislative energy goals and the 
internal contradictions within many of these objectives. 
Faced with such a complex range of tasks, the FEA has often 
turned inward to focus upon bureaucratic goals emphasizing 
system maintenance.
Responsiveness 
It was hypothesized that the FEA would initially 
prove to be highly responsive to unarticulated public opin­
ion, but would increasingly respond to articulated group 
demands as its "crisis spotlight" faded. Generally this has 
been the case. The agency has been responsive to feedback 
from both the general public (through polling) and to a wide 
spectrum of the oil industry (through the exceptions and 
appeals process) . But the FEA has devoted almost as much 
of its attention to the manipulation of opinion through its 
public relations apparatus. Particularly on the issue of 
price controls on petroleum and its products, the FEA 
appears to have been more responsible for rather than respon­
sive to public opinion. But despite this public relations 
effort, the FEA has never succeeded in establishing a
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widespread public awareness of either its existence or its 
major energy policy functions. Thus, while the agency has 
developed extensive organizational mechanisms for increasing 
its sensitivity to public preferences, it has still spent 
perhaps too much time and effort in self-promotion activi­
ties and not enough in formulating policy responses.
Responsibility 
The FEA has avoided being captured by its client 
industry, but the temporary nature of the agency's mandate 
has severely hampered efforts to strengthen its independence 
through internal controls. Agency morale, organizational 
identity, and standards of professionalism have been weakened 
by the constant threat of agency termination. When combined 
with the Watergate-weakened executive, internal controls on 
the FEA's performance were limited, as hypothesized. But 
the hypotheses regarding external control mechanisms were 
not substantiated. The petroleum industry and other interest 
groups have apparently made some use of external informal 
control frameworks, but avenues such as the advisory commit­
tee have been of only secondary importance. External formal 
controls have been less stringent than expected— the Congress 
has adequately funded the agency, although legislative sup­
port has eroded since 1973. More significantly, the judic­
iary has placed almost no constraints on FEA rule-making or 
rule-adjudication; the agency has been allowed a remarkable 
level of administrative discretion in its implementation of
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the allocation and pricing regulations. However, recent 
trends point toward a narrowing of this flexibility allowed 
the agency. Both the legislative and judicial branches 
appear ready to impose more restrictions upon the FEA's 
regulatory activities in the future.
Implications for Policy Evaluation 
This study has developed and applied a model for the 
evaluation of public policies which draws heavily upon the 
vast literature of organization theory, bureaucratic behav­
ior, and decision-making analysis. As such, it differs both 
in kind and in scope from the dominant research traditions 
in the discipline of political science. It is different in 
kind because most policy evaluation efforts in the past have 
ignored political theory to focus upon standards adopted from 
other disciplines. Most notable in this regard has been the 
emphasis on concepts borrowed from economics (the use of 
cost-benefit analysis is only one example) and social psy­
chology (as in the development of social choice models).
While not a critique of this interdisciplinarity, this study 
has instead sought to bring some of the conceptual "tools" 
of political science to bear upon the analysis of public 
policy-making. Through this approach, a broader analytical 
scope can be attained. Most policy assessments have empha­
sized only one evaluative criterion, usually either policy 
output efficiency or policy outcome effectiveness. The 
reasons for this myopia are numerous, but a significant
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element has been the temptation to utilize fiscal indicators 
as measures of public policies. Using a model composed of 
the entire range of policy process components forces the 
analyst to consider factors other than program funding.
The case of the Federal Energy Administration pro­
vides an excellent example of why this broader approach to 
policy evaluation is necessary. Criticized as an inefficient 
and ineffective bureaucracy by those analysts with narrow 
policy foci, the FEA is a classic example of a regulatory 
agency which was created for purposes other than the mere 
economic allocation of resources. The FEA was established 
in part as an "overseer" of oil industry competition, in 
part as a "receptor" of interest group demands, and in part 
as a political symbol of federal government action in the 
wake of the energy crisis. Any reform of the energy policy 
system must be based on analysis which has a broader defini­
tion of policy "failure" than mere inefficiency or ineffec­
tiveness. The same principle holds true for policy evalua­
tion in general. Consideration must be given to concepts 
like representativeness, equity, responsiveness and responsi­
bility in any future research which assesses the content of 
public policies.
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